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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE

OF LIBERAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
The roots of feminism as an organized philosophical and
political movement lie in liberalism.

Liberalism's emphasis

on individual rights, as opposed to obligations, creates an
environment conducive to the political aspirations of many
disenfranchised groups.

Thus feminism, loosely understood as

any attempt to "end women's subordination" (Jaggar 1983, 5),
originated in claims by women to equal political rights within
liberal

society.

Recently,

rejected

liberalism,

initiated

the

addresses

women's

feminist

however,

claiming
movement,

emancipatory

many

that
it

feminists

although
no

longer

concerns.

have

liberalism
adequately

Indeed,

some

feminists claim that liberalism is itself merely a vehicle of
patriarchy.
Many feminists use the term "patriarchy" to identify the
systematic oppression of women in all areas of life.

Femi-

nists adopted this term from an older usage which designates
the

father's

rule over his

children.

According

to

Kate

Millett (1970, 25), "the principles of patriarchy appear to be
two-fold:
younger."

male shall dominate female,
In

attacking

patriarchy,

elder shall dominate
feminism

extends

2

liberalism's emancipatory project.
paternalism

in politics,

female by male.

As liberalism undermines

feminism challenges

the

rule

of

This extension of the liberal ethic revealed,

according to many feminists, a limitation and contradiction in
liberalism itself (see Jaggar 1983; Eisenstein 1981; Elshtain
1981; Hirschmann 1992;
liberalism rests

on

private institution,
because

Pateman 1988; Young 1990).

the

1970,

that

the

family

is

a

largely outside political control, and

"patriarchy's

(Millett

assumption

Because

chief

33),

institution

liberalism

is

effectively

captive within patriarchal family life.

the

family"

leaves

women

In particular, some

feminists charge that the liberal understanding of family, and
its relationship to politics, cannot adequately address the
demands of women's biological, cultural and historical situation.

Other feminists claim that liberalism's distinction

between private and public eliminates women's unique moral
voices

from

political

discourse.

Although

liberalism's

promise of individual freedom and equality invigorated women's
aspirations, many feminists believe that this promise cannot
be fulfilled within liberalism• s understanding of the distinction between private and public (see Jaggar 1983; Eisenstein
1981;

Elshtain 1981;

Hirschmann 1992;

Pateman 1988;

Young

1990).
Liberalism's distinction between private and public is
precisely what many feminists find most troubling:

one's role

in the family necessarily has consequences for one's position

3

as a citizen.

According to these feminists, family relations

are not free

from coercion and therefore cannot simply be

relegated to the private sphere as liberalism conceives of it.
These anti-liberal feminists claim liberalism has been blind
to and thus legitimized the inequalities in family relations.
As Pateman (1987, 103) notes, "feminist criticism is primarily
directed at the separation and opposition between the public
and private spheres in liberal theory and practice."
In this way, feminism extends and revolutionizes Marx's
critique of liberalism.

Marxism unmasked the relations of

coercion inherent to capitalist economy,

but failed in its

emphasis on class structure to address women's subordination
in the family independently of class.
other hand,

Feminism argues, on the

that political equality demands

at least some

standard of both economic and familial equality

(Nicholson

1986, 3-4, 201-203).
Linda Nicholson traces the historically evolving nature
of private and public in Gender and History.
that

"liberalism

and

marxism

are

Nicholson claims

manifestations

of

the

changing dynamic between private and public in the seventeenth
and nineteenth centuries, respectively," and that "feminism is
a manifestation of the changing dynamic between these spheres
in the nineteenth and twentieth century"

(1986, 4).

In her

view, the decreasing role of kinship in politics resulted in
liberalism's bifurcation of the private (family) and political.

Marxism redefined the private and public distinction,

4

identifying the relations of domination in
economy and removing

the capitalist

them from the private,

sphere (1986, 201-203).

non-political

Feminism also redefines the private

and public distinction identifying the relations of domination
in the family (1986, 3-4).
Feminism exposes the relations of domination endemic to
the family, although individual feminists have analyzed these
bases on different terms.

Susan Moller Okin (1979), in her

ground-breaking Women in Western Political Thought, laid the
foundation

for

the continuing feminist

elaboration on the

relationship between the private and public and its implications for woman's position in society.
the

works

discovers

of

Plato,

that

Aristotle,

because

these

Through an exegesis of

Rousseau

thinkers

and

Mill,

continually

Okin
define

"woman" in terms of "family," true feminist reforms within the
framework of these philosophies is limited,

if not impossi-

ble. 1

Even the feminist liberal thought of John Stuart Mill

fails

to effectively address women's demands for equality,

according to Okin.

Although Mill posits that there exists "no

natural inequality between the sexes," he consistently ties
women to their roles as wives and mothers
228) .

Mill

refuses

to

allow

women

to

(Okin 1979,
relinquish

227their

domestic duties and fails to recognize the implications of

1

The notable exception to this synthesis of woman with
family is, of course, Plato's Republic. Plato does, however,
resurrect this synthesis in The Laws.

5

this

burden

for

the

possibility

of

women

sharing

equal

political power with men.
Other feminists, building on Okin' s original work, extend
the critique of private and public in liberalism to include a
critique of distinctions between man/woman,
and politics/family (Pateman 1987, 109).

power/morality,

Zillah Eisenstein

(1981, 223) identifies the private and public with woman and
man:
Because of the patriarchal origins of this
distinction, the state is identified as the male
and public world, and the family is defined as the
female and private world.
The rule by men is
formalized by the state because this division of
public and private life is at one and the same time
a male/female distinction.
On the basis of this
distinction,
ideology identifies the realm of
female, family, private life, as outside political
life and the domain of the state.
Eisenstein argues that the public-private distinction merely
reiterates,

in a sophisticated "mystified" way, patriarchal
In her

oppression.
covertly

maintains

view,
female

individual--male--liberty.

the

public-private

subordination
Liberalism

in

distinction
the

face

perpetuates

of
and

supports women's oppression by disallowing political means to
attack women's subordination in the family, in language and in
the market.
and

By "reify(ing)" the distinction between familial

political

life,

liberalism

institutionalizes

woman's

oppression by man (Eisenstein 1981, 44).
Jean Bethke Elshtain criticizes liberalism on yet another
ground, the association of public with power and private with

6

moral. 2

She traces the demarcation between public-private in

liberal tradition to a deeper distinction between reason and
feeling

(Elshtain

1981,

116-117).

Liberalism

identifies

politics with the realm of reason, self-interest, calculation;
it

identifies

the

private--the

family--with

nurturance, responsibility and love.

the

realm of

This aspect of public-

private in liberalism Elshtain finds both dysfunctional and
sexist.
In this view, the problem with liberalism is two-fold in
that liberalism both confines this compassionate nature to the
non-political and in doing so relegates women to an inferior
private sphere.

The solution argues

Elshtain,

is

not

politicize the family but to feminize the political.

to
She

hopes for a "politics of compassion" (Elshtain 1981, 348-349)
in which:
the activation of a female participatory capability
must begin with her immediate concerns, go on to
give a robust account of them, and then bring these
concerns to a transformed vision of the political
community.
Arlene

Saxonhouse

poses

yet

another

liberalism through her examination of
thought.

The premoderns,

challenge

for

premodern political

ranging from Plato to Machiavelli

(to the extent that the latter is premodern)

taught us that

the private is political, that politics rests on a foundation

2

Pateman (1987) suggests power and morality as one
framework for understanding the feminist critique of public
and private.

7

laid by the family.

Woman and family play a central, albeit

subordinate, part in the political thought of the premoderns.
Both male and female are necessary for the existence of the whole. Preliberal thought acknowledges the differences between the sexes and attempts
to work with that difference, sometimes for better
and sometimes for worse, to build coherent, stable
political communities.
(Saxonhouse 1985, 9)
Liberalism,

which

distinguishes

clearly

between

the

public and the private, celebrating the individual's exploitation of the private realm (in that endless search for goods)
poses a paradox for the advancement of women.

Saxonhouse

distinguishes between private and public in a substantially
different way than Elshtain.
in premodern times virtue
(private),

According to Saxonhouse, whereas
(public)

rested upon partiality

the elimination of a consideration of virtue in

modernity transformed the public and private into two competing channels for the actualization of self-interest.

Liberal-

ism pushes men back into the realm of traditionally female
economic (in ancient terms "household") matters.

In identify-

ing both the public and private with self-interest, liberalism
eliminates differences between people in the public realm but
also

displaces

private,

woman

from

her

traditional

location,

the

without providing and adequate foundation for her

integration within the public realm.
As both public and private realms become arenas for
male activity in the theoretical perspective of
liberalism, the female, whose previous stature had
been guardian of the private realm, was denied any
significant place in the portrait of society.
(Saxonhouse 1985, 15)

8

This

dissertation

def ends

liberalism

against

those

feminists who would jettison it as necessarily implicated in
patriarchy (Eisenstein 1981; Elshtain 1981; Hirschmann 1992;
Jaggar 1983;

Nicholson 1986;

Young 1990).

In adopting a

feminist perspective, I seek, in this dissertation, to defend
liberalism as compatible with feminism.

I defend liberalism

as potentially feminist against those feminists who dismiss it
as irretrievable patriarchal.

Specifically, I argue that the

patriarchal aspects of liberalism are historically contingent,
that liberalism can effectively address patriarchy and still
remain liberalism.
In

opening

endanger

individual

express personal,
require a

offers

the

family

to

politics,

integrity.

In

uniquely chosen,

degree of

challenging
public,

the

families,

ends;

feminists
individuals

as such,

families

autonomy from external coercion.

liberal

some feminists
individuals,

some

in

distinction

between

private

In
and

lose the security that distinction
and

out

of

families.

Liberalism

provides a model for battling familial inequities and their
economic and political implications while preserving individual autonomy.
of

Liberalism, I argue, allows for a consideration

these concerns without losing sight of individuals and

their need for autonomy within their own family.
Although the demarcation of private and public arenas
varies among different liberals, the aim remains the same:
secure individual autonomy.

to

John Locke, writing to def end the

9

individual

from

an oppressive monarch

and

an

established

Church, distinguishes the public (politics) from the civil and
the private

(marriage,

attempt

restrict

to

authority.

family,
the

economics,

boundaries

John Stuart Mill,

of

religion)

in an

legitimate

state

writing in a

time and place

where civil liberties had been widely accepted,
protect

the

individual

majority opinion.

from a

new danger- - the

sought to
tyranny of

Mill seeks to protect the individual from

the majority by delineating certain domains (e.g., freedom of
speech)

where the individual is sovereign.

These freedoms

must be respected regardless of the "likings and dislikings"
of the majority.

In the twentieth-century, John Rawls faced

quite a different threat to individual self-actualization-economic inequality.

Rawls' welfare liberalism attempts to

reconcile

autonomy

individual

with

economic

disparity

by

redefining some economic concerns as political concerns.
Regardless of the actual content of private and public in
different liberal formulations, the private is identified with
the freedom of individual action necessary to ensure autonomy,
the public with
groups.

To

the concessions

limit

and

control

maximize individual liberty,
authority

to

certain

arenas

of

individuals

coercion,

to

living

protect

in
and

liberalism relegates political
and

private, as beyond political control.
definitions of private and public

labels

other

arenas

as

Despite the fluctuating
(Nicholson 1986,

4),

and

despite the historically ambiguous nature of those definitions

10
(Pateman 1979,
categorizes

103),

It does

liberty within a
an

implicitly

domains of various activities which it

differently.

creates

liberalism explicitly and

arena

this

in order to allow for maximum

variety of
free

treats

from

social

contexts.

coercion

(the

Liberalism

private),

and

organizes the public so as to minimize its coercive potential.
Both the private and public aim toward one end:
enhancement of individual autonomy.

the

The adaptable nature of

private and public in different liberal expressions allows it
to face a variety of threats to individual liberty, whether
those

threats

arena.

arise

Liberalism

from within or without
implicitly

recognizes

the political

that

a

certain

balance is required in the relationship between the familial,
economic and political spheres if individual autonomy is to be
maintained.
private

In

particular,

the

in liberalism reflects

ty/partiality

in each person.

pull

between

public

and

a pull between uni versali Just

as

each person must

balance the needs of her/his own family with the needs of the
community at large, liberalism represents a continual struggle
to balance private and public in the face of changing circumstances (Kirp 1986, 18).
An examination of the dynamics of private and public in
the evolution of liberal thought can help liberalism meet the
challenges of feminists who claim that liberalism denies the
reality that women live each day--the overlap between public
aspirations and private responsibilities (Pateman 1987, 117).
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Specifically, liberal political thought provides feminism with
a paradigm for understanding the meaning of different spheres
of

human acti vi ty 3 while

patriarchy.

still allowing

for

an attack on

Some feminists, in stressing "patriarchy," come

close to defining all spheres of human activity in terms of
male

power,

all

heterosexual

domination (Landes 1982, 125).
recapture

the

differences

relationships

in

terms

of

The liberal paradigm can help

between power and

love

in both

politics and family while admitting that considerable overlap
exists and that patriarchy touches both.
Liberalism allows for an understanding of the intersections between family and politics, private and public, while
accounting for the differences between them.

My relationship

with my neighbor or an acquaintance differs significantly from
my

relationship

with

Liberalism recognizes

my

sister,

my

spouse

or

my

child.

the integrally distinctive nature of

each realm while still allowing for a dialogue between them.
So as Elshtain argues that we can transform politics through
compassion, I would argue that the gentle, responsible, giving
creature Elshtain depicts as original and distinctive to the
family unit cannot survive translation to the political realm.
Liberalism reflects a pull between reason (power) and emotion
3

See Walzer's Spheres of Justice for a thoughtful
discussion of these different spheres and their overlap.
Particularly note his discussion on "dominance" and "kinship
and love."
Okin in Justice, Gender and the Family also
suggests that Walzer will be of particular help in the area,
although she elaborates what she sees as major concerns with
his feminism.
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(nurturance) in each individual, and not necessarily between
the sexes.
only a

The tension between reason, power and love is not

tension between the different sexes but also within

each individual.
Finally, liberalism offers a picture of the individual as
a

responsible,

reasonable actor and a vision for enhancing

reflexive action.

Whereas some feminist histories draw a

picture of women as unwitting innocent victims of patriarchy
who

suddenly gain control of

their destinies

through

the

miracles of birth control, 4 liberalism constructs a system in
which the individual accepts, and politics enhances, responsibility.

Liberalism provides a model for encouraging individu-

al responsibility while mitigating oppressive personal and
social inequalities.
This project builds,
Okin.

In Justice,

most directly,

Gender,

and

the

upon the work of

Family,

Okin

(1989a)

suggests that certain twentieth century liberals, particularly
Rawls,

can be used,

concerns.
tying

the

selectively,

to meet feminist familial

This dissertation builds on Okin' s suggestion while
liberalism of Rawls

to

the

larger

tradition of

liberalism itself--a tie which Okin neglects. 5

In addition,

this dissertation adopts a "spheres of justice" approach to
politics and human life, articulated by Walzer (1983).

4

Unlike

See, for example, O'Brien (1981).

"Note Okin' s stinging criticism of
Western Political Philosophy (1979).

Mill

in Women

in

13
Walzer,

I

find

this

understanding of multiple spheres

of

activities to be compatible with, and informed by, liberalism
and its understanding of the individual participating in a
variety of relationships.
In

conclusion,

feminist

political

thought

lacks

a

coherent, systematic examination of private and public in the
liberal

tradition.

liberalism),

The

works

John Stuart Mill

of

John

Locke

{classical

{modern liberalism)

and John

Rawls {welfare liberalism) serve as the foremost expressions
of the various liberal traditions and should reveal both the
universal

and

liberalism.

relative

nature

of

private

and

public

in

A coherent identification of the similarities

among and the differences between private and public manifestations

in these expressions of liberalism should allow a

separation of the inherent--from the incidental--character of
public

and

implications

private.
of

the

This

study

feminist

clarifies

project while

the

political

revealing

the

latent potential within liberalism for meeting this newly
identified challenge to individual liberty--gender.
This task will be accomplished in four steps.

Chapter l,

"Locke and Patriarchy," explores the classical liberalism of
John Locke as a response to premodern patriarchy.

Placing

Locke's distinction between private and public in historical
perspective reveals his attempt to protect individual autonomy
from patriarchy.
consent provides

A look at Locke's foundation for politics in
an opportunity

for

questioning

the

14
responsible actor notion in liberalism.

An elaboration of

Locke's different purposes and meanings of authority demonstrates at least a rudimentary understanding of the variety of
different relationships (e.g., marital, parental, economic and
political)

in

life.

social from political,

Furthermore,

Locke's

not merely private,

distinction of
may reveal

the

depth of understanding of the complexity of human relations in
even this early liberal expression.
Chapter 2,
teenth

"Mill and Feminism," analyzes Mill's nine-

century

liberalism

as

both

a

unique

response

to

particular historical threats to individual autonomy and as a
continuation

of

the

liberal

project

revealed

in

Locke.

Special attention is paid to Mill's demarcation of certain
areas of autonomy and their implications for feminist concerns
with the family.

Specifically,

I ask if Mill's liberalism

carries consequences for women's emancipatory concerns which
he may not have carried to their fruition in his own feminist
writing.
Chapter 3,

"Rawls and Gender Justice," assesses Rawls'

Theory of Justice in light of the theme, gender justice.

Can

Rawls' "original position" and "veil of ignorance" accommodate
the liberation of both sexes?

Can Rawls' abstract individual-

ism be reconciled with women's actual, historical oppression?
In particular,

this chapter argues that Rawls distinguishes

between private and public in a way that is both helpful to

15
women's emancipation, and maintains the liberal concern for
privacy and individual choice.
Finally,
Paradigm:

the

conclusion,

"The

Liberal

and

Feminist

Are the Two Mutually Exclusive?" illustrates the

historically evolving nature of liberalism, and the private
and public distinction as inherent to and as the product of
that evolution.

That chapter delineates the implications of

this project for both the feminist and liberal paradigm.

I

argue that feminism must acknowledge and return to its liberal
heritage

if

it

hopes

to

reconcile

sexual

equality

with

individual freedom.
Using

a

feminist

perspective,

my

approach

textual exegesis and historical analysis.

relies

on

As Myra Jehlen

(1982, 189) explains,
Feminist thinking is really rethinking, an examination of the way certain assumptions about women and
female character enter into the fundamental assumptions that organize all our thinking.
Feminism reclaims women's experience in society,
history and language.

politics,

Through textual criticism and histori-

cal analysis I investigate both women's inherent and incidental status in liberalism and the implications of that status.
My

focus

differs

from other

feminist

explorations

in

its

concentration on the historically evolving nature of liberalism and the dynamics of private and public within liberalism.

CHAPTER II
LOCKE AND PATRIARCHY
As

one

political

of

the

thought

founders

offers

an

of

opportunity

criticize key liberal assumptions.
ty,

family,

and most

liberalism

John

to

Locke's

analyze

and

Individuality, rationali-

importantly,

the distinction between

private and public life provide a focal point for the feminist
critique of Locke and liberalism.

Indeed,

feminists target

Locke as the first political theorist to explicitly separate
private family from public politics and use his thought as an
indication of the repercussions of that separation for women
given their unique positions within families, the economy, and
politics.

Feminists ask whether Locke's distinction between

private and public furthers or hinders women's emancipatory
goals. 1
Feminists

read

Locke with

two goals

in mind.

Most

simply, they hope to expose the assumptions about and implications for women evident in Locke's liberalism.

More profound-

ly, they seek to reveal something integral to Locke's liberalism--and liberalism in general--which becomes apparent when
1

For an interesting discussion of Locke's place in the
history of the evolution of private and public, see Nicholson
(1986).
16
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one

reads

Locke

with

woman's

unique

personal,

economic, and political experiences in mind.

familial,

Decentering man

and putting woman at the center of Locke's political philosophy

discloses,

for

many

feminists,

the

assumptions

subsequent limits of Lockean freedom and equality.

and

On this

basis, Nancy Hirschmann (1989, 1242) writes that "a feminist
method profoundly alters the very terms of the discourse" in
liberalism and concludes that "the context must be changed" in
order

for

politics

women's concerns.

to

adequately

understand

and

address

In fact, many feminists conclude that women

simply do not, and cannot, fit into Locke's schema of freedom
and equality; that is, Locke's thought on equality, autonomy
and individuality fails to address women's actual biological
and historical circumstances.

For many feminists,

reading

Locke from a woman's perspective reveals an internal contradiction in Locke's liberalism which neither he nor liberalism
in general can resolve (see e.g., Elshtain 1981; Eisenstein
1981; Jaggar 1983; Nicholson 1986; Pateman 1987).
These feminists

find this internal contradiction most

apparent in Locke's argument against patriarchy.

As feminists

correctly point out, patriarchy supports both paternalism in
politics and the family.

Patriarchy not only demands that

older rule younger but also that male rule female.

Locke's

own argument against patriarchy addresses only the former
(older rule of younger) while failing to challenge, and even
buttressing, the latter (male rule of female).

Locke manages
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to do this by distinguishing between a public sphere (politics) where men are regarded as adults and a private sphere
(in particular, the family) where men rule as "the abler and
the

stronger"

(II,

82) . 2

This

feminist

reading of

Locke

concludes that Locke's liberalism can never deliver on its
promise of equality and autonomy because Locke's argument
against patriarchy goes neither far nor deep enough.
challenging

the

authority of

one patriarch

(the

While

King)

justifies the authority of many (fathers and husbands).

he
In

distinguishing private family from politics Locke manages to
free adult men while leaving women enslaved (see, in particular, Pateman 1988; see also Clark 1979; Coale 1988).
The feminist critique of Locke centers on his distinction
between public

and private which,

these

feminists

allows him to liberate men while subordinating women.

claim,
Some

feminists look closely at Locke's thought on woman as wife,
mother and
public

laborer,

and conclude

that

Locke's

promise of

freedom and equality conflicts with his particular

understanding of the private patriarchal family and woman's
place in it.

More specifically, these feminists claim that

the individual Locke frees is biologically and socially male;
that Locke eliminates political patriarchy while salvaging

2

Hereafter Locke's works will be cited as follows:
An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding as Essay, Book #, Section
#, paragraph#; A Letter Concerning Toleration as Letter, page
#; Two Treatises of Government as 1, paragraph # and II,
paragraph #; and Some Thoughts Concerning Education as STCE,
Paragraph #.
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familial patriarchy; that Locke's assumptions about property
and

rationality and women's

economic position effectively

undermine any possibility of sexual equality;

and finally,

that Locke's distinction between private and public brings all
these facets of women's oppression together in a systematic,
albeit "mystified"

(Eisenstein 1981, 49) paradigm.

In sum,

these feminists critique Locke from all sides, finding Locke's
philosophy inadequate to meet women's unique circumstances,
arguing that putting woman into her appropriate biological,
familial,

economic

and

political

context

undermines

any

pretense of freedom and equality in Locke's thought.

Locke's

distinction

women's

between

private

and

public

cements

oppression in all spheres of human activity. 3
This chapter argues that Locke's feminist critics misread
Locke and misinterpret his distinction between public and
private.

3

These

anti-liberal

feminists

claim

that

the

Thus this chapter as well as the feminist critique of
Locke goes well beyond his sexually biased language; that is,
the question is not simply whether he used "man" or "he" in a
generic or sexually specific way.
Interestingly, Locke
elaborates the meaning of "man" in distinguishing "man" from
"person"
in his Essay concerning Human Understanding.
According to John Yolton he identifies the former with the
"sameness of life in a biological organism" and the latter
with a person aware of "one's actions and thoughts" ( 19 64,
17).
Locke himself refers to the "Species of Man" (Locke's
emphasis) (Essay, III, 6, 26) .
Probably, Locke used the
pronoun "he" in both specific and non-specific ways. In Some
Thoughts Concerning Education Locke uses the pronoun "he"
throughout, with the exception of a few examples solely
applicable to daughters, but also indicates in correspondence
to Mrs. Clark that the educational advice given in that work
applies almost wholly to daughters as well (Eisenstein 1981,
4 8) •
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public-private distinction is founded, directly or indirectly,
in male-female differences,
private sphere.

thereby relegating women to the

Particular feminists characterize the public

and private distinction differently, as one between reason and
passion

(Elshtain

1981),

or

politics

and

family/economy

(Eisenstein 1981), or politics and marriage, "male sex right"
(Pateman 1988), but behind all these characterizations looms
what

each

considers

fundamental

differences between the sexes.
Locke's

or

constructed

The real dichotomy behind

public-private distinction,

f emale but adult-child.

socially

however,

is

not male-

Locke's anti-paternalism underlies

his identification of a variety of spheres

(e.g., politics,

religion, the economy and the family) where persons interact
as adults.

Clearly, children cannot and should not be treated

as adults.

Locke's distinction between family and politics

reflects this child-adult difference.
Furthermore, what some feminists represent as a dichotomy
between public and private is actually for Locke a multitude
of

interacting

individuals act.

and partially

integrated

An examination of

spheres

these various

in which
spheres

reveals a latent potential in Locke's philosophy for addressing women's particular circumstances.

Locke distinguishes

private spheres--family, religion, economy--from the public,
political sphere in an attempt to further the understanding of
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each unique relationship and to guard against authority in one
sphere inappropriately seeping into another. 4
(T)he Power of a Magistrate over a Subject, may be
distinguished from that of a Father over his Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his
Wife, and a Lord over his Slave .... It may help us
to distinguish these Powers one from another, and
show the difference betwixt a Ruler of a Commonwealth, a Father of a Family, and a Captain of a
Galley.
(II, 2)
Locke explores the dynamics at work in a number of different
spheres of human relationships and attempts to balance the
needs of both equality and liberty within and between each
sphere.

He also indicates an understanding of the impact of

each sphere on another:

rather than isolating each sphere

from the others he demonstrates the necessity of diminishing
inequalities

of

one

sphere

to

affect

opportunities

for

equality in another.
In sum, the feminist critique of Locke has neglected the
more radical strains in Locke's thought.

These come into

focus when one interprets Locke's distinction between private
and public as an expression of the competing needs and rights
of a

multitude of

spheres within

4

spheres and when one understands

the context of adult

these

liberty and parental

See Walzer (1983) for a recent exploration of the
distinctions between various private and public spheres.
Walzer, like Locke, guards against "domination" in one sphere
inappropriately influencing relationships in another.
For
example, one should not be able to buy political off ice;
economic dominance should not translate into political
dominance.
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nurturance. 5

More specifically,

depicting Locke's politics

as isolated from familial and religious concerns leads some
feminists to mistakenly conclude that materialistic hedonism
grounds Locke's politics (see, in particular, Elshtain 1981).
Representing Locke's distinction between private and public as
dichotomous leads other feminists to conclude mistakenly that
Locke's political theory fails to provide an avenue for the
understanding and amelioration of women's private subordination (see, among others, Coole 1988; Nicholson 1986; Pateman
1987).
Not only do some feminists misread Locke and underestimate the radical potential in his work, their rejection of the
liberal distinction between private and public leaves
feminist project vulnerable to a
tyrannical rule over female.

the

tyranny as great as male

Some feminists undermine the

distinction between private and public activities

without

suggesting or sketching a suitable alternative conception of
either family or politics or the differences between each.
Although

the personal

carries political

personal is not political.

implications,

To conceive of it as such opens

the family to tyrannical intrusions from a
political

system.

Families

are by

(compassionate?)

their nature private.

Locke does not arbitrarily label them as such.

5

the

The family

Contemporary scholarship has focused on these more
radical strains in Locke without specifically exploring the
ramifications for feminism.
See, for example, Ashcraft
(1987).
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functions not only as a financial unit, but also, and perhaps
more importantly, as an emotional unit where love can override
interest and giving can take place without a constant concern
for

reciprocity. 6

To politicize

this

love

beyond

dilutes it to such an extent as to destroy it. 7

family

Love, by its

nature, is prejudiced, unequal (Walzer, 229) not universal or
generalized.
Family

arrangements,

marital

arrangements,

demand

a

certain degree of personal choice free from the demands of
political dictates.

Regulation of the give and take in family

and marital exchanges would destroy the free expression of the
love that takes place within families.

Demands for equality

limit

their

the

behavior.
nature,

choices

of

individuals

in

interpersonal

A demand for equality within the family,
denies

liberty.

In

seeking

to

destroy

by its
Locke's

distinction between private and public, some feminists fail to
provide a protection for the free,

prejudiced and unequal,

expression of love.
None of this denies that politics necessarily affects
families, or that any political philosophy must recognize and
constructively
other.

regulate

the

impact of

each

See Walzer (1983) discussion
emotional/financial unit.
7

the

However, I argue that any interference of one sphere

into another should not only be limited,
6

sphere on

of

but also should

the

family

as

an

See Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic in Politics, Ernest Barker, ed.
(1979, Bk. 2, Chap. 3, 43-45).
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respect

the unique nature of

identification

of

separate,

that other sphere.
yet

interacting,

Locke's

spheres

of

activities is crucially important to the feminist project of
human emancipation as a necessary protection against tyranny.
Whereas

some

feminists

argue

that

Locke's

philosophy

of

liberty is ultimately a philosophy of patriarchy, I argue that
Locke's anti-paternalism, his distinction between private and
public,

can be harnessed by feminists

freedom and equality,

in the struggle for

despite the fact

that Locke himself

often failed to delineate the radical potential within his own
principles.

Locke's

thought

on personhood,

marriage

and

family, the economy, and most importantly, private and public
relationships, all demonstrate Locke's principles of emancipation and egalitarianism.
The purpose of this first chapter is not to paint Locke
as a feminist, or even as a precursor of feminism (indeed the
term feminist in this context would be an anachronism)

but

rather to fully examine some of his more radical thought on
gender and family and demonstrate that liberalism itself can
accommodate both male and

female

equality.

the

Demonstrating

demands

principles

for

liberty and

of

liberty

and

equality at work in a multitude of spheres highlights this
radical potential and guides this chapter.

By emphasizing the

more radical aspects of Locke's thought with respect to women,
this chapter hopes to draw attention to the sexually liberating potential in classical liberalism.

Toward this end the
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remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections.

The

first section elaborates the feminist critique of Locke.

The

second section expounds those principles in Locke's political
philosophy most valuable to feminist aspirations.
section details a

The third

specific response to the feminist chal-

lenges.
The Feminist Critique of Locke
Feminist critics of Locke perceive a conflict between his
promises

of

political

liberty

and

individual and social circumstances.

equality

feminist

critique. 8

critique

and

a

women's

Two broad strains of

anti-liberal feminist criticism of Locke exist:
tarian

and

a communi-

radical/marxist

feminist

The former stresses women's particular biological

and familial situations and concludes that the person Locke
frees is biologically and socially male.

The latter concen-

trates on women's unique familial and economic circumstances
and concludes that the structure of society and politics which
Locke defends leads inevitably to women's domination by men.
Both the communitarian feminist and radical/marxist feminist
analyses conclude that Locke's liberalism oppresses rather

8

Mary Dietz (1987) identifies two feminist challenges to
the liberal notion of citizenship which she labels maternalist
feminism and marxist feminism.
The two critiques I discuss
here are substantially the same.
I've changed the names for
two reasons.
The former label, "maternalist feminism"
neglects, I think, the debt of these feminists to more
traditional communitarian thought.
The latter, "marxist
feminism" collapses, too readily, feminist thought on patriarchy with marxist thought on class.
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than liberates women.

Both strains of anti-liberal feminists

agree that Locke's attack on patriarchy fails

to undermine

men's patriarchal rule over women.
The communitarian feminist reading of Locke argues that
Locke's

philosophy

individual,

who

revolves

concerns

around

himself

an

exclusively

with

male

self-preservation,

maximizing rights and accumulating wealth.

He is the center

of his world; his own needs drive his actions.

According to

Mary Dietz (1987, 2), liberal individuals, including Locke's
individuals, "are atomistic, rational agents whose existence
and interests are ontologically prior to society."
uals tend "naturally toward egoism"

Individ-

(Jaggar 1983, 31).

The communitarian feminist interpretation of the character of Locke's individual derives from an older reading of
Locke,

his notion of human nature and its relationship to

politics.

Leo Strauss•

Natural

Right

and History

(1953)

claimed, among other things, to discover the moral foundation
grounding Locke's politics and Locke's individual.

Contrary

to the dominant interpretation, Strauss asserted that Locke's
writings on the state of nature, natural law, and the moral,
religious

individual

were

actually

a

prudent

obscuring the primacy of the state of war,
natural

right

and

individual

Straussian

interpretation,

individual

palatable;

Locke

hedonism.

makes

the

rejects

subterfuge

self-interested
Locke,

selfish

the

in

this

Hobbesian

traditional

and

Christian explanation of humanity partaking in an ordered
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universe

guided

(natural

law)

limitless
system.

by

and

search

independent,
instead

for

places

joy at

discernable
the

moral

individual

the center of

his

codes

and

his

political

Strauss (1953, 248) claims that,

through the shift in emphasis from natural duties
or obligations to natural rights, the individual,
the ego, had become the center and origin of the
moral world, since man--as distinguished from man's
end--had become the center or origin.
This

hedonism,

accumulation

of

a

"peculiar"
wealth

enjoyment of pleasure,

hedonism associated with

rather

than

the

simple

the

immediate

explains both the character of the

Lockean individual and the nature of politics.

The intent of

Locke's politics, as seen by Strauss, is to guard the individual' s hedonist pursuits and protect "the joyless quest for
joy" (1953, 251).

Strauss' interpretation of Locke's politics

empties it of any virtue higher than self-interest, of any
compassion or morality not immediately founded on the individuals own egoistic desires.
Communitarian

feminists

do

not

greatly

dispute

the

accuracy of this description of men; rather, they challenge
its applicability to women.

Communitarian feminists assert

that women's experience of themselves and the world differs
significantly from male--and

11

liberal 11 --individuals.

Liber-

alism tries to fit women into a mold which they cannot and
should not accommodate.

Some communitarian feminists trace a

difference in men's and women's moral agendas--that is, their
empathic

capability--to

their

different

reproductive
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capacities interacting within social contexts.

Man's alien-

ation from the product of his body at conception actualizes
itself in his greater sense of separateness, in abstract moral
reasoning, and in his historical and institutional attempts to
mediate his alienation from the means of reproduction (0' Brien
1981).

Women,

in

contrast,

immediately

and

profoundly

experience themselves as connected, both in their reproductive
experience and their historical roles as nurturers.
who

traditionally

have

centered

their

lives

Women,

around

the

activities of the family, realize themselves as members of a
group, members bound by the needs and desires of others as
well as the limits of that unique familial context.

Women

cannot

These

and should not become

liberal

individuals.

feminists
eschew the liberal notion of citizen as an individual holder of rights ....
Such a notion is at
best morally empty and at worst morally subversive
since it rests on a distinctly masculine conception
of the person as an independent, self-interested,
economic being. (Dietz 1987, 10)
Women are more likely to think, to act, to reason in terms of
duty rather than right. 9
Jean Bethke Elshtain's (1981, 118) analysis of liberalism
centers on this sexually differentiated understanding of self.
9

Carol Gilligan (1982, 100) documents male and female
moral development in In A Different Voice.
Gilligan:
"The
moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in interviews with
women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern
and alleviate 'the real and recognizable trouble' of this
world.
For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an
injunction to respect the rights to life and self-fulfillment."

29

The presumption that human beings are rational,
metaphysically free, prudential calculators of
marginal utility ... is used as a contrast model for
the qualities and activities in a private
world
from which the public sphere is bifurcated theoretically.
According
interest

to

Elshtain,

in

liberal

the

emphasis

politics

on

rights

eliminates

and

the

self-

distinctly

feminine voice from liberal political discourse.

Women's

moral sense of connectedness and compassion is relegated to
extra-political institutions such as family.
the

detriment

women's

of

both women

compassionate

natures

and
in

This works to

liberalism by
the

private

secluding
family

and

robbing politics of the compassion women can bring to political endeavors.

The male perspective further fails politics,

as government's purpose is to guide compassionate co- existence
not hedonistic anarchy.
In this way, communitarian feminists challenge not only
liberal

individualism

but

also

liberal

rights,

liberal

obligation and liberal rationality (Jaggar 1983; Hirschmann
19 89;

Elshtain 19 81) .

obligations

are

not

For women,
conventional

completely objective and abstract.

rights are not primary,
and

rationality

is

not

Women's superior empathic

abilities distinguish them from men--and Locke's individual.
In

addition,

in

separating

family

from

politics,

Locke

isolates women's compassionate, familial nature from the hard
cold world of politics.
which

in

nurtures.

turn

For Locke, politics protects property

protects

self-interest.

Family,

however,

Within the family another's interest can override
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one's

own.

The

intimate

ties within a

family

allow

its

members to forcefully and cogently appreciate and consider the
interests of other members.

In contrast to politics,

precedes

Elshtain

right

in

family.

(1981,

126)

duty

decries

Locke's politics as oblivious to the "silenced" private sphere
of the family and, historically, women's voices.

In separat-

ing politics from family, liberalism, and Locke in particular,
diminishes politics to self-interest and relegates women's
voices to the private, non-political realm.
Saxonhouse (1985, 14) offers a different, communitarian
analysis:
Locke, with his theory of property--his contention
that the acquisition of property could lead to the
increased wealth and happiness of the entire human
--gave justification for abandoning public life and
turning to the private search for wealth.
Saxonhouse criticizes liberalism and Locke from the standpoint
of antiquity.

Politics for the Ancients entailed the pursuit

of virtue, personal and social justice, whereas the household
simply provided an economic,
pursuit.

private basis for this public

In reducing politics to the protection of property

Locke creates two competing realms of self-interest.
for

Elshtain

Locke's

politics

silences

Whereas

compassion,

for

Saxonhouse Locke's politics silences virtue in its pursuit of
secure life and goods.
very

foundation

of

political thought.

This silence is the antithesis of the

politics

as

first

espoused

in ancient

31
The
focuses

conununitarian

feminist

disagreement

on the perceived dichotomy in his

private and public, family and politics.
the

family

Locke

allows

room for

only

with

Locke

thought between

In depoliticizing
the male voice

in

politics, devaluing the significant contribution of the female
character

and

perspective.

The

radical/marxist

feminist

critique similarly emphasizes Locke's understanding of private
and public, detailing how women's actual marital, familial and
economic (i.e., private) positions militates against promises
of political emancipation for women.
nists point

Radical/marxist femi-

to an incongruence in Locke's

thought between

formal political rights and the subs tan ti ve inequalities women
experience in a variety of societal relationships. 10

Whereas

both the conununitarian feminist and radical/marxist feminist
reading of Locke revolve around his separation of family and
politics, the latter argue that in depoliticizing the family
Locke both misinterprets reality and hinders women's emancipatory struggles.

These feminists maintain that the elimination

of male control over female demands an understanding of the
political character of women's private, familial situations.
Accordingly Locke's

10

liberal political philosophy obscures,

In terms of liberalism in general, Catherine MacKinnon
(1987, 16) states "Hear this:
the abstract equality of
liberalism permits most women little more than does the
substantive inequality of conservatism."
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indeed disallows such an understanding. 11
The radical/marxist feminist critique of Locke incorporates

and

liberalism.

extends

the

more

general

marxian

critique

of

Whereas Marx revealed the intricate relationship

between the economy and politics, pointing to the patterns of
coercion operating in the economy, radical feminists unmask
the patterns of coercion present in the

family which are

reflected in the economy and politics (Nicholson 1986).
directly,

radical/marxist

feminists

extend

the

interpretation of Locke offered by C. B. Macpherson

More

marxist
(1962,

195, 261) which exposes Locke as an apologist for the nascent
English

capitalist

class.

According

to

Macpherson,

Locke

postulates the "full individuality for some ... by consuming the
individuality of

others."

That

is,

Locke

sacrifices

the

emergent working class to economic enslavement and inequality
in order to defend the right of the capitalist class to a

11

Carole Pateman (1988, 3) best represents this feminist
analysis of Locke when she distinguishes paternal patriarchy- where older males, fathers, rule younger males and all women- from fraternal patriarchy- -where all men rule all women.
According to Pateman, Locke frees adult males from their
fathers,
thus undermining paternal patriarchy.
Yet he
incorporates "male sex right" (male conjugal rights or powers)
and substantive inequality by protecting patriarchal familial
arrangements, instituting fraternal patriarchy. Patriarchal
families allow men to claim individual rights to freedom and
equality while maintaining male rule over female, smashing
feminine aspirations to the same liberty and equality. Locke
fundamentally transforms political patriarchy but Locke's
thought remains patriarchal.
One man no longer rules all
other men and women, now all men rule all women. "Patriarchy
ceased to be paternal long ago. . . .
The original contract
takes place after the political defeat of the father and
creates modern fraternal patriarchy" (Pateman's emphasis).
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virtually limitless pursuit of wealth.
whole

theory

of

limited

and

In this view, "Locke's

conditional

essentially a defense of property."

government

was

The distinction between

a private economy and public politics served both the demands
of

the

emerging

political

capitalist

equality

and

class

supplied

for

the

the

appearance

required

of

subs tan ti ve

inequality necessary for the continuation of their pursuit of
wealth within a capitalist market.

In this way, private and

public in Locke establishes both theoretical

equality and

actual inequality.
Radical/marxist feminists apply this reading of Locke's
distinction between private and public spheres

to women's

actual marital, familial, economic and political situations.
They outline the inequalities present in all these spheres of
activities and conclude that these actual inequalities obviate
any formal equalities Locke may promise.

Locke's failure to

recognize the patterns of coercion in marriage, family and the
economy obliterates any hope for equal rights for women within
his political system.

In fact,

following Macpherson,

these

feminists conclude that private and public in Locke merely
serves as a tool for the continuation of patriarchy.

Formal

equality

actual

for women both masks

and

legitimates

the

inequality in marriage, family and the economy.
According
Locke's

to

particular

the

radical/marxist

version

of

the

feminist

marriage

approach,

contract

patriarchal, demanding the subordination of women.

is

Despite

34

Locke's assertion that each person has "Property in his own
Person" and that the "Labour of his Body and the Work of his
Hands ... are properly his" (II, 27), Locke overlooks reproductive labor.
what,

Mary O'Brien (1989, 13) notes, "We do not yet ask

if all labor creates value,

reproductive labor." 12

is the value produced by

Moreover, a wife's labor in a marriage

produces community property (or offspring) which the husband
controls as

the

communality of

"abler and the stronger"
property in

the

family,

(II,

and

This

82).

the husband's

ultimate control over property produced through his wife's
labor, conflicts with the woman's right to the value of the
property produced by her own labor

(Nicholson 19 86,

156) .

Women not only bear and raise children, but also traditionally
reproduce (i.e., maintain) the entire household, including the
husband.

The

husband's

control

over

community

marital

property ignores women's reproductive labor.
More specifically, although women bear the brunt of the
labor involved in both the reproductive processes and nurturing, Locke delegates ultimate control of the product of that
labor,

the children,

to the husband.

Furthermore,

Locke's

claim that marriage provides for a "Right in one anothers'
Bodies" in effect translates into male control over the female
body given the inequities of the marriage contract and the
cultural
12

reality,

where women have historically not owned

Mary O'Brien's thought bridges what I have called the
communitarian feminist critique of Locke and the radical
feminist critique.
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their bodies but have been subject to both the control of
their fathers and their husbands.
contract

legitimizes

"masculine

In this way, the marriage
sex-right"

(Pateman

1988,

16 8) .

Radical/marxist feminists conclude that for Locke the
institution of monogamous marriage functions primarily as an
insurance of legitimate heirs for the biologically alienated
father.

Lorenne Clark (1978, 38) asks, in reference to Locke,

If Adam does not own Eve, how can he be sure who
his descendants are, and hence, on whom his apples
ought properly to devolve? And if Eve owns her own
apples, why should she obey Adam?
Along

similar

Locke's

lines,

liberalism

O'Brien

mediates

(1981,
male

159)

concludes

uncertainty

that

about

his

biological offspring by maintaining patriarchal families.
The final solution of the problem of patriarchy is
elaborated by John Locke in his first "Treatise of
Government," while the legitimacy of property as a
self-generating "principle of continuity" is celebrated in his second.
That is,

Locke's celebration of private property demands a

system- -patriarchal marriage- -whereby the father can,
certainty,

identify his rightful

(biological)

heir.

with
Locke

captures women in patriarchal marriage contracts in order to
ensure the continuation and transfer of property to legitimate
heirs.
Although Locke contends that the terms of the marriage
contract are negotiable for both men and women (each partner
may protect
contract),

the property with which he or she enters
feminists

point

out

that

for

the

Locke women must
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contract marriage.

According to Locke, women's sequential

reproductive potential (where the woman bears a second child
before the first matures) and the infant's extensive need for
care provides a "Foundation in Nature," a necessity requiring
that the woman contract marriage. 13

Thus, women's existing

economic and social disadvantages, exacerbated by the necessity to contract, significantly erode the opportunity for women
to conclude non-patriarchal marriages.

Although women may

have some latitude in negotiating the terms of the contract,
this formal latitude masks the fact that nature dictates the
need to contract and history dictates the husband as the head
of that contract. 14

Diana Coale

(1988,

86)

summarizes the

dilemma liberalism poses for women:
... there is no reason why they should not strive
for a favorable conjugal contract if, as in the
case of queens, they are able. Here is the novel
and revolutionary core of liberalism: every individual is at liberty to compete for autonomy and
success through the exertion of will.
Yet it is
unlikely that many women will succeed because their
natural and customary disadvantages remain.
Thus
emerges the hiatus which prevents the doctrine from
fulfilling its radical, universalist promises.
In a similar vein, Linda Nicholson decries Locke's
"dehistoricization" of the family.
nuclear,

patriarchal

family

is

Locke's version of the
historically

contingent,

13

0n this basis Lorenne Clark (1979, 20) notes that Locke
never mentions or discusses single women.
14

Socialist Anatole France eloquently observes, "The law,
in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal to
eat."
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according to Nicholson,
argues.

and not founded in nature as Locke

The "Foundation in Nature" to which Locke appeals in

order to justify his own version of the nuclear family is
actually

historically

reveals a

variety of

and

culturally

specific.

familial arrangements.

nature, constructs Locke's family.

History

History,

not

Patriarchy, male domina-

tion, is not based in nature as Locke describes, but is rather
the specific byproduct of a particular historical and cultural
process.
In addition to demonstrating the patriarchal aspects of
Locke's
feminists

notion
point

prejudicial

to

of

marriage

to a

and

number of

women.

Besides

control over community property,

family,

economic

radical/marxist
issues which are

criticizing

the

husband's

feminists

turn to Locke's

teaching on parental honor and inheritance.

These feminists

note that despite Locke's contention that children owe both
parents honor, the "Power Men generally have to bestow their
Estates on those, who please them best" which "is no small Tye
on the Obedience of Children"
Father.

(II,

7 2 - 7 3)

belongs

These feminists echo Leo Strauss in asking:

honor without obedience?

to

the

What is

What power do women have unless both

parents control inheritance?

According to Diana Coole (1988,

92) this allows the
father considerable political leverage thanks to
the terms of the marriage contract which generally
make him sole executor of the family property. (See
also Clark 1979)
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Radical/marxist feminists off er an even more stinging
critique of

Locke's

economic position. 15
inextricably

tied

thought

as

applied

In this view,
to

property;

rationality and individuality.

to women's

actual

Locke's rationality is

ownership

expresses

human

Locke's optimism about the

abundance of land and raw materials leads him to conclude that
the rational and industrious can and will acquire private
property.

Furthermore, to the

degree that the right to private property excludes
the working classes and women, they are excluded
from the realm of free and rational activity.
(Eisenstein 1981, 44; see also, Jaggar 1983; Coole
1988)
"He does not understand that it is

the nature of private

property to exclude the laboring masses" and women (Eisenstein
1981,

46).

Locke thereby excludes women and laborers from

legitimate activity in the political realm.

Jaggar (1983, 32)

quotes Locke:
opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly
as narrow as their fortune and their understanding
are but little instructed, when all their whole
time and pain is laid out to still the croaking of
their own bellies, or the cries of their children ....
The distractions of the cries from their children and the
husband's

control of

the wife's property indicate women's

inferior rationality for Locke.
Picking up one nuance of this radical/marxist feminist
critique and applying

15

it

to

women's

unique

political

See Macpherson (1962) for the origins of the argument.
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situation, Carole Pateman (1979, 74-76) analyzes the role of
tacit and express consent as it applies to women.

When one

expressly consents to government--by, for example, inheriting
property in that system--one acquires a "higher obligation"
(e.g., one may not emigrate)

than that imposed on those who

tacitly consent (see II, 121; see also, Coole 1988; Nicholson
19 86) .

Women,

estates

in

however,

the

have previously surrendered their

marriage

contract

and

so

"at

best

their

interest" in the social contract is "indirect and mediated by
the husband" (Coole 1988, 94).

Thus, women are in but not of

the social contract (Nicholson 1986, 157).

The standard of

consent for women and their indirect interest in its political
protection imposes both differential motives and obligations
on women.

More specifically, in so far as the state protects

their life,

women benefit;

as

to protecting their estate,

women possess no interest in consenting.

Coole

(1988,

94)

explains that "women will therefore receive limited benefits
from the state, although these will be sufficient to oblige
them to obedience."
On the basis of this examination of Locke's notion of
family, economy and politics, radical/marxist feminists oppose
Locke's separation of family from politics, of private from
public.

Women's subordinate position in the family and the

economy profoundly affects their possibilities for autonomy
and equality.
formal,

Even if Locke's liberalism does grant women

abs tract

freedoms

in

the

political

realm,

in
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separating family from politics, Locke leaves woman enslaved
in family, society and the economy.

In "reifying" (Nicholson

1986, 137) the distinction between family and politics, Locke
"mystifies"

women's

subordination

(Eisenstein

1981,

49).

Locke's separation of public from private offers the vision of
freedom and equality with one hand while pulling it back with
the

other.

Radical/marxist

feminists

conclude

that

if

politics relies on bargaining and contractual agreement then
equality is only possible if all negotiators have equal access
to valuable goods with which to negotiate.
familial obligations,

By nature of

historical expectations and economic

disadvantages, women are not properly equipped to compete in
the liberal public sector.
Thus both the communitarian and radical/marxist feminist
critiques revolve around Locke's attempt to depoliticize the
family.

The separation of private and public life renders

Locke unacceptably and necessarily patriarchal to feminist
critics.
and

An elaboration of the Lockean principles of liberty

equality,

as

they operate

in

the

private

and public

spheres, however, demonstrates that Locke's understanding of
the distinction between private and public is essential to
attaining the feminist goals of liberty and equality.
Locke's Liberal Response
I

argue

that

these

anti-liberal

feminists

not

only

misinterpret Locke's distinction between private and public as
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dichotomous 16 and "reified" 17 but also that they endanger the
feminist project (women's emancipation) in abandoning it.

The

feminist claim that the "personal is political" may collapse
human

relationships

into

a

single

dimension.

Patriarchy

touches all human relationships, but not all human relationships are defined by patriarchy.

Some feminists resurrect

exactly

which

that

notion

of

politics

Locke

finds

most

repugnant and dangerous in his protagonist, Sir Robert Filmer:
the failure to recognize the difference between private and
public pursuits (Elshtain 19 81, 212 -214) .

Locke distinguishes

private from public concerns as a protection against tyranny.

16

Pateman (1987, 106, 119) describes the liberal distinction between private and public as a dichotomy and argues that
"Locke's theory ... shows how the private and public spheres are
grounded in opposing principles of association which are
exemplified in the conflicting status of women and men;
natural subordination stands opposed to free individualism."
Eisenstein ( 19 81, 16) also identifies this dichotomy.
In
discussing the woman as mother she argues that "derived from
this are the more subtle forms of patriarchal organization:
... the division between public and private life, and the
divorce of political and family life. The separation of male
from female constructs a dichotomous world view that limits
insight into the structure of patriarchal organization itself"
(my emphasis).
17

Feminists use the term "reified" to describe what they
perceive as the liberal abstraction of public from private
life, an abstraction founded on an inappropriate understanding
of reality.
Pateman (1989, 91-92) states that in Locke, "a
reified conception of the political is built upon what I shall
call the fiction of citizenship."
She continues "Liberaldemocratic theory today ... continues to present the political
as something abstracted from, as autonomous or separate from,
the social relationships of everyday life." Nicholson (1986,
2, 4, 137) also describes the Lockean distinction between
private and public as "reified" and argues that modern
feminism, in contrast, recognizes the "complex interconnections" between the family and other spheres of society.
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Tyrants, according to Locke, extend their "Power beyond, what
of Right belonged to the lawful Princes, or Governours of the
commonweal th"

(II, 19 7) . 18

In protesting Locke's separation

of family from politics some feminists
freedom and choice.

These

feminists

threaten individual
fail

to balance the

demands of liberty and equality in terms of the variety of
specific social contexts.
Indeed many feminists do assert the need to distinguish
private from public. 19

The crucial problem becomes one of

identifying a model which articulates the differences between
private and public while providing an avenue for the elimination of patriarchy.

Properly understood, Locke provides the

beginning of such a model.

An examination of the dynamics at

work in the variety of spheres Locke identifies reveals the
radical potential founding his private-public paradigm.

18

Walzer ( 19 83, 19) explains the relationship between
private and public spheres and the protection against tyranny
more explicitly.
"The regime of complex equality is the
opposite of tyranny.
It establishes a set of relationships
such that domination is impossible. In formal terms, complex
equality means that no citizen's standing in one sphere ... can
be undercut by his standing in some other sphere."
19

For example, O'Brien (1989, 79) distinguishes between
"intimate" space and "public" space.
Elshtain (1981) also
criticizes radical feminists for forgetting about this
important distinction.
Pateman (1987, 119, 122) summarizes
that the feminist critique of the liberal distinction between
private and public does not "necessarily suggest that no
distinction can or should be drawn between the personal and
political aspects of social life."
Rather "Feminism looks
toward a differentiated social order within which the various
dimensions are distinct but not separate or opposed."
For
provocative explorations of a feminist distinction between
private and public see Young (1990); Hirschmann (1992).
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Locke distinguishes a variety of social spheres in terms
of both their foundation and their ends (II, 71).
for

example,

originate in

"Inclinations of Tenderness

Concern" (II, 63) of parents for their children.
relationship

also

Families,

expresses

this

intimacy (Ashcraft 1987, 109-112).

natural

and

The marital

inclination

to

Marriage brings with it:

Mutual Support and Assistance, and a Communion of
Interests too, as necessary not only to unite their
Care, and Affection, but also necessary to their
common Off-spring.
(II, 78)
The end of marriage and family is the duty of parents "to take
care

of

their

Off-spring,

Childhood" (II, 58).

during

the

imperfect

state

of

Politics begins with the person's desire

to be free of arbitrary and non-consensual political authority
(i.e.,

the avoidance of a state of war)

its goal the preservation of property

(II, 21) and has as
(II,

3).

Feminists

misread Locke when they describe his separation of private
(family)

and public

(politics)

as dichotomous and reified.

Rather Locke explores the dynamics at work in a number of
different

spheres

of

human

relationships

and

attempts

to

balance the demands of both individual liberty and equality in
each sphere.

Locke's reciprocal principles of liberty and

equality both inform his treatment of various spheres (familial, religious, economic, and political) as well as determine
the extent that one sphere can actively intervene another.
For Locke,

adults are rational,

free and equal.

Upon

reaching the age of reason, persons are assumed to have the
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consciousness of self and consequences which allows reasonable
action (Ashcraft 1987, 47-48, 168).
Thus we are born Free, as we are born Rational; not
that we have actually the Exercise of either: Age
that brings one, brings with it the other too. (II,
61)
Individual

freedom

consists

not

only

in

the

ability

of

individuals to choose their actions in accordance with their
preferences but also in their capacities to organize their
desires rationally, so as not to always succumb to immediate,
ephemeral passions.
discern

This rationality allows individuals to

an ordered reality which reveals

justice to humanity (natural law).

certain

laws

of

Liberty allows reasonable

individuals to discern this order and respond appropriately
(Polin 1969, 3-6).

Natural law constrains both the state of

nature and civil government.

As Locke explains,

The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern
it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is
that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult
it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty
or Possessions.
(II, 6)
In moving from the pre-political state of nature to civil
government, individuals consent to a common judge to interpret
and enforce natural law through civil law.

Thus, natural law

operates within civil arrangements as well as the state of
nature.

For this reason, the individual cannot sell him or

herself

into

slavery

in

or

out

of

the

social

contract.

Natural law forbids the arbitrary destruction of one's own or
another's life (Grant 1987, 67-71).
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Liberty is not license.

Laws of nature and of government

both circumscribe and enlarge human liberty by harmonizing
individual

freedom

Liberty

assumes

natural

law;

with

that

equality.

nature

(Pangle 1988, 234).

of

other

Individuals

neither

assigns

free
are

rulers

individuals.
equal
nor

before

subjects

Among adults:

Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another:
there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and
rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages
of Nature, and use of the same faculties, should
also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection.
(II, 4) 20
Nature

lends

equal authority to each individual,

although

individuals vary in terms of strength, beauty or intelligence.
Locke

illustrates

these

principles

of

freedom

and

equality at work in a variety of human relationships, specifically in his thoughts on family, politics and the relationship
between them.

Locke explicitly and systematically distin-

guishes political from familial relationships.
response

to

Sir

Robert

Filmer's Patriarcha,

Filmer,

who

He does so in

confounds

the

two.

the leading exposition and defense of

patriarchy in Locke's time, grounded political authority in
paternal right which, according to Filmer,
will.

reflected divine

That is, Adam's dominion over Eve, their children and

the world has been passed,
20

father

to son,

to present day

Locke makes this same point many times. "The Equality,
which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion
one over another, ... being the equal Right that every Man hath,
to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or
Authority of any other Man" (II, 54).
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rulers.

Indeed,

will but

the justification of political power remains

Adam's

same:

occasionally God intervenes to ensure his

fatherhood passed

political authority.
politics is family

to his

heirs

the

legitimizes

For Filmer, politics is not like family;
(Nicholson 1986, 141).

The king exerts

both paternal and political power over his subjects, because
the king is literally both patriarch of this extended political family and head of the political institutions.
In response,

Locke's First Treatise directs itself to

demonstrating the differences between family and politics,
between natural and conventional authority.

Locke separates

familial from political ends in an attempt to protect individual liberty, to free adults from patriarchal political rule.
Locke's distinction between family and politics safeguards
both adults and children.

Children benefit because politics

can never adequately replace a loving parent.

Adults benefit

because politics recognizes their status as mature, rational
beings.
According to Locke, the family's purpose is procreation
and the education of children.
and

the

sharing

of

common

Sexual and emotional affinity
goals

guide

its

movement.

God hath made it their business to employ this Care
of their Offspring, and hath placed in them suitable Inclinations of Tenderness and Concern to
temper this power, to apply it as his Wisdom designed it, to the Children's good, as long as they
should need be under it.
(II, 63)
Parenting requires tenderness and a personal understanding of
each unique child.

Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education
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(STCE)
The

demonstrates the need for flexible,

ill - tempered child's

loving parents.

discipline and upbringing

differ from that of a timid child.
with particular dispositions.

should

Each child enters a family

A parent can appropriately and

lovingly gear a child's education to his or her particular
strengths and weaknesses (Yolton 1989, 14-15).
He, therefore, that is about Children, should well
study their Nature and Aptitudes, and see, by often
trials, what turn they easily take, and what becomes them, observe what their Native Stock is, how
it may be improved ....
He should consider, what
they want; whether they be capable of having it
wrought into them ... and whether it be worth while
to endeavor it.
(STCE, 122)
Locke understands the implicit dimensions underlying family
life.
In contrast,

protection of property directs political

action; politics operates in terms of individual rights, each
person's interest in securing body,

liberty and estate from

injury.
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making
Laws ... for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in
the Execution of such Laws....
(II, 3)
Locke's

distinction

between

politics

and

family

founded in the difference between adults and children.

is

Adults

are free; children require guidance until they reach an age of
reason where they are presumed to perceive natural law for
themselves.

"And thus we see how natural Freedom and Subjec-

tion to Parents may consist together, and are both founded on
the same principle"

(II, 61).

Adulthood brings with it both
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reason and freedom.
tion as

Feminists who misinterpret this distinc-

resting ultimately on differences between man and

woman not only misread Locke but also
liberating potential in Locke.

fail

treated as adults, not children. 21

so that adults will be

Women can utilize Locke's

distinction between family and politics
and

children.

the

Locke distinguishes adults

from children, politics from family,

adults

to grasp

Locke's

to safeguard both

private-public

allows women to claim their adult

status

distinction

in politics

and

family without detracting from the unique parental relationship.

Children remain under the authority of their parents.

In principle, wives need not,

should not,

remain under the

authority of their husbands.
Locke's distinction between family and politics is also
founded in the difference between intimacy and citizenship.
The former relies on personal,

emotional

ties;

the latter

relies on mutual respect for each person as a rational, free
and

equal

21

individual.

Actually

two

types

of

emotional

II, 2, clearly distinguishes parental from political
authority. II, 54-55, identifies "that equal Right every Man
hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the
Will or Authority of any other Man."
Children differ from
adults in that they have not yet reached a state of full
equality.
"Children, I confess are not born in this full
state of Equality, though they are born to it. Their Parents
have a sort of Rule and Jurisdiction over them when they come
into the World, and for sometime after, but 'tis but a
temporary one.
The Bonds of this Subjection are like the
Swadling Cloths they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the
weakness of their Infancy.
Age and Reason as they grow up,
loosen them till at length they drop quite off, and leave a
Man at his free Disposal."
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relationships compose modern nuclear families:
and wife/husband.
politics
mutual,

captures
intimate,

parent/child

Locke's distinction between family and
both

features

sexual

of modern

support

present

families:
in

the

the

spousal

relationship and the nurturing, loving support present in the
parental relationship.

Neither spousal nor parental relation-

ships can survive translation to the political sphere.

One

cannot love a stranger as one loves a spouse or a child. 22
Thus,

anti-liberal feminists misunderstand family when

they reduce it to its public dimensions,

to the political.

Not only does this fail to account for the dynamics at work in
the different relationships, but it also forgets that individual liberty requires a refuge from politics which is lost if
one dissolves the distinction between family and politics.
Family provides a shelter from the over-arching,
intrusions

possible when politics

steps

into

arbitrary

family.

In

addition, although families provide love, it is politics which
provides the sufficient scope necessary for the full development of

the personality.

Persons need both families

and

politics as distinct relationships to actualize their potential.

Neither can be reduced to the other.
Locke's

understanding

of

adult

freedom

and

equality

profoundly influences his understanding of marriage.

While

feminists correctly point out some disturbingly patriarchal

22

See Ashcraft ( 1987, 109 -112) for a discussion of the
role of intimacy in Locke's family.
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features of Locke's

thought,

some also neglect its deeper

potential for a radical transformation of patriarchal marriage.

For example,

although Locke does grant control of

community property to the husband as the "abler and stronger,"
he does so only after having already undermined the notion
that strength gives authority (Schochet 1975, 249-250).

Locke

himself denies "that Men live together by no other Rules but
that of Beasts"

(II,

1).

Furthermore,

not only is

Locke

tentative in granting marital authority to the husband--it
"should be placed somewhere"

(II,

82) --he immediately opens

the possibility of marriage without male domination and female
submission.

"But the ends of matrimony requiring no such

Power in the Husband," that power,
might be varied and regulated by that Contract,
which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far
as may consist with Procreation and the bringing up
of Children till they could shift for themselves;
nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not
necessary to the ends for which it is already made.
(II, 83)
Indeed, here Locke merely reiterates a point he made in his
First Treatise:
There is here no more Law to oblige a Woman to such
a Subjection, if the Circumstances either of her
Condition or Contract with her Husband should
exempt her from it, then there is, that she should
bring forth her children in Sorrow and Pain.
(1,
4 7)

Melissa Butler

(1978)

has shown that Locke often con-

sciously departs from traditional views about women in the
interest of individualism.

Locke understood that his individ-

ualism required a consideration of women as well as men as
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individuals.

Similarly,

Mary Lyndon Shanley's

(1979,

91)

study of seventeenth century marriage contract theory leads
her to conclude that Locke revolutionized marriage,

not in

basing it in a voluntary contract, but in making the terms of
the contract negotiable:
Locke's notion that contract might regulate property rights and maintenance obligations in marriage
was an astonishing notion, and not for the seventeenth century alone.
For Locke, a woman could control not only who her partner was
to be, but also the terms of her relationship to that chosen
partner.
basis

Despite patriarchal aspects of Locke's thought, the

of

a

radical

transformation

marriage lay in his work.
individual

in

the

institution

of

Locke takes his own principles of

liberty and equality seriously and in doing so

revolutionizes marriage and family.

Although Locke betrays

his own principles in some specific instances, this does not
invalidate the principles themselves.
This radical Locke also surfaces in an examination of his
thought on family,

as well as marriage.

Locke denies the

husband's ultimate control over the children, as God, not the
children's father, is the "Author and Giver of Life"

(1, 52)

and "the Mother cannot be denied an equal share in begetting
the Child, and so the Absolute Authority of the Father will
not arise from hence" (1, 55) . 23

Mere paternity does not lend

authority, at least no more than the mother herself shares by
23

See Nicholson's (1986, 142) discussion on this point;
also Ashcraft (1987, 72).
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virtue of her maternity.
ly grants

control

of

In addition, although Locke tenuousjoint property

and

children

to

the

husband, he explicitly excludes property belonging to the wife
before the union (II, 82).

This is significant because every

woman enters the contract with a fundamental property right in
her own body, and therefore retains control of that property. 24
This

carries

radical

repercussions

institutions of marriage and family.

for

the

traditional

On this basis, women can

protect their bodies,

and the product of their bodies from

masculine domination.

Neither nature nor God demands that the

woman relinquish control of her body, or her labor,
husband.

Furthermore,

the wife's and child's

to her

independent

claim on familial property suggests that paternal authority
over property is one of trust rather than absolute control. 25
A violation of political trust allows revolution.

Conceiving

of paternal authority as a trust not only indicates a move
away from a patriarchal conception of the family but also
implicitly recognizes the redress available in the case of a
breach of that private trust-revolution.
undermines

his

own apparent

support

for

Locke not
an

only

authoritarian

patriarchal family structure, he also recognizes the historically and culturally fluctuating nature of this social unit.

24

Coole (1988, 88) overlooks the significance of
exclusion for all but a few lucky heiresses.
25

this

Locke (II, 83) identifies the "Community of Goods, and
the Power over them, mutual Assistance and Maintenance, and
other things" as "belonging to Conjugal Society."
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Although Locke describes an historically specific family, he
leaves

open

the

adaptations.
educating

possibility

of

cultural

and

historical

As long as the family fulfills its purpose- -

young--Locke

can

accommodate

it.

Locke

cites

various circumstances where "the Children are all left to the
Mother" and even where "one Woman hath more than one Husband
at a time"
include

(I I, 6 5) .

polyandry

familial

For Locke, the marriage contract could
(Tarcov

1984,

209).

Although

illustrations reveal a bias toward a

Locke's

traditional

nuclear family, the implications of his contractual thought do
not lend to the closure feminists such as Linda Nicholson
suggest.

The

application of

Locke's

principles

are

not

limited by any one historical or cultural manifestation.
Locke's understanding of individuals as free and equal
persons interacting in a variety of relationships informs his
picture of marriage, family and politics and the possibilities
inherent

to

those

institutions.

In

addition,

although

politics and family are distinct spheres, Locke argues that
the boundary between them is not impermeable.
avenue

through which politics

can actively

He paves an
encourage

actualization of liberty and equality in the family.
can,

on some bases,

economy

and

interfere in the family

religion,

as

indicated

below) .

the

Politics

(as with the
Family

and

politics are not separate, dichotomous and reified for Locke
as some feminists claim.

He not only discusses the reciprocal
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relationships of family and politics but also, more implicitly, the extent of political intrusion in the family.
A comparison of marriage and political contracts yields
evidence to suggest that politics can interfere with family
(Butler 1978, 145).
according to Locke.
contract

can

Consent grounds both types of contracts
Just as Locke argues that the social

legitimately

support

a

number

of

political

institutional arrangements, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy

(although Locke does have preferences),

so the marriage

contract can support a number of familial arrangements.
according

to

Locke,

in politics we

cannot

consent

But,
to

an

absolute monarchy; 26 this would deny the freedom and equality
which justifies consent in the first place and which is a
necessary feature of
individuals.
make

this

contracts

societies

Similarly,
argument,

would

bringing

rational

although Locke does not expressly

authoritarian,

violate

together

the

patriarchal

inalienable

rights

marital
to

life,

liberty and property of those contracting (in this case, the
wife) and be illegitimate. 27

Politics, in its legitimate role

as a caretaker of these inalienable rights,

can and should

26

More exactly,
absolute monarchy is in principle
illegitimate.
As Ashcraft (1987, 118-120, 155-157) points
out, absolute monarchs exist and historically people have
consented to them; but, in principle this consent, and those
absolute monarchies, are illegitimate. People living under an
absolute monarch remain, in fact, in a state of nature.
27

Locke (II, 202) limits authority in various contexts.
"For the exceeding the Bounds of Authority is no more a Right
in a great, than a petty Officer; no more justified in a King,
than a Constable."
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step into the family to support these rights and to subvert
illegitimate marriage contracts.

Politics protects the life,

liberty and property of women as well as men and can step into
the

family

to do

so.

Locke's

principles

of

freedom and

equality can be used to attack patriarchal families as well as
patriarchal politics and allows politics to conduct such an
Just as politics can

attack on patriarchy in the family.

interfere in the economy in the interest of life, liberty and
property,

so

it

can

interfere

in

the

family

Government being the preservation of all"

"the end of

(IL 159) . 28

Both the marriage contract and the political contract are
bound by natural law. 29
the

limits

to

These boundaries are most evident in

the consent which forms
self

each society.

In

into or consent

to

neither case may one

sell one's

slavery (Lemos 1978).

As noted earlier, consent to slavery

violates the natural law to preserve one's own, and another's
life (Grant 1987, 71).

This indicates that mere efficiency is

neither the standard of a good political or familial order.
Locke denies the justice of an efficient, absolute monarchy
28

Later in the work I provide a detailed discussion of the
relationship between the economy and politics, and specific
examples of the ability of the latter to interfere in the
former.
29

Locke (II, 135) explains, "Thus the Law of Nature stands
as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others.
The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well
as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law
of Nature, i.e., to the Will of God, of which that is a
Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the
preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or
valid against it."

56

(Grant 1987,

92)

and,

implicitly of the efficient absolute

authority of the father.
cal

and

familial

This demonstrates that both politi-

relationships

justice which transcends each.

appeal

to

a

principle

of

In this way, Locke implicitly

recognizes the steps civil government can take to discourage,
even outlaw, authoritarian, patriarchal marriages.
politics

can

actively

attack

patriarchal

Liberal

marriages

which

violate this principle of liberty, which violate natural law
(the principle of justice in families).
nists

could use Locke's notion of
types

of

liberty and consent
rape,

to

attack,

and outlaw,

rape. 30

Regardless of the marital contract a woman's body

remains her own.

all

For example, femi-

including marital

Penetrating that woman's body without her

consent violates natural law.

Politics legitimately steps in

to protect that woman and punish that perpetrator.

In sum,

although Locke distinguishes politics from family, both appeal
to natural law as the standard of a just familial, or political order.
The interactive relationship between family and politics
becomes apparent when put in the context of natural law.

The

family's role is to educate children to assume roles as free
and

responsible

adults.

Appropriate

familial

education

becomes almost a patriotic duty for Locke.

In his introduc-

tion

Locke

to
3

Some

Thoughts

on

Education,

declares:

°For a discussion of the relationship between rape and
patriarchy, of the patriarchal use of rape to keep women
subordinate, see Brownmiller (1975).
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The well Educating of their Children is so much the
Duty and Concern of Parents, and the Welfare and
Prosperity of the Nation so much depends on it,
that I would have everyone lay it seriously to
Heart.
( STCE, 80)
The family educates for liberty while liberal politics allows
the exercise of that liberty (Tarcov 1984, 76).

Specifically,

Locke designs his education so as to subdue the child's desire
for mastery over others and directs this desire to mastery
over

one's

self

and

one's

desires

(Tarcov

1984,

89-90).

Children must not be allowed to master their parents,
maids,

their

rewards

or

their

environments;

rather,

their
they

should be taught to master their desires through reason (STCE,
33-36).

Locke also tells us that example is the best teacher;

surely a patriarchal master of the household would undermine
any attempt to subdue the desire in children to master others.
The political sphere provides an environment within which
the marital union occurs and familial activities take place.
For all the ends of Marriage being to be obtained
under Politick Government, as well as in the state
of Nature, the Civil Magistrate doth not abridge
the Right, or Power of either naturally necessary
to those ends, viz., Procreation and mutual Support
and Assistance whilst they are together; but only
decides any Controversie that may arise between Man
and Wife....
(II, 83)
Just

as

family

politics

can

relations

influence

can

family

influence
and

politics,

marital

liberal

relationships.

Politics can support and encourage non-patriarchal marriage
contracts.

Feminists who oversimplify Locke's distinction

between private and public, describing it as reified, fail to
account for the potential in Locke's description of private
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and public for understanding, even shaping the influence each
sphere has on the other.
Not only does Locke's description of the relationship
between private and public allow politics to address patriarchy in the family but his defense of individual freedom and
rationality encourages individual action in order to establish
and

protect

liberty.

demands, revolution.
family

and politics,

Illegitimate

rule

allows,

indeed

The principles of justice constraining
and

Locke's

explicit

assertion

individuals can ascertain those principles of

that

justice for

themselves, 31 logically supports a right to revolution where
the individual can demand justice in either the familial or
political community.

Oppressors do not give up power,

the

oppressed seize it. 32
31

Locke (II, 6, 225) throughout the Second Treatise,
asserts this individual capability to discern natural law:
"The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern
it ... which ... teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions."
The
people, the oppressed, serve as judge of the oppression: "If
a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all
tending the same way, make the design visible to the People,
and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see,
whither they are going, it is not to be wonder'd, that they
should then rouze themselves, and endeavor to put the rule
into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which
Government was first erected."
32

It should be noted that Locke (II, 168, 176, 225) is not
inciting citizens to immediate or imprudent revolution. "And
he that appeals to Heaven, must be sure he has Right on his
side; and a Right too, that is worth the Trouble and the Cost
of the Appeal, as he will answer at a Tribunal, that cannot be
deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according
to the Mischiefs he has created to his Fellow- Subjects." Only
a "long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifaces, all
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What is my Remedy against a Robber, that so broke
into my House? Appeal to the Law for Justice. But
perhaps Justice is denied, or I am crippled and
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do
it.
If God has taken away all means of seeking
remedy, there is nothing left but patience ... then
they may appeal ... to Heaven, and repeat their
Appeal
till
they have
recovered
the native
Right....
(II, 176)
Mary

O'Brien

(1989)

argues

that

the

unlike any revolution in the past,
realm.

feminist

occurs

revolution,

in the private

Locke's liberal principles open the door to such a

private revolution.

As Shanley (1979, 70) says, "Women, like

men, were free beings able to define their relationship to
others by their own wills and consent."

Locke's theory of

revolution derives from Locke's conception of both men and
women as free, rational beings.
A revolution in the private realm, in the family, is far
from easy or certain, given the pervasiveness of patriarchy.
Since those who benefit from patriarchy do not simply relinquish control, women must demand freedom and equality across
the spectrum of familial,
addition,

as we have seen,

economic and political life.

liberal politics encourages the

enhancement of freedom and equality in the family.

Freedom

and equality in any realm reverberates into others.
provides

for

both an

In

individual

and political

Locke

at tack

on

patriarchal families.

tending the same way" will incite a majority which is typically rather complacent.
Locke is, however, emphatically
defending a people's right to protect their own liberty when
circumstances demand it.
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Marriage, family and politics are only three spheres of
human relationships which Locke explores in terms of liberty
and equality.

Throughout his writing Locke locates a number

of different spheres of human activity which operate according
to

different

principles,

different

centers

of

gravity.

Locke's treatment of these other spheres echoes his treatment
of the relationship between family and politics.
interfere in religion,

or in the economy,

Politics can

to protect each

person's right to life, liberty and property.
In religion charity grounds action.

Love, as in love thy

neighbor, defines religious relationships.

Religion concerns

itself with the "Interest of Mens Souls" (Letter, 26) whereas
politics
Locke,

concerns

itself

with property,

body

and

estate.

in rebuttal to those who confound these two spheres,

distinguishes faith from coercion.

Once again, the interests

of liberty and equality demand that politics not preach and
preachers not coerce.

While exploring the different laws of

conduct guiding religion and politics, however, he implicitly
and explicitly recognizes
spheres of action.

the

interactive nature of

these

In a Letter Concerning Toleration Locke:

undertake[s] to represent how happy and how great
would be the Fruit, both in Church and State, if
the Pulpits everywhere founded with the Doctrine of
Peace and Toleration.
(Letter, 34)
Furthermore, Locke demonstrates the necessity for mitigating,
and eliminating, the prejudicial impact of religion on other
spheres:

61
All ... care is to be taken that the sentence of
Excommunication, and the Execution thereof, carry
with it no rough usage, of Word or Action, whereby
the ejected Person may any wise be damified in Body
or Estate.
(Letter, 30)
Politics protects property and religion cares for souls.
Politics cannot interfere in religion for the sake of souls
(i.e.,

faith)

but it may for

the sake of property.

When

religious rites threaten life, liberty or property, government
legitimately intervenes.
But those things that are prejudicial to the Commonweal of a People in their ordinary use, and are
therefore forbidden by Laws, those things ought
not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred
Rites.
Onely the Magistrate ought always be very
careful that he do not misuse his Authority ....
(Letter, 42)
On this basis,

politics need not,

should not,

tolerate the

sacrifice of infants, "promiscuous uncleanness, or practise of
other such heinous Enormities" (Letter, 42), or the sacrifice
of any calf other than the member's own.
In the economic sphere utility guides action.

Property

originates in each person's drive for self-preservation and
has as its end the comfortable life of the laborer,
extension, those who benefit through his/her labor.

and by

Rational

individuals best serve their own interests as well as those of
the

community.

Free

individuals

exercise

their

liberty

through labor and the procurement of property (Polin 19 69, 6) .
In this way,

property manifests liberty,

materialism (Myers 1991).

rather than sheer

For Locke, an individual's right to

property encompasses actually two rights:

1)

the right to
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private property, to keep what one labors for or inherits, and
2)

the right to acquire property in the first place
140-141) . 33

1978,

The former generates

(Lemos

inequalities while

manifesting liberty; the latter demands a modicum of equality
in order to ensure liberal expression through property.

This

becomes most apparent when one reads Locke's use of the word
"property" in its broadest sense:

"property" connotes one's

liberty as well as one's estate (Myers 1991, 327-329).
So,

once again,

equality,

this

time

Locke attempts to balance freedom and
by

politics and the economy.

structuring

the

dialogue

between

Class divisions can be neither so

great that one class of people is permanently crippled in its
at tempts

to

acquire

property, 34

nor

inadequately reflect individual effort.

so

small

that

they

In this way, politics

protects property while setting the terms of economic relationships,

establishing

the

limits

of

procurement,

and

enforcing taxation:
... in some parts of the World (where the Increase
of People and Stock, with the Use of Money) had
made Land scarce, and so of some Value, the several
33

Putting the individual's right to property within the
context of each person's duty to preserve God's workmanship
also supports this conclusion.
In this interpretation, a
right to property is based upon appropriate use, upon its
promotion of human happiness.
See Tully (1980); Ashcraft
(1987).
34

"Man can no more make use of another's necessity, to
force him to become his Vassal, by withholding that Relief,
God requires him to afford to the want of his Brother, than he
that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to
his obedience, and with a Daggar to his throat offer him Death
or Slavery" (1, 42; quoted in Tully 1980, 137).
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Corrununities settled the Bounds of their distinct
Territories, and by Laws within themselves, regulated the Properties of the Private Men of their
Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement settled
the Property which Labour and Industry began.
(II,
45)

over and above this, because "all the Members of the Society
are to be preserved"

(II, 159),

he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of
his full Satisfaction, and give way to the pressing
and preferable Title of those, who are in danger to
perish without it.
(II, 183)
One may be coerced, presumably through political means,
provide for the needy.

Furthermore,

to

Locke's injunction to

leave "enough and as good" (II, 33) for others when procuring
property, al though considerably weakened with the introduction
of money,"' demands that neither disparity of wealth be so
great, nor monopolies of goods be so extensive, as to bar the
opportunities of others to an equal exercise of labor and
enjoyment of goods.
acquire,

as

demonstrated,

well

as

Locke protects each person's right to
own,

property.

Often,

as

has

been

these two subsidiary rights need to be bal-

anced. 36

35

The introduction of money provides that "he who
appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but
increase the corrunon stock of mankind" (II, 3 7) .
With or
without the presence of money, however, when procurement
lessens the corrunon stock of mankind, obstructs the rights of
others to acquire property through labor, Locke would, in this
interpretation, curtail appropriation.
36

Furthermore, Locke (I, 86) limits the right to property.
"And thus Man's Property in the Creatures, was founded upon
the right he had, to make use of those things, that were
necessary or useful to his Being."
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Following this same line of argument,

as politics can

interfere in the economic realm it can intervene in the family
for the sake of protecting each individual's right to property.

In the case of the family, it may not, however, usurp the

family's educational authority.

It may not wholly equalize,

or regulate the intimate marital relationship.

It steps into

these roles only to the extent that is necessary to ensure
each person's right to protect and acquire property.
tantly,

Impor-

Locke understands property broadly as life,

liberty

and estate.
Communitarian and Radical/Marxist Feminists:

A Reply

Understanding the underlying dimensions of liberty and
equality at work in the interaction among the multitude of
private and public spheres Locke identifies sheds light on the
potential within his paradigm for addressing his communitarian
and radical
within

the

feminist
context

critics.
of

these

Putting Locke's
multiple

spheres

individual
reveals

an

individual who is not the egoistical, self-preserving maximiz er of rights and accumulator of goods that some communitarian
feminists depict.
on

"person"

A closer look at Locke reveals an emphasis

as well as,

and above,

the individual.

This

person realizes himself or herself in a variety of social
contexts.

My religious obligation to my fellow person--love

(charity) --which
protecting
obligation.

his

differs

from

my

property--differs

political
again

Even self-preservation,

from

obligation-my

familial

the motivation behind
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politics,

manifests God's Will

("Workmanship")

rather than

desire (although the two do not conflict in this instance) .
Self-preservation is an obligation before it is a right.
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and
not to quit his station willfully; so by the like
reason when his own Preservation comes not in
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind.
(II, 6)
As Ashcraft (1987, 133) points out, there exists a connection
in Locke's thought between natural law which obliges one and
natural right to property--life and estate.
The communitarian feminists' stress on Locke's individualism

neglects

the

constellation

surround each person,
degrees,

reflect

of

relationships

relationships which,

both

man's

and

which

each in varying

woman's

connectedness.

Communitarian feminists' stress on natural rights fails to put
those rights within the context of natural law and various
human

relationships.

On

this

same

basis,

communitarian

feminists who take Locke to task for removing "compassion" or
"virtue"

from politics have misread Locke's own intention.

Locke removed considerations of virtue--for Locke, religion-from politics in the hope of promoting both peace and virtue.
As

Locke argues

in a

Letter Concerning Toleration,

cannot be induced by force, but encouraged through love.

faith
For

Locke, virtue is self-generating (or at least more likely to
surface) given the appropriate tolerant political environment.
The care of Souls cannot belong to the Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists only in outward
force; but true and saving Religion consists in the
inward persuasion of the Mind.
(Letter, 27)
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The

recognition

of

this

distinction

interest of the Publick" (Letter, 21).
that

virtue

individuals

in

one

make

sphere

good

benefits

citizens;

works

to

the

"true

Indeed, Locke believes
another:

compassionate,

religious
reasonable

familial education creates liberal citizens; removing direct
and

explicit

concern

for

virtue

from

politics

promotes

virtuous politics. 37
Locke illustrates what Nancy Rosenblum (1987, 55) might
call a "divine egotism."

Locke's identification of political

interests with "Life, Liberty, Health and Indolency of Body;
and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands"
(Letter, 26) serves not only to protect each individual from
political tyranny but also to provide a space for "inwardness"
(Rosenblum 1987, 55) or in Locke's words "inward sincerity."
Removing
surface

virtue
in

an

as

a

political

atmosphere

of

concern

allows

individuality

and

virtue

to

plurality

because virtue is not the product of force but of persuasion.
Coercion promotes blind acceptance rather than the thoughtful,
ingrained understanding of rational virtue.

Locke remarks on

those who:
are resolved to stick to a Party, that Education or
Interest has engaged them in; and there, like the
37

The communitarian feminist reading of Locke overlooks
many persuasive, more recent interpretations of his philosophy.
Refuting Strauss' vision of hedonistic nihilism in
Locke, Grant (1987) argues that although humanity is not
capable of absolute certainty, we can rationally and morally
guide our conduct. In addition, Macedo (1990) points to the
virtuous underpinnings grounding liberalism and Tarcov (1984)
elaborates on the moral nature of Lockean education.
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common Soldiers of an Army, show their Courage and
Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever
examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they
contend for.
(Essay, IV, 18, 11) 38
In regards to Christian virtue,

"If the Gospel and the

Apostles may be credited, no Man can be a Christian without
Charity, and without that Faith which works, not by force, but
by Love"

(Letter, 23).

The virtuous politics some communi-

tarian feminists espouse confounds two dimensions of life,
inappropriately using force to generate something it cannot
create and imperiling necessary space for inward sincerity.
The radical/marxist feminist error in reading Locke also
results

from an oversimplification of

between private and public.

Locke's

distinction

As the preceding discussion of

the spheres at work in Locke's thought indicates, Locke does
depoliticize

the family,

but he does not

isolate it.

He

demonstrates an understanding of both the adverse effect one
sphere can have on another

(e.g.,

note the adverse effect

politics can have on religion) and the welcome influence one
sphere can have on another (e.g.,
family can have on politics) .
dialogue between spheres,

note the positive impact

Because Locke allows for a

he can accommodate

the dialogue

between substantive and formal rights without degrading either
the family or politics.

Politics can encourage free,

equal

families while respecting the unique nature of that familial
community.

38

In

this

interpretation,

Quoted in Myers (1991, 400-401).

Locke's

political
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philosophy would allow for government subsidized day care as
a necessary, although clearly not sufficient, prerequisite to
female equality.

Politics enforces each individual's right to

protect and acquire property.
in

the

economic

and

This demands some interference

familial

sphere.

This

also

allows

politics to outlaw marital rape. Politics can step into the
family, but it does so carefully, ever mindful of the liberty
expressed in that marital, familial contract.
A correct understanding of the underlying dimensions of
liberty and equality at work

in the dialogue between two

particular spheres, economics and politics, contradicts the
argument by some
considered

feminists

rational

relationship

to

that

for

by virtue of

property.

Not

Locke women were not

their unique
only

does

historical

circumstantial

evidence indicate that Locke thought women to be rational, but
understanding Locke's rationality in terms of the richness of
human contexts and the principles of

liberty and equality

clearly reveals that Locke considered, in fact, assumed women
to be rational beings.
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke refers
to "rational parents" (Essay, IV, 4, 16) suggesting that both
parents are rational,
child's call.

despite the mother's

tending to her

Furthermore, in discussing political conquest

Locke refers to both the wife's title in property and the
wife's labor in producing goods

(thereby confirming women's

rationality even by Macpherson's standard):

The Conqueror
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"cannot take the Goods of his Wife and Children; they too had
a Title to the Goods he enjoy'd,
Estate he possessed."

and their shares in the

In addition, "whether her own Labour or

Compact gave her a Title to it, •tis plain, Her Husband could
not forfeit what was hers"

(II, 183).

Over and above this circumstantial evidence,
(1987)

Ashcraft

unveils a more radical interpretation of Locke which

directly confronts both Macpherson's and, by extension,
radical/marxist feminist reading of Locke.

the

Ashcraft argues

against Macpherson's narrow equation of Locke's rationality
with property on three bases:
as

free

in the state of nature,

socio-economic
Second,

First, Locke refers to all men

conditions

which

without any reference
underlie

that

to

freedom.

even if Locke did correlate property with reason,

every man (and woman) has property in his

(or her) own body

and Macpherson (and some feminists) mistakenly equate property
solely with estate.

Finally, and most importantly, Locke's

indication that reason is presumed with maturity, where one
"might be supposed capable of knowing the Law, and so living
within

the

universal

Rules

of

it"

character of

Education buttresses

(II,

reason.

60),

demonstrates

Some

this meaning of

Thoughts
Lockean

the

more

Concerning

rationality.

Locke describes education as making the mind of

the child

"pliant to Reason" (STCE, 34) and providing habits so one may
submit to his own Reason, when he is of an Age to make use of
it" (STCE, 36).

Not estate, but "reason and property in one's
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person"

(Ashcraft 1987, 175) is the criterion for legitimate

political

involvement

and

consent.

Macpherson,

and

less

directly, some feminists, are misled by reading passages out
of context;

in a political context reason is not socially,

economically or sexually differentiated for Locke
1987,

167-173).

Not property

(Ashcraft

(as understood as goods)

but

self-guidance, the ability to render legitimate contracts and
the perception of natural law all indicate rationality for
Locke.
Clearly,

the principles of freedom and equality inform

the relationships (marital, familial, economic, religious and
political) of all individuals, men and women.

Locke's liberal

political philosophy begins to illustrate the transformation
which all human relationships undergo when individuals are
considered

rational,

free

and

equal.

In

this

way,

the

misinterpretation of Locke's distinction between private and
public domains as reif ied yields mistaken conclusions about
the possibilities of emancipation for women within Locke's
liberal system.

The oversimplification, by some feminists, of

Locke's understanding of private and public leads them to err
in concluding that Locke's liberal individual is artificially
divorced from social particularities,

that Locke's liberal

family is necessarily patriarchal, that women are not rational
and that politics does not and cannot influence family.

More

specifically, because some feminists misread Locke's distinction between politics and family as one between male and
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female and not between adult and child,

they discount his

paradigm.
Instead of rejecting Locke's distinction, feminists can
use it as both a protection of (male and female) adult liberty
and as a principle with which they can press for equality and
liberty

in

different

social

contexts.

Locke's

liberal

political philosophy allows women, like men, to be treated as
rational adults in family and politics.

Politics should treat

neither men

Feminists

nor women

as

children.

should be

activating Locke's principles of personhood and anti -paternal ism, of rationality,

freedom and equality while criticizing

specific instances of patriarchy in Locke's thought.
Locke supplies the beginning of a model, with all its
rough

edges,

which

captures

the

differences

between private and public concerns.

and

overlap

In doing this,

Locke

creates a paradigm which discourages tyranny and maximizes
individual liberty.

In establishing and protecting the family

as private, Locke disarms political, tyrannical intrusions in
that sphere.

Locke's thought,
a

shelter

in contrast to some feminist

thought,

provides

for

families

from

political

tyranny.

This paradigm also distinguishes essential differ-

ences between different spheres while providing a basis for
understanding

the

overlap

among

spheres.

The

organizing

principle in one sphere differs from another, but actions in
each reverberate in others.

Locke's

liberalism begins

to

reconcile the demands of freedom and equality within a variety
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of contexts.
impact of

Although Locke never explicitly explores the

familial

gender disadvantages as

they influence

political aspirations of freedom and autonomy, he plants the
seeds for a deeper understanding of these influences, and even
leaves open the possibility of tempering the impact among
private and public positions.

In so doing, he points to the

possibility of enhancing freedom and autonomy in each sphere
of activity.

Liberalism needs to systematically and self-

consciously work out

the

interactive relationship between

spheres of human activities,

to specifically address gender

differences and formally incorporate those differences into
its paradigm. 39

This does not undercut as much as continue

the liberal, or Lockean, project.

39

Walzer (1983) details
attempt to do exactly this.

a

provocative

and

persuasive

CHAPTER III
MILL AND FEMINISM
Feminist

critics

of

liberalism

turn

with

particular

interest to the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill.
Mill actively championed the rights of women in his writings
and his political career.

He consciously extended liberal-

ism's fundamental principles of individualism, equality and
liberty to women.

On this basis, feminists ask whether Mill

can consistently and systematically maintain a distinction
between private and public spheres while providing for women's
equality and liberty in both domestic and political circles.
Feminists ask whether Mill's liberty is a real possibility for
women as well as men.
While some feminist critics of Mill defend his basic
principles, 1 others

conclude

that

his

distinction between

public and private limits Mill's liberal paradigm, negating
any substantive liberty or equality for women.

Mill's promise

of

divorced

from

women's actual familial, economic and social positions.

The

female

autonomy

remains

an

1

abstraction,

See, for example, Rossi (1970); Shanley (1981); Spitz
(1981); Tulloch (1989); Urbinati (1991).
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elimination of women's "domestic slavery" 2 requires a rethinking of Mill's separation of private from public, of family
activities from political intervention.
Mill (OL, 105) contends that the repeal of the "despotic
power of husbands over wives" requires "nothing more ... than
that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the
protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons." 3
From the anti- liberal feminist standpoint, this undermines any
hope for the concrete realization of genuine female autonomy.
Women's daily lives demand a reconceptualization of private
and

public

which

fully

recognizes

and

incorporates

constraints of private lives on public opportunities.

the
These

feminists argue that in protecting a private arena of human
activities, Mill's liberalism remains blind to private sources
of

power.

They

point

out

that

women's

private

slavery

obstructs women's public freedom; Mill's separation between
private and public obscures and masks these private obstacles.

2

Mill himself uses this description of women's familial
position in Sub., 150.
3

Hereafter, references to Mill's On Liberty, The Subjection of Women and Chapters on Socialism will be to J. s. Mill,
On Liberty and other writings, Stefan Collini, ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and noted as OL, page #;
Sub., page#; Soc., page#. References to John Stuart Mill,
Autobiography, Jack Stillinger, ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin
Company, 1989) are noted as Auto., page#. References to John
Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government,
Currin Shields, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1958) are noted as Rep., page #.
Finally, references to
Mill's Utilitarianism are to Utilitarianism and Other Writings, Mary Warnock, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1962)
and cited as Util., page#.

75
Equal "protection of law" and "the same rights" (OL, 105) lays
a

superficial

veil

of

freedom,

disguising

and protecting

actual historical slavery.
Feminist critics argue that in carving out a private
arena

free

from political

intervention,

Mill,

like

other

liberal thinkers, masks and protects private sources of power.
These critics point to Mill's separation between private and
public

and

to

his

perceived

failure

to

develop

framework relating formal and substantive equality.

a

cogent

They deny

any possibility for a resolution to this problem within Mill's
liberal paradigm.

Hughes

(1979),

for example,

argues that

Mill's distinction between public and private covers over the
conflict between an abstract promise of public freedom and a
concrete disparity in private property,
economic success for women.

Cameron

a

barrier to real

(1980)

identifies the

conflict as one between the ideal of freedom and the customary
sexual division of labor in the family.

Eisenstein

(1981)

targets the tension between what she calls "individuality" and
the "ideology of liberal individualism"
Finally,

Elshtain

(1981)

depicts

the

in Mill's thought.
distinction

between

public and private in Mill as one between abstract reason and
emotion.

All these feminists agree, however, that "a conflict

exists in Mill between the ideal and the reality"
1980, 782).

(Cameron

The illusion of freedom and equality evaporates

when women's actual historical and customary situations are
taken into account.

Mill's cornrni tment to a liberal conception
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of a private sphere free from political intervention leads to
the

"ultimate

renunciation

of

his

egalitarian

principle"

(Hughes 1979, 540).
Feminists who discount Mill's

liberalism misread his

feminism and misinterpret his distinction between private and
public life.

In this chapter, I argue that this results from

a failure to differentiate two levels of theoretical analyses
operating in Mill's work 4 --a distinction Mill himself would
recognize.

Mill's philosophy synthesizes fundamental princi-

ples, like equality or social welfare, with experiential and
historical opinions on how these principles can be achieved.
For example, Mill recognized both psychology and economics 5
as evolving fields of study,

and would certainly adapt his

prescriptions in these fields to meet his goals.
leads

some

of

his

feminist

critics

to

This failure

oversimplify

and

exaggerate Mill's separation of private and public in a way he
himself

would not

accept.

As

a

result,

these

feminists

overlook the richness and variety that distinction encompasses.

Reading Mill in light of

the richness of spheres of

activities he seeks to encourage reveals a capacity in Mill's

4

Gutmann (1980, 58), for example, refers to Mill's
defense of laissez-faire economics as a "second-order principle."
Shanley ( 19 81, 241) asserts, "Mill's commitment to
equality in marriage was of a different theoretical order than
his acceptance of a continued sexual division of labor."
Tulloch (1989, 14) also discerns two levels of theoretical
commitment in Mill.
5

For a discussion of the status of Mill's economic theory
see Ryan (1984).
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liberalism for addressing and attacking patriarchy in public
and

private

life,

while

maintaining

and

protecting

the

integrity of different spheres of human activity.
This chapter shows that a feminist rereading and reclaiming of Mill's liberal principles is important for two reasons.
First, Mill's philosophy offers a strategy for distinguishing
between private and public along rationally defensible lines - harm to others.

That is,

legitimate political intervention

confronts only those actions which harm or threaten to harm
another

individual.

This

criterion

protects

individual

autonomy and self-actualization without arbitrarily identifying either the family or the economy as always and absolutely
beyond political intervention.

Indeed, Mill recognizes the

patterns of coercion present in both the family and economy.
Mill wages a
domestic

fight against political,

tyranny,

while

initiative and choice.

preserving

public

erects

a

space

economic and

for

individual

Mill seeks to protect a private sphere

and to combat private power.
which does just that.

social,

He offers a principle--harm--

Mill's distinction between private and

sanctuary

for

individual

expression

and

growth, 6 while providing for appropriate political intervention7 in the interest of freedom and equality.

6

Rosenblum (1987) identifies
liberalism and in Mill.

this

romantic

aspect

in

7Tulloch (1989, 160-161) discusses the opening in Mill's
thought for a positive case for political intervention, for
the sake of individual development.
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In

rightly

attacking

private

and corrupt

sources

of

power, feminism requires a cogent conceptual framework which
recognizes the private arena as a legitimate and necessary
realm of human self-expression.

Mill's liberalism offers such

a framework while at the same time addressing, in principle,
feminist concerns.

Mill articulates a paradigm which attacks

private sources of power while preserving social and cultural
complexity.

Feminism requires such a paradigm if it hopes to

balance its attack on socially pervasive patriarchy with a
consideration of individual free choice and autonomy.
Just

as

important,

Mill's

depiction

of

the

family

captures the vast possibilities built into intimate, familial
relationships.

The family unit,

particularly the marital

union, expresses a number of complex relationships: emotional,
erotic,

nurturing,

intellectual

and

power

relationships.

Mill's family, and its position within his distinction between
private and public, recognizes all these dynamics and allows
for

the

families

richness
are

of

family

vehicles

of

life.

For Mill

patriarchy, 8

(Sub.,

150),

characterized

by

"domestic slavery" but emotional, sympathetic ties also bind

8

0f course, Mill did not use this term himself.
Its
appropriateness becomes apparent however upon reading The
Subjection of Women where Mill locates women's subordination
within all social spheres. In particular, he identifies women
subordination in familial, social (e.g., custom enslaves
women), economic and political spheres.
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the family. 9

At present, families are about both power and

love, and Mill refuses to collapse the two.
the

asymmetrical

power

relationships

Mill addresses

corrupting

marital

relationships without forgetting the love integral to that
relationship.

Mill

(Sub.,

sympathy in equality,

161)

hopes

for

"a marriage of

of living together in love,

power on one side or obedience on the other."

without

Feminists need

a model which both expresses their abhorrence of familial
patriarchy and recognizes the love possible in family relationships.

Mill offers such a model.

Mill's paradigm of

private and public offers a principle by which patterns of
coercion

operating

in

a

variety

of

social

arrangements

(including the family) can be tackled without shattering the
independence and integrity of that sphere.
In sum,
Mill's

the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate

reconciliation

of

the

principles

of

liberty

and

equality at work in a multitude of spheres and to argue that
Mill's liberalism is potentially feminist.

His distinction

between private and public enriches, rather than corrodes, his
feminism.

Toward this end, the remainder of this chapter is

divided into three sections.
feminist critique of Mill.

The first section elaborates the

The second identifies and develops

those principles in Mill's political philosophy most valuable

9

A number of feminists point to this Mill's two-sided
analysis of the family.
see, in particular, Okin (1979);
Shanley (1981); Urbinati (1991).
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to the feminist project.

The third specifically responds to

feminist critics.
The Feminist Critique of Mill
Feminist

critics

of

Mill

argue

that

behind

Mill's

abstract promise of liberty and equality dwells an elitism
which subordinates women familially, economically and politically.

They point

promise

of

equality

to an
and

incongruence between the
substantive

f orrnal

inequalities.

This

incongruence becomes apparent through an analysis of Mill's
distinction between private and public spheres of activity.
Two main strains of anti-liberal feminist criticism exist,
echoing the critiques of Locke:
critique
former

and

a

analyzes

marxist/radical
Mill's

a communitarian feminist
feminist

epistemological

critique. 10

The

assumptions

and

concludes that his identification and definition of rationality and its role in the distinction between public and private
effectively excludes genuine gender equality and liberty.

The

latter stresses women's actual individual and social circumstances,

and

concludes

that

Mill's

separation of

private

interests from public concerns inevitably protects socially
pervasive patriarchy.

Both anti-liberal feminist critiques

agree that, intentionally or not, Mill's liberal feminism not
only fails to liberate women; in fact, it oppresses them.

10

see Chapter 2 of this work, "Locke and Patriarchy" for
a defense of these labels which are adapted from the work of
Dietz (1987) .
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The

communitarian

feminist

critique

revolves

around

Mill's emphasis on reason--a reason which they identify as
constructively
reading, Mill

and historically male.

According

to

this

(Sub., 121) praises an "apotheosis of Reason"

and he denigrates "Instinct" and feeling.

Mill's "reason"

requires an abstraction from feeling and emotion which is
alien to women's cultivation of empathy--an emotion necessary
to the well-being of the family.

Mill actualizes this split

between reason and emotion in his distinction between public
and private.

"Hard, external institutions of enormous power"

(Elshtain 1981, 143) characterize politics whereas women and
families "beautify" and "soften,
cold reality of politics.

1111

offering solace from the

Mill's distinction between private

and public reflects his bifurcation of emotion and reason
effectively subordinating the feminine character.
Jean Elshtain reads Mill's work in light of a growing
body of feminist literature which suggests that the male and
female

character are psychoanalytically constituted. 12

As

11

Elshtain (1981, 144-145) quotes an early essay by Mill
on women in which he describes women's role as "to beautify
life." Elshtain herself refers to the "traditional softening
effect" of women.
12

Hirschmann (1992, 164-165) argues, "In the rationalist
and empiricist epistemologies of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Mill,
and Kant, which dominate liberal theory and western thinking,
ontology and epistemology are separate and distinct ....
[W]e
can see that the dichotomy between epistemology and ontology,
which characterizes both rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, is specifically masculinist, for it follows from, or at
least echoes, the mind-body duality: if the body is separate
and distinct from the mind, then theories of knowledge and the
ways we conceptualize knowing must be distinct from theories
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such,

women

personalize.

learn

early

to

empathize,

nurture and

to

Men more readily impersonalize moral dilemmas,

abstracting personal considerations
impersonal

to

perspective.

Carol

in order to attain an

Gilligan

(1987,

79),

for

example, identifies a "different voice" in which "the conventional feminine voice emerges with great clarity, defining the
self and proclaiming its worth on the basis of the ability to
care for and protect others."
This feminine personality falls victim to a political
structure--Mill's

liberalism--which

neglects

and

isolates

women by defining politics in terms of power, in terms of a
male rather than female voice.
speak privately.

Men speak politically, women

Elshtain (1981, 142, 216) suggests that this

occurs as a result of "internalization" and "projection" in
the male psyche.

That is, male fear of female reproductive

power, which they can neither ignore nor coopt, causes them to
separate

themselves

from

that

which

they

fear

(that

is,

reproductive power) and create a world- -the political sphere- in which male power supersedes reproductive power,

thereby

"embedding the need to defend themselves against women in
institutions and activities."
As such, Mill's distinction between private and public
results from the male denial of their own femininity and the
attempt

to

politics.

remove

this

affront

to

their masculinity

from

In doing this, men, and in this case Mill, relegate

of existence and the ways we conceptualize being."
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both

feelings

and women

to

the

private

familial

sphere.

Elshtain (1981, 143) elaborates:
To fend off both the unconsciously imbedded images
of female power and the recognition of the "weakness of women" as that which one cannot accept in
oneself, men have, over the years, created hard,
external institutions of enormous power both as a
match for the vision of the powerful Mother within
and as a protection, a hedge against their own
"weak, female" self.
Thus, Mill's distinction between private and public results
from psychoanalytic processes which effectively discriminate
against women and reduce politics to power. 13
The
Millian,

communitarian
version

of

"egoistic" - -a model

feminists

rationality
of

reject
as

rationality

liberal,

and

"instrumentalist"

and

to

the

which women

should

neither aspire, nor through which they can be emancipated. 14
Other feminists, with a less psychoanalytical approach, also
target Mill's notion of "reason" as the ultimately limiting
aspect

of

his

liberalism.

Julia Annas

(1977,

191),

for

example, contends that Mill's emphasis on reason neglects the
13

0'Brien (1989, 37) offers a similar analysis of modern
politics, although she does not apply her conclusions as
directly to Mill. "The state itself is a concept, an abstract
principle of continuity rendered as vital entity.
This
abstract state provides a continuity that is abstracted from
the actuality of biological reproduction in which men are
marginal and uncertain actors and reconstituted as men's
greatest achievement in rational social organization, in
making history."
14

Jaggar (1983, 45) argues "The egoistic conception of
rationality is inadequate ... for political theory. . . .
The
egoistic model of human nature is unable to acknowledge the
values intrinsic to participating in an affective, a productive or a rational community because these values involve, by
definition, a concern for individuals other than oneself."
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role that sentiment and feeling play in the subjection of
women, sentiments and feelings which support women's subordination

by

appealing

domestic roles.

to

women's

traditional

or

"natural"

Consequently, she argues Mill,

is not aware of the massive changes required in
people's desires and outlooks before sexual equality becomes a reality ....
He does not pay enough
attention to the extensive interference in people's
lives necessary to ensure that the liberation of
women becomes a real change and not just the same
attitudes under another name.
Mill's stress on reason leads him to overlook the radical
nature of his own theory and to settle for public (political)
reforms

when

the

liberation

private revolution.

of

women

requires

a

radical

Political reforms cannot alter patriar-

chal custom and sentiment.

In short, she insists that Mill's

distinction between private and public subverts his potentially

revolutionary

principles

of

equality

and

liberty

by

allowing "rational" political reforms while ignoring private
sentiment and feeling.
In a similar vein, Jennifer Ring blames Mill's empiricism
for the limits of his liberalism. 15

Mill's empiricism forces

him to understand women's nature through observable historical
In doing

data.

so,

Mill

incorporates many

stereotypical

traits into his characterization of women and their role in

15

Ring' s
thought
radical/marxist feminist
radical/marxist feminist
notion of rationality as

bridges
the
communitarian
and
critiques of Mill. She shares in the
conclusions while dwelling on Mill's
a point of contention.
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the

family.

Mill's

(Sub.,

165)

empiricism prompts

such

assertions as:
Like a man when he chooses a profession, so when a
woman marries, it may in general be understood that
she makes a choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of her family ... and she
renounces, not all other objects and occupations,
but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this.
Again, Mill's methodological assumptions necessarily limit his
liberal vision.

In Ring's (1985, 28) words, "Mill depended so

heavily

empiricist

on

an

methodology

that

his

political

solutions lay embedded in existing custom, unable to embrace
the future."
The

radical/marxist

feminist

analysis

of

Mill

shifts

attention from Mill's conception of individual rationality to
an

evaluation of

the

societal

women's equality and liberty.

institutions

which

inhibit

It focuses on the familial,

economic and political inequalities which inevitably undermine
any formal promise of equality.
Mill's

separation

of

private

These feminists argue that
from

public

disguises

the

inegalitarian consequences built into the liberal political
structure.
citizens. 16

16

Mill's

liberalism

necessarily

assumes

male

It masks this assumption by welcoming both sexes

In terms of liberalism in general, Zillah Eisenstein
(1988, 77) asserts, "The fact that liberalism has always
privileged the phallus and the social relations of patriarchal
society explains why the tension between women's similarity
(to) and difference (from men) is embodied within liberal law.
As a gendered discourse, liberal law ends up exposing the
phallus, because in its view men and women are supposedly
homogenous individuals and not sex classes."
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in the political sphere but nevertheless refusing to address
patterns of coercion in private spheres.

By claiming that

women's emancipation requires nothing but "that the present
bounties

and protective duties

in favor of men should be

recalled," which does not necessitate "protective duties and
bounties in favor of women," (Sub., 144) Mill provides for the
mere

appearance

inequality.

of

equality

and

for

the

maintenance

of

As Diana Coole (1988, 148) writes,

He does not appear to have recognized that there
might be structural reasons for women's continued
and reinforced subjugation, predicated on contemporary interests which might be fully rational and
useful to their practitioners.
Although Mill feared unrestrained political power and sought
to

limit its

political

reach by delineating a

intervention,

private arena beyond

radical/marxist

feminists

conclude

that he remained blind to private patterns of coercion which
enslave and subordinate women. 17
Zillah

Eisenstein

also

attacks

private and public and claims

that

Mill's

separation

it embodies a

of

tension

between "individuality" and "liberal individualism" in Mill's
thought.

On

the one hand,

Mill's

philosophy

includes

a

rudimentary conceptualization of "individuality," in which the

17

Even "liberal" feminists note and criticize the
repercussions of Mill's separation of private and public.
Susan Okin (1979, 280) declares that with Mill "the strict
separation of the private from the public realm, of the family
from economic life, and the assumption that the day-to-day
care of the family is women's unpaid work, would all be
undermined by the inclusion of women in his theory as the
complete equals of men."
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individual is understood as actualizing her or himself within
complex social structures.
to

On the other hand, his commitment

"liberal individualism"

disassociated,

from and

conceives of

independent of,

the individual as
social

realities.

This disallows any true actualization of individuality as well
as a penetrating analysis of the impediments to the actualization of individuality.
liberal

individualism

This tension between individuality and
obscures

Mill's

diagnosis

of

the

structural nature of patriarchy, necessarily limiting Mill's
(and any) liberal paradigm.

Eisenstein (1981, 127) concludes

that insofar as Mill accepts "the structural base of society- the separation of public and family life--out of which the
ideology of liberal individualism is defined, a true individuality

is

not

open

to most women."

Mill's

attempt

at

a

reconciliation between women's social oppression (that is, his
recognition of sex and class as oppressive in themselves) and
abstract, atomized individualism fails.
The limits of liberalism, of "liberal individualism" in
Eisenstein's words, manifest themselves most profoundly for
women in the family.

Mill's sanguine acceptance of a sexual

division of labor within the home indicates the essentially
oppressive dimension of his private-public distinction.
(Sub., 164) observes that,
when the support of the family depends, not on
property, but on earnings, the common arrangement,
by which the man earns the income and the wife
superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me
in general the most suitable division of labour
between two persons.

Mill
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According to the radical/marxist feminist critique, assertions
such as these, rather than illustrating departures from Mill's
fundamental principles, demonstrate the necessarily patriarchal conclusions of Mill's liberalism and his private-public
distinction (see, for example, Annas 1977; Cameron 1980; Coole
1988; Eisenstein 1979; Hughes 1979; Pateman 1989).

According

to this critique, Mill's "failure to question the apparently
natural division of labour within the home means
arguments

for

democratic

citizenship

apply

only

that his
to

men"

(Pateman 1989, 217).
In this view, women's familial subordination resonates in
the economic sphere where it is solidified by Mill's commitment to private property.

Despite Mill's call for reforms of

the private property system,

he

failed

to

recognize

that

capitalism inherently privileges some while oppressing others.
In adhering to the principle of free accumulation and exchange
of property, Mill sacrifices freedom and equality for women
(see Hughes 1979).
tives,

Mill's scheme for encouraging coopera-

where workers band together to produce and procure

goods, fails to address the real cause of inequality:

private

property.
Capitalist

private

property

necessarily

reproduces

unequal distribution of goods and disparities in the opportunities of different people to procure goods.

Ownership is a

form of power over people in which the owner controls the
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lives and destinations of other individuals. 18

This problem

is especially poignant for women, who have historically been
excluded from and disadvantaged in the market place.

More-

over, Mill's assumption that women will continue to supply the
bulk of domestic labor irretrievably handicaps women in this
market system.

Mill's disregard for the coercive dimension of

private property is evidenced when he declares that "The power
of earning is essential to the dignity of a woman, if she has
not independent property" but "it would not be necessary for
her protection,

that during marriage she should make this

particular use of her faculties"

(Sub., 164).

As such, Mill

is blind to the coercive consequences of a wife's dependence
on her husband for economic subsistence.

Marriage can never

be a partnership of equals while one partner holds the purse
strings. 19

In the end,

radical/marxist feminists

conclude

that "the pull toward private property was stronger than the
one towards equality in Mill"

(Hughes 1979, 537).

Male domination in the family and in the economy effectively subverts Mill's attempt to secure political equality
for women.

Al though Mill called for women's suffrage, he also

18

Like the radical/marxist feminist interpretation of
Locke, the radical/marxist feminist reading of Mill extrapolates Macpherson' s more general interpretation and critique to
women's particular circumstances.
According to Macpherson
(1977, 55), Mill failed to see "that capitalist market
relation enhances and replaces any original inequitable
distribution ... steadily increasing mass of capital."
19

For a feminist reading of the coercive nature of private
property in Mill see, among others, Cameron (1980}; Coole
(1988); Eisenstein (1981); Hughes (1979).
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suggested

a

strategy of

against class faction.

plural voting

in order

to guard

Mill suggests that all people require

representation but that the quality of each person's vote
varies.

One way to balance the quality of various votes would

be to weigh them in terms of a standard such as education.
Everyone, male and female, would have at least one vote; more
qualified individuals, more likely according to Mill to be
concerned with and knowledgeable of the overall social good,
would be awarded plural votes.
The only thing which can justify reckoning one
person's opinion as equivalent to more than one is
individual mental superiority; what is wanted is
some approximate means of ascertaining that.
(Rep. , 13 7 -13 8)
Mill

(Rep.,

138)

recommends

educational

or

occupational

standards as possible criteria for plural votes:
If there existed such a thing as a really national
education or a trustworthy system of general examination, education might be tested directly. In the
absence of these, the nature of a person's occupation is some test.
In

effect,

this

system

of

plural

voting

prejudices

against all women and those men of the laboring classes whose
educational and occupational possibilities is significantly
diminished.

A woman's position as homemaker, a position Mill

endorses, works against possible educational and occupational
achievement.

As a result, men's votes would inevitably and

significantly
sphere,

as

outweigh

in the

women's

familial

votes.

In

the

and economic sphere,

political
a

formal
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promise of equality,

in this case an equal right to vote,

masks an actual inequality, in this case plural voting.
In

conclusion,

both

the

communitarian

feminist

and

radical/marxist feminist critique of Mill revolve around a
tension

in Mill's

thought

between

formal

and

substantive

equality, a tension apparent in his private-public distinction.

Both groups of anti-liberal feminists conclude that an

analysis of Mill's thought on rationality, family, economics
and politics exposes the empty nature of his abstract promise
of equality and the oppressive nature of his political and
social system.
Mill's Liberal Response
A response

to

feminist

criticism of Mill

demands

an

elaboration of liberty and equality at work in a variety of
social contexts as well as an analysis of the role that Mill's
standard of harm plays in distinguishing between private and
public.
The demand for individual liberty echoes throughout John
Stuart Mill's work.

While continuing Locke's liberal defense

of the individual Mill radically alters its moral foundation.
In doing so he transforms the complexion of liberalism.
grounds his defense of the individual,

and his distinction

between private and public, in utilitarian concerns. 20
20

Mill

It is

specif ically, John s. Mill defines utilitarianism as
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility,
or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
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best for the society as a wh.Ole, as well as for each individual, that each member is fret? to pursue his/her own ends to the
fullest

extent

possible.

The

greatest

happiness

of

the

greatest number demands, according to Mill, a robust consideration of individual self-development and variance.
way,

Mill defends

In this

individual liberty without appealing to

natural rights. 21
Mill

adopts

and

revolutionizes

the utilitarianism he

learned from his father Ja:ines Mill and from Jeremy Bentham.
Mill rejects the narrow notion of pleasure and the individual
offered by earlier utilitarians.
of experiencing a pleasure

To be human is to be capable

beyond that described by Bentham.

Mill's utilitarianism attempts to account for the moral and
intellectual

pleasures

wn_ich

separate

human

beings

from

animals.
It would be absurd th.at while, in estimating all
other things, quali tY is considered as well as
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.
(Util., 258259)

as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, the pain, and the privation of pleasure" (Util.,
257) .
21

Mil1 states, "I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a
thing independent of utili t::.Y" (OL, 14) .
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He concludes that "It is better to be a human being dissatisf ied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied" (Util., 260) . 22
Mill's

notion of

individuality reflects

this

complex

understanding of pleasure.

For Mill, full individual actual-

ization

for

requires

latitude

choice

and

variance.

The

ability to choose who and what we become inextricably binds
Mill's

notion

of

human

choice

with

both

his

defense

individual liberty and his faith in human progress. 23
Mill (OL, 60)

of
For

I

human nature is not a machine to be built after a
model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed
for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and
develop itself on all sides, according to the
tendency of the inward forces which make it a
living thing. 24
Mill's notion of individuality and choice informs his utilitarianism; his appeal is to "utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive

22

The question whether Mill does or does not commit a
"naturalistic fallacy" in qualifying as well as quantifying
pleasure is beyond the scope of this paper.
23

Berlin (1984, 192-193) remarks on Mill's "passionate
belief that men are made human by their capacity for choice-choice of evil and good equally.
Fallibility, the right to
err, as a corollary of the capacity for self-improvement ... these are the principles which Mill never abandons."
Berlin elaborates: "He saw that men differed and evolved, not
merely as a result of natural causes, but also because of what
they themselves did to alter their own character, at times in
unintended ways."
24

Mill underscores the variety and complexity of human
nature. "Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are
not indistinguishably alike" (OL, 67) .
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being"

(OL,

14).

Human development requires choice, which

results in human beings who are a "noble and beautiful object
of contemplation" (OL, 63).
Mill

is

confident

that

a

full

range of

choices

and

experiences combined with the appropriate education allows
persons

to come

potential.
his

or

her

to know the

fullness

of

their

individual

In addition, each individual will become aware of
social,

empathic

Mill

nature.

(Util.,

286)

predicts that,
the influences are constantly on the increase,
which tend to generate in each individual a feeling
of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect,
would make him never think of, or desire, any
beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits
of which they are not included.
Mill's stress on human choice and progress combine to
produce an understanding of liberty and equality which is
exercised in a variety of social spheres.

Human beings come

to know themselves within an assortment of social relationships.

Moreover, Mill discerned that liberty- -choice- -demands

a modicum of equality throughout the different spheres of
human activity.

Liberty not only requires an environment free

of social and political coercion, but also an environment free
of coercive inequalities.

These principles of liberty and

equality instruct Mill's vision of the possibilities for human
familial, economic and political associations.
As

utilitarianism provides

the

moral

foundation

for

Mill's liberalism, feminism becomes a moral imperative of that
liberalism.

James Mill and Jeremy Bentham influenced Mill's
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utilitarianism;

Harriet

Taylor

influenced

his

feminism.

Mill's interest in women's political and domestic equality
predates his relationship with Taylor.

However, it was her

influence which clarified for Mill the practical consequences
of

the

extension of

liberal principles

to women. 25

Mill

(Auto., 149) describes her contribution:
What was abstract and purely scientific was generally mine; the properly human element came from
her:
in all that concerned the application of
philosophy to the exigencies of human society and
progress, I was her pupil.
Taylor made Mill aware of the pervasive nature of women's
subjection to men. 26
In his relationship with Taylor, Mill personally discovered the patriarchal dangers as well as the emotional riches
of

married

married.

life.
Despite

When Mill
a

growing

met

Taylor

emotional

she was
and

already

intellectual

25

See Auto., 143-150, for Mill's account of Taylor's vast
influence
his thought.
"When two persons have their
thoughts and speculations completely in common; when all
subjects of intellectual or moral interest are discussed
between them in daily life ... it is of little consequence in
respect to the question of originality which of them holds the
pen ... the writings which result are the joint product of both,
and it must often be impossible to disentangle their respective parts and affirm that this belongs to one and that to the
other."

on

26

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discern exactly
which of Mill's works Taylor co-authored.
For a persuasive
discussion on this topic see Rossi (1970).
Abiding by the
conclusions of Rossi's arguments, I will forsake any advantage
an appeal to The Enfranchisement of Women would have for my
purposes, as Rossi attributes this work primarily to Taylor
(Rossi 1970, 41-43).
In many specific instances, Taylor's
essay delineates more radical conclusions than Mill's, see,
e.g., Krause (1982); Rossi (1970).
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affinity between Mill and Taylor, Harriet Taylor's marriage to
John Taylor endured until his death almost twenty years later.
Mill and Taylor both recount, in personal correspondence and
formal writings, the distaste they felt for the constraints of
marriage and for the gossip which surrounded their private
relationship.

Custom as well as legalities imprison brilliant

women in stunting marriages (Rossi 1970).
John Taylor's death, the two married.

Within two years of

In this marriage Mill

experienced the "blessing" of a "partnership of thought and
feeling,"
14 3) .

"a partnership of our entire existence"

Mill's union with Taylor became his

(Auto.,

prototype

for

healthy marriages, marriages built on equality and friendship.
From this relationship Mill learned that marriages need not
rely on dependence or independence,

but on an inter-depen-

dence, "when each of the two persons instead of being nothing,
is something"

(Sub., 209).

Mill's adaptation of utilitarianism and his relationship
with Harriet Taylor culminate in Mill's attempt to balance
liberty and equality in various social relationships.

Mill

deliberately presents a case for individuality and diversity
in a

variety of private and public spheres.

liberty

not

only

for

its

service

to

human

Mill values
progress,

to

utilitarian considerations, but also for itself as a necessary
component of a full human life (see, in particular, Archard
1990;

Cohen 1986; Halliday 1976; Rosenblum 1987; Ten 1980;

Thornton 1987).

Freedom not only serves the "interests of man
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as a progressive being" (OL, 14) but the desire for freedom is
also firmly rooted in our human nature.
necessities of foods and raiment,
strongest want of human nature"

"After the primary

freedom is the first and

(Sub., 212).

Mill's concep-

tion of freedom as both an instrumental and intrinsic good 27
grounds his identification of private activities where the
individual is sheltered from oppressive social and political
coercion, where the individual is free to discover his or her
own nature. 28
On one level, liberty connotes negative liberty--freedom
from external coercion.

But Mill also defends a positive

liberty, 29 where we are not only free from arbitrary external
coercion but also for individual self-actualization.
allows the individual to flourish.
and

which

describes

negative liberty,
foot. 3 °

the

Freedom

One metaphor Mill employs,

interplay

between

positive

and

is his allusion to the Chinese "lady's"

Freedom, as this example demonstrates, means freedom

27

See Archard (1990) for a fuller elaboration of these two
dimensions of freedom in Mill's thought.
28

Mill alludes to both ends of individuality, "Where, not
the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of
other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of
the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the
chief ingredient of individual and social progress" (OL, 57).
29

For an exploration of the two sides of Mill's liberty
see, in particular, Archard (1990); Ten (1980); Thornton
(1987); Tulloch (1989).
3

°Cummings ( 1973) uses Mill's reference to the Chinese
lady's foot to demonstrate the positive aspect of Mill's
liberty.
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from restraints as well as freedom to become healthy and whole
(see OL, 69).

Another metaphor expresses the repercussions of

the denial of negative and positive liberty to women.

"What

is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial
thing--the result of forced repression in some directions,
unnatural stimulation in others" (Sub., 138).
women,

a

hot-house and

"In the case of

stove cultivation has

always

been

carried on ... for the benefit and pleasure of their masters"
(Sub., 139).

For Mill, women's subordination, the denial of

liberty to women, means that women suffer arbitrary coercion,
and also that women are denied the opportunity to discover and
articulate the fullness and variety of their humanity.

Mill

(Sub., 184-185) expresses this succinctly:
For the artificial state superinduced by society
disguises the natural tendencies of the thing which
is the subject of observation, in two different
ways:
by extinguishing the nature, or by transforming it.
In one case there is but a starved
residuum of nature remaining to be studied; in the
other case there is much, but it may have expended
in any direction rather than in which it would
spontaneously grow.
This understanding of liberty entails the necessity for
psychological and legal freedom (Lonoff 1986).

The explora-

tion of options essential to individual development requires
freedom from the oppressive dictates of custom, institutions
and autocratic law.

"Individuals, instead of being deterred,

should be encouraged in acting differentially from the mass"
(OL, 67).

In this way, Mill's Subjection of Women not only

forcefully states a liberal case for women's emancipation, but
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also acts as a rhetorical treatise 31 in which Mill appeals to
both men and women for the end of a system which enslaves
women,

for an end to their customary and legal oppression.

For this reason, Mill illustrates the detrimental effect of
female subordination on both men and women. 32
Mill's
liberty

definition

means

freedom

of

liberty

for

assumes

equality.

self-cultivation,

equally deserve the opportunity for fulfillment.

then

If

persons

If the goal

of liberty is the enhancement of each individual's growth,
then

each

individual

merits

liberty.

According

to

Mi 11

(Util., 319), equality,
is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the
Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a
mere form of words without rational significance,
unless one person's happiness ... is counted for
exactly as much as anothers. 33
More exactly, Mill understood that liberty requires a certain
equality in the opportunity to avail oneself of that liberty.
As Alan Ryan points out, Mill perceived that freedom "without
resources is illusory" (Ryan 1984, 158; see also, Mendus 1989;
Robson 19 68;

Rossi 1970;

Thornton 19 87) .

Mill identified

31

For an exploration of the rhetorical side of The Subj ection of Women see Lonoff (1986, 79). Lonoff notes "Mill took
pains with the literary aspects of his arguments; his pleas
for liberation, equality, and justice are sustained by a
skillful subtle rhetoric."
32

Mill states that "Women can not be expected to devote
themselves to the emancipation of women, until men in considerable number are prepared to join with them in the undertaking" (Sub., 194).
33

See Hughes (1979) for a discussion of Mill's definition
of equality.

100
familial

and

economic

constraints

political constraints.

on

liberty

certain

standard

well

as

In doing so he addresses feminist

concerns about private patterns of coercion.
a

as

of

equality

in

all

Liberty mandates
spheres

of

human

activity.
Individuals come to know and express themselves through
a variety of intimate and casual contacts.
protect and enhance indi victual
individual

choice and

Mill seeks to

liberty by maintaining the

spontaneous

development

integral

these different social expressions of individuality.

to

Mill

also understands that patterns of coercion (e.g., oppressive
inequalities) detrimental to individual liberty exist within
intimate and social relationships.
small place in modern life"

"Citizenship fills only a

(Sub., 160), and Mill calls for

emancipation of human life itself.
social spheres.

Prejudice invades all

Inequality in one sphere of activity carries

damaging repercussions for success in other spheres.

Mill

foresaw that the end of women's domination by men entails
dramatic reforms throughout social life (see Shanley 1981).
In this

sense,

there exists no clear line of demarcation

between private and public activities for Mill

(see Robson

1968, 204-205).
Mill wishes to protect a private sphere while at the same
time

addressing

private

power.

As

such,

Mill

offers

a

standard, harm to others, which can combat coercive inequities
in private spheres, such as the family, while maintaining the
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independence and integrity of that sphere.

Mill's liberalism

can address private challenges to liberty and equality.
directly

answers

feminist

protecting a private sphere,

concerns

that

Mill

liberalism,

in

is blind to existing private

power.
Throughout On Liberty Mill grapples with the problem of
distinguishing individual interests from societal concerns.
Mill

(OL,

16)

draws a circle around the individual within

which he or she is sovereign.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that
of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as
we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it.
Each is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily,
or mental and spiritual.
Society and government

should

leave

individuals

alone

to

determine their own "mental and spiritual" ends, but intervene
when individual actions infringe on the liberty of others.
The sole reason justifying "physical force in the form of
legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion ... is
self-protection" (OL, 13; see also Ten 1980, 52-67).
The problem becomes the identification of the focus and
scope of harm. 34
34

On this basis, Mill (OL, 80) distinguishes

Feminist Anne Phillips (1991, 26) finds Mill's distinction between private and public ultimately incoherent.
"In
the complex and interrelated world we inhabit, there is
virtually no action performed by an individual which is
without some impact on other people's lives. Does this mean
governments can interfere in them all?"
Many Mill scholars
dispute this sort of conclusion.
Rees (1991), for example,
claims that the distinction is "between just •affecting
others' and 'affecting the interests of others'." Ryan (1991)
discerns
three branches of conduct in Mill (prudence,
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"the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and
that which concerns others."
person

is

an

entirely

Just as obvious, however,

isolated

being."

Once

question becomes one of an interpretation of harm.

again

"no
the

Where is

the line between harm to oneself and harm to another?

In the

service of this elusive distinction Mill points to legitimate
reasons

for

intervention

(harm

to

identifies illegitimate reasons. 35

others)

and

explicitly

Illegitimate reasons of

intervention include any purpose other than the protection of
others.

The fact that an action harms the agent, that society

finds the act distasteful or morally repugnant, cannot justify
intervention

(see Ten 19 80) .

The health,

well-being and

growth of the individual concerns the individual alone.

aesthetics and morality) and concludes that government can
only legitimately intervene in the latter.
Ten (1980, 5-6)
offers the most persuasive interpretation.
He argues that
"[Mill's] case depends on distinguishing between different
reasons for interfering with the individual's conduct in any
area. Certain reasons are always ruled out as irrelevant, but
there is one reason, the prevention of harm to others, which
is always relevant."
35

Mill explains "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise.
To justify that, the conduct
from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to
produce evil in some one else" (OL, 13).
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When Mill extends to women equal protection of the law,
he promises more than political equality; he offers a strategy
by which harm to women can be addressed regardless of the
social sphere in which it surfaces.

The "same rights" Mill

promises to women encompass the equal protection from harm by
others.

Furthermore, in extending liberal rights to women,

Mill begins to understand that women suffer as groups.
is

not

merely an

individual phenomena,

individual on another. 36
as

individuals

(see

Harm

acted out by one

Women suffer as a sexual class and

Eisenstein

Mill

1981).

(Sub.,

196)

asserts that "Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our
There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of

law.

every house. "

Mill's liberalism can confront obstacles to

individual liberty regardless of their private nature.

For

example, Mill's standard of harm allows an attack on marital
rape.

Indeed, Mill's positive notion of liberty permits far

greater

interference

anticipated

(Tulloch

in

individual

1989).

Harm

lives
can

than

take

even

the

Mill

form

of

encroachments on people's opportunities for self-actualization.

In this way, Mill's principles can be interpreted to

support aff irma ti ve action. 37
36

Fox-Genovese (1991, 178) points to the "ways in which
women's
relation to individualism transformed
(Mill's)
thought."
37

Recently, David Dyzenhaus (1992) has argued that Mill's
harm standard could be logically extended, in keeping with
Mill's own principles, to allow censorship of pornography on
feminist grounds. Reading On Liberty in light of The Subjection of Women
reveals
not
only
the breadth of Mill's
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In

sum,

Mill's

distinction

of

revolves around the standard of harm.

private

from

public

This standard allows

Mill to preserve a private sphere while attacking private
power.

Mill explicitly explores liberty and equality at work

in the familial, the economic, and the political sphere.

An

analysis of Mill's understanding of each of these spheres
should reveal the ability of Mill's liberalism for attacking
patriarchy while protecting free individual expression and
association.

Mill does not forget substantive equality in his

promise of formal equality.
Two relationships

actually comprise the family:

marital relationship and the parental relationship.

the
Both

relationships affect and reflect other social and political
relationships.
At

present

Both are open to political intervention. 38
the

marital

relationship

encompasses

dynamics; both love and power define this relationship.

two
The

healthy, or corrupt, actualization of the marital relationship
dramatically influences the children.

On the one hand, Mill

understanding of the unique social harm incurred by women, but
also reveals an opening for a less narrow identification of
the presence of harm.
Just as one may be prohibited from
shouting fire in a crowded theater, or in Mill's example,
prohibited from inciting an angry mob by calling corn dealers
"starvers of the poor" (OL, 56) one may be prohibited from
distributing incendiary pornography in a society already
inflamed with patriarchy.
According to Dyzenhaus, Mill
understood the potential harm of expression, as well as,
conduct.
In contrast, Robert Skipper (1993) argues that
Mill's theory allows no such revision of its harm principle.
38

See Coole (1988) for a more skeptical analysis of Mill's
intervention in the family.

105
identifies marriage with power.
the roots of patriarchy

(see,

Shanley 1981; Tulloch 1989).

Within marriage Mill finds
in particular,

Millet 1970;

The domination of women by men

begins in the family and reverberates outward. 39
tion of women begins at home.

The subjec-

A husband's despotic rule over

his wife is akin to the rule of slaves by masters.
(Sub.,

148)

argues

that

"no slave is a

Mill

slave to the same

length, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is," for
a husband can claim "from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an
animal function contrary to her own inclination."
The despotic power exercised within the family presents
a major obstacle to progress.
benefit

of

women's

potential

It denies humanity the full
contributions.

Moreover,

a

husband's despotic power over his wife produces children who
value power as opposed to liberty. 40

Boys learn that man-

hood, rather than virtue or merit, yields power and recognition.

Mill (Sub., 196) observes that,

39

Mill explains, "And here, I believe, is the clue to the
feelings of those men, who have a real antipathy to the equal
freedom of women.
I believe they are afraid, not lest women
should be unwilling to marry, for I do not think that any one
in reality has that apprehension; but lest they should insist
that marriage should be on equal conditions; lest all women of
spirit and capacity should prefer doing almost anything else,
not in their own eyes degrading, rather than marry, when
marrying is giving themselves a master, and a master too of
all their earthly possessions" (Sub., 145).
40

Rossi (1970) explores these two benefits of sexual
equality: 1) the doubling of human talents, 2) the advantages
for socialization.
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All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the
unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind,
have their source and root in, and derive their
principal nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and women.
Mill hopes for a time when women's human capacities double the
talents available for human progress.
Love, as well as power, defines the marital union.

The

marriage relationship embraces the possibility of the richest
of friendships, where each partner's happiness and fulfillment
intensifies the other's.

In this healthy union, each spouse

understands her or his private interests in light of the union
as a whole,

and in light of the benefit for one's spouse. 41

The possibility of emotional, intellectual and erotic affinity
animates

marriage. 42

The

family,

and

in

particular

the

41

Note the interesting symmetry between this description
of the possibilities latent in marriage and Mill's prediction,
which we analyzed earlier in this chapter, that eventually
each of us would understand our social natures, that each
would discern the private benefit of the public good. In sum,
Mill hopes for an end to the clash between private and public
interests.
Healthy, giving marriages provide the building
blocks for such an understanding by the individual of her/his
social nature.
42

Shanley (1981) disapproves of Mill's reticence on the
sexual component of marriage. In fact, Mill refers to sex as
an "animal function" and an "animal instinct."
Mill also
maintains in his Autobiography that his twenty year premarital relationship with Taylor "was one of strong affection
and confidential intimacy only" (Auto., 136).
Mill went so
far in an early draft of his AutobIQCi'raphy to describe how he
and Taylor "disdained, as every person not a slave of his
animal appetites must do, the abject notion that the strongest
and tenderest friendship cannot exist between a man and a
woman without a sensual relation, or that any impulses of that
lower character cannot be put aside when regard for the
feelings of others, or even when only prudence and person
dignity require it" (see FN 1, Auto., 137).
Despite Mill's
depreciation of the importance of sexual expression in marital
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marital relationship "in its best form is, as it is often said
to be, a school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving forgetfulness of self"

(Sub., 153).

Mill details the political benefits of a marriage based
in friendship.

Democratic liberal government requires members

who value liberty,

equality and self-cultivation.

Mill's

description of a healthy, even ideal, marriage produces such
citizens.

The

observation

of

the

loving

and

voluntary

commitment between one's parents vividly demonstrates for the
children

the

advantages

of

society.

Children grow confident of their own worth, cogni-

zant of the worth of others.
equality,
merit.
slavery,

liberal

equality

throughout

Children mature to liberty and

perceiving the shallow security of power without

In contrast, a corrupt marriage, based in power and
little

tyrants,

capriciously exercising whatever arbitrary power

they can

grasp.

results

in

children

who

become

Mill (Sub., 153) describes this corrupt family as "a

school of wilfulness, overbearingness, unbounded self-indulgence, and a double-dyed and idealized selfishness."

Absence

of liberty corrupts the family, impeding the care, nurturance,
socialization and love manifest in that relationship.

In this

way, Mill graphically illustrates the dialogue between family
and politics.

Family life carries significant social and

political implications (see Shanley 1981; Urbinati 1991).

friendships, he certainly allows room for this expression.
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Mill understands that the "personal is political" to the
extent that the domestic and political spheres carry profound
implications for each other.

Furthermore, Mill's (Auto., 111)

vision of friendship comprises one aspect of his attack on
patriarchy.

The possibility of a "most valuable friendship"

in marriage, combined with the political intervention necessary to prohibit the harm of one marital partner by another,
can together attack patriarchy. 43

As patriarchy has roots in

family, a resolution of patriarchy begins with the family.
Mill addresses the parental relationship more briefly.
Parents owe their children an appropriate upbringing conducive
to the child's fruition as a mature,

free and equal adult.

This imposes an obligation on parents which can be enforced by
political means.

Government can interfere in the family for

the sake of the child's education.

"One of the most sacred

duties of parents" is to provide for their child an "education
fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others
and towards himself"

(OL,

demands state enforcement.

105).

The import of

this

duty

However, Mill attempts to balance

state interference for the sake of equality with individual
liberty.

For this reason, he suggests a number of methods,

such as compulsory exams or defraying costs, which can assure
educational achievement without promoting educational uniformity.

Mill hopes to provide parents with the widest latitude
43

Urbinati (1991) points to the role of friendship in marriage as a principle for the transformation of socially
pervasive patriarchy.
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possible in choosing educational strategies while assuring a
minimum of education for all children.

Mill

(OL, 108) ties

his interference in the parental relationship to his standard
of harm:
The fact itself, of causing the existence of a
human being, is one of the most responsible actions
in the range of human life.
To undertake this
responsibility--to bestow a life which may be
either a curse or a blessing--unless the being on
whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the
ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a
crime against that being.
In the end, Mill distinguishes the family from politics
on

the

basis

of

their

legitimate

ends.

Families

should

operate in terms of love--personal, partial, discriminating
love.

Persons experience the interests of one's spouse, or

one's child,

poignantly and profoundly.

A full account of

family life demands an exploration of this intimate connection.

In

contrast,

impartially. 44

politics

and

government

should

act

The liberty and equality of each individual

demands the impartial application of the power of government
in the prevention of harm.

Equally dangerous would be any

attempt to found a politics of love and any attempt to remove
the partial, personal component in the family.
The

task

is

to employ government

to prevent harm to

others without interfering in the personal expression of love.
This can be achieved through a close attention to the reasons
for intervention.
44

Intervention to prevent the harm of one

Mill discusses the definition of impartially, and its
connection to various activities (Util., 300-301).
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partner

by

another

constitutes

legitimate

intervention.

Intervention for the sake of the agent himself or herself
constitutes illegitimate intervention.

The free choice by a

couple of a particular (homosexual or heterosexual) marital
arrangement, whether we find that arrangement unfair in its
repercussions

or

distasteful

in

its

expression,

deserves

protection as long as each partner legitimately chooses that
arrangement for herself or himself.

Mill supports interven-

tion when one partner cannot protect himself or herself, when
the patterns of coercion are so great as to render free choice
impossible.
should

Mill warns,

neither

add

however,

unnecessarily

that
to

this

intervention

political

power

and

bureaucracy nor contribute needlessly to uniformity of action.
Mill's depiction of the wife as a slave, and his description of the presently constituted marriage relationship as a
master-slave relationship, refers back to his prohibition of
slave contracts

in On Liberty. 45

According

to Mill,

one

cannot exercise his or her liberty by abdicating that liberty
in favor of slavery.

Persons cannot deny their status as

persons, as agents capable of choice and self-actualization.
One's choice cannot legitimately forsake all future choices.
"The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be
free not to be free.

It is not freedom to be allowed to

alienate

(OL,

45

his

freedom"

103) .

Mill's

prohibition

of

Pateman (1988) points out the repercussions of Mill's
prohibition of slavery for women's present enslavement in marriage.
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slavery lays the foundation for a political and social attack
on familial patriarchy,

on marital slavery.

The parallel

between patriarchal marriages and slavery opens an avenue for
positive political intervention to encourage female liberation, to end women's enslavement.
slavery

requires

an

The elimination of domestic

expansion

of

familial,

economic

and

political opportunities through positive political intervention.
As always, Mill attempts to reconcile the dictates of
liberty and equality in the family.

Government can interfere

for the sake of individual protection, but not in order to
mandate a pre-established division of labor.
expression consists of

the opportunity to determine as

couple the give and take in that relationship.
of

determination

coercive

cannot

inequality

Free marital

or

take

place

customary

in

an

prejudice.

a

This liberty
atmosphere
The

of

sexual

division of labor "neither can nor should be pre-established
by the law, since it must depend on individual capacities and
suitabilities" (Sub., 156).
Mill's

paradigm

of

private

and

public

attempts

to

reconcile the attack on social patterns of coercion which
require

government

intervention

sovereignty of the individual.
others does exactly this.
free

choice

remain

with

a

concern

for

the

Mill's standard of harm to

Family arrangements which express

immune

from

government

intervention.

Government should not violate free choice by establishing
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certain marital arrangements (e.g. , uniform guidelines for the
sexual division of labor).

Moral repugnancy or distaste does

not warrant government intervention.

In contrast,

marital

arrangements in which one person harms the other, in which one
partner victimizes the other, or in which one partner's free
choice is eliminated, demand political attention.
one partner by another legitimizes intervention.

The harm of
In this way,

Mill allows for the love possible and power present in marital
relationships.

Mill

allows

politics

to

intervene

in

the

family while preserving the difference between the two.
The actualization of free choice in the family depends
upon freedom and equality in other spheres of activities.
Familial freedom for women demands freedom in the economic and
political spheres.
cal activities

Mill's evaluation of economic and politi-

demonstrates

the principles of

freedom and

equality operating throughout Mill's philosophy.
In

his

autobiography,

Mill

(Auto.,

138)

explicitly

identifies the goal guiding his economic theory:
The social problem of the future we considered to
be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of
action, with the common ownership in the raw materials of the globe, and an equal participation of
all in the benefits of combined labour. 46
Mill

struggles

with

the

problem

of

reconciling

liberty,

equality and social welfare in his Chapters on Socialism.

In

this work, Mill evaluates different economic systems, communism and
46

capitalism,

in

terms

of

their promotion of

The "we" Mill refers to is Taylor and himself.
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independence,
nis~ 7

social welfare and equality.

Whereas commu-

generates an oppressive centralization of authority,

capitalism engenders

troublesome,

class

Mill notes

inequalities.

and
that

equally oppressive,
capitalism fails

correlate labor with reward or merit with success.

to

Communism,

however, stifles healthy competition while empowering a large
managerial cadre.
The

question

empirical one.

of

which

system

to

support

becomes

an

Mill supports whichever system works best,

judged in light of the over-arching principles of liberty and
equality.

In the end, he supports a modified capitalism, but

his support is provisional.

Mill (Soc., 275) concludes that

"individual property has presumably a long term before it, if
only a provisional existence."

This does not entail, however,

that it must exist during the whole term unmodified, or that all rights now regarded as appertaining to property belong to it inherently, and must
endure while it endures.
Mill provisionally rejects communism as "not available as a
present resource"

(Soc.,

275).

Communism assumes a human

nature, a "social fabric" not yet available.
In addition to his provisional support of capitalism,
Mill looks to government to encourage cooperative production.
With

a

47

taste of

independence

and

freedom

in

the

family,

Mill uses the term "socialism" where I use the term
"communism." The socialism Mill criticizes equals communism
as we now understand it. This is important because, as will
be demonstrated, Mill recommends what some call a liberal
"socialism."
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economic market and politics, workers can extend that freedom
by

forming

industrial

cooperatives where

joint production

overcomes individual inequalities (Ryan 1984).

Mill states:

Eventually, and in perhaps a less remote future
than may be supposed, we may, through the cooperative principle, see our way to a change in society,
which would combine the freedom and independence of
the individual, with the moral intellectual, and
economic advantages of aggregate production. 48
The principles of liberty and equality shine through Mill's
historical conclusions.

Mill's particular economic sugges-

tions rank second to his fundamental principles of liberty and
equality (Gutmann 1980; Ryan 1984).
In

the political

sphere,

as

in

the

economic

sphere,

Mill's struggle with the political prerequisites of liberty
and equality is compounded by his concern for social welfare- progress.

Mill actively championed women's

suffrage.

He

declared that women deserve, and require, equal protection of
law.

Female political participation advances both women and

politics.

Mill (Rep., 143) takes,

no account of difference of sex.
I consider it to
be entirely irrelevant to political rights as
difference in height or in the color of the hair.
All human beings have the same interest in good
government; the welfare of all is alike affected by
it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to
secure their share of its benefits.
It should be recalled that equal "political rights" for Mill
entails impartial protection from harm by others.

48

Mill, Principles
Gutmann (1980).

of

Poli ti cal

Economy.

This does

Quoted

in
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not necessarily exclude a consideration of the unique harm
done to women.
Mill

(Rep., 127) argues for a representative democracy

"representative of all, and not solely of the majority."

Mill

fears a tyranny of a capricious majority as much as that of a
political despot.

For this reason Mill recommends a number of

strategies for blending majority with minority rights, liberty
and equality with progress.
143)

suffrage represents

"Universal but graduated" (Rep.,
By merging a

one such attempt.

consideration of the quality of a vote with the quantity of
votes Mill hopes to protect against class faction

(i.e., an

angry and short-sighted laboring class) as well as provide for
social progress and welfare. 49

Mill

qualified voters with a weighted vote.

seeks

to

reward more

Qualities deserving

recognition are those that demonstrate a far-sighted concern
for the public interest as opposed to selfish individual or
class interest.

Mental superiority justifies plural votes.

Mill (Rep., 137) immediately recognizes, however, the problems
with discerning the quality of a vote.
a measure of quality:

He rejects property as

"accident has so much more to do than

merit with enabling men to rise in the world"

that such a

measure "will continue to be supremely odious."

Mill (Rep.,

138) tentatively suggests that education or occupation "might"
serve as "some" test.

49

Mill limits plural voting so that no

Robson (1967) discusses the connection between plural
voting and progress in Mill's thought.
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single class could dominate the majority.
a

number of other strategies

designed

He also elaborates
to

insure minority

representation. 50
This

strategy,

plural

voting,

represents

suggestion founded on deeper principles.

a

specific

Once Mill discerned

that any of his particular strategies violated their justifying principle, he would abandon it promptly.

He recognizes

the evolving nature of knowledge, particularly knowledge of
social phenomena (note his discussion of economics).

It is

therefore mistaken to dismiss Mill's paradigm on the basis of
some misguided (tentative and contingent) specific recommendations.

Upon

recognizing

the corrosive

effects

of

plural

voting, Mill would, I believe, revise his strategy in order to
adequately service his principles of liberty and equality.
Communitarian and Radical/Marxist Feminists:
This elaboration of

the variety of

A Reply

social spheres

in

Mill's thought reveals the radical potential in Mill's private
and public paradigm for addressing socially pervasive patriarchy while maintaining
Mill's

50

philosophy

the

attacks

integrity of different spheres.
coercive

inequalities

without

0ne such method Mill favors to insure minority representation is proportional representation. Interestingly, some
feminists also look to proportional representation as one way
in which women's voices are not utterly silenced. Unlike the
"winner take all" strategy of determining representation,
proportional representation guards against one dominant class
or faction monopolizing discussion or policy formation.
For
a discussion on the feminist advantages of proportional
representation see Phillips 1991, 80-89.
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collapsing private pursuits with public duties.

He backs his

formal promise of equality with an understanding of substantive inequality.

He perceives,

and addresses patterns of

domination in all social spheres,

but refuses

to diminish

private to public, love to power, or families to domination.
Mill's private and public paradigm conveys the richness and
complexity of human nature, a multi-dimensional human nature
in which individuals realize themselves in a variety of social
contexts

(see Rosenblum 1987).

social spheres:

He explores in detail three

the domestic, economic and political spheres.

All these spheres are necessary, but none sufficient in and of
themselves, as expressions of human liberty and equality.

As

such, Mill balances liberty and equality within, and among,
spheres of activity.
The

underlying

principles

of

liberty

and

equality

operating in Mill's analysis of private and public spheres of
activity allow a specific response to the communitarian and
radical/marxist
earlier,

feminist critiques of Mill.

As explained

the communitarian feminist critique centers upon a

perceived separation in Mill's thought between emotion and
reason.

This allegedly reflects a difference between men and

women.

Communitarian feminists argue that Mill depreciates

and subordinates women and the emotional private family to the
rational (male) public realm.

Mill's distinction of private

from public is not founded on a difference between men and
women,

however,

but

in

two

different

aspects

of

every
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individual's life:

the partial personal expressions of love

and the impartial interest in public welfare.
Mill tries to reconcile these two dimensions of human
nature in his private and public paradigm and in his depiction
of the individual.

Each individual expresses him/herself in

a variety of personal and impersonal contexts.

Mill (OL, 60)

explains that "desires and impulses are as much a part of the
perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints:

and strong

impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced."

Mill

(OL, 61) defends emotions as necessary to healthy societies:
whoever thinks that individuality of desires and
impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself,
must maintain that society has no need of strong
natures - -is not the better for containing many
persons who have much character--and that a high
general average of energy is not desirable.
Mill accounts for and balances the pull of both reason and
emotion

in

society

and

in

the

individual.

He

does

subordinate emotion to reason or family to politics.
express humanity.

not
All

In his Autobiography, Mill's speaks of a

mental crisis he suffered, through which he came to believe
that "The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties,
now seemed to me of primary importance.

The cultivation of

the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical
and philosophical creed"
Communitarian

(Auto., 86).

feminists

mistakenly

interpret

Mill's

denigration of instinct and prejudice as a depreciation of
emotion and feeling
Thornton

1987) .

(Urbinati 1991;

Rather

than

also see Robson 1967;

"abstracting"

reason

from
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emotion,

Mill

coordinates

the

two

healthy individual, male or female.

into

a

portrayal

of

a

Furthermore, Mill employs

the Subjection of Woman as both a rhetorical and a rational
tool.

Mill discerned that the elimination of women's subordi-

nation requires

a

re-education of

sentiment as well

as

a

rational philosophic argument (Shanley 1981; Urbinati 1991).
Whereas
results

the communitarian feminist misreading of Mill

from a mistaken association of men and women with

reason and emotion in Mill's

thought,

the

radical/marxist

feminist misinterpretation ensues from an exaggeration of the
"separateness" of private and public activities.

Furthermore,

it fails to distinguish principles of fundamental import in
Mill's philosophy from practical, provisional suggestions. 51
The

preceding

analysis

exposes

the

complexity

in

Mill's

paradigm of private and public which allows- -indeed demands- -a
concern for coercive inequality.

Mill's private and public

paradigm incorporates a dialogue between formal equality and
substantive inequality.
Radical/marxist feminists read Mill's support of laissez faire capitalism,

plural voting,

and a

sexual di vision of

labor in the home as indications of the conflict in Mill's
thought between formal equality and substantive inequality.
Mill, however, recognized the tenuous, evolving character of

51

Gutmann (1980); Shanley (1981); Ten (1980); Tulloch
(1989) all discern two levels of theoretical commitment in
Mill's philosophy.
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the study of economics and of human social behavior. 52
examined

the

tentative

and

provisional

economic and political theory.

nature

of

we

Mill's

Likewise, his psychological

assumptions about the sexes and their appropriate roles in the
family can,

and for a

true understanding must,

be distin-

guished from his deeper commitment to freedom and equality.
Although Mill

(Sub., 164) says that "It is not. .. I think, a

desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labor
to the income of the family"

(my emphasis),

he reiterates

several times throughout the same text that no one can know
the true nature and roles of women.

"I consider it presump-

tion in anyone to pretend to decide what women are or are not,
can or cannot be,

by natural

constitution"

(Sub.,

173). 53

His particular recommendations of procedures and strategies
depend entirely on their service to liberty and equality in
the sphere of activity in which they operate.
In conclusion, Mill's private/public paradigm provides
for liberty and equality while protecting the private aspect
of the family.
women.
this

Mill coherently extends liberal principles to

Rather than exposing the limits of Mill's liberalism,
endeavor

52

See,
(1961).
53

reveals

especially,

the

breadth

and

potential

of

his

Mill's Auguste Comte and Positivism

Earlier in the same text Mill asserts, "It is only a man
here or there who has any tolerable knowledge of the character
of the women in his own family.
I do not mean, of their
capabilities; these nobody knows, not even themselves" (Sub.,
141) .
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paradigm

for

society.

Mill advances Locke's liberal paradigm by explicitly

identifying

articulating

a

standard

the

of

complexity of

intervention

humanity

which

and

regulates

interaction between the political sphere and the economic and
familial

spheres.

contains a

Whereas

la tent potential

Locke's

political

for political

philosophy

intervention in

various spheres, Mill systematically demarcates private and
public activities

in terms of a

standard of intervention.

Whereas Locke's liberal philosophy begins to illustrate the
transformation all human relationships undergo when individuals are considered free and equal, Mill consciously promotes
that transformation.

The political dictate to protect the

individual from harm by others transcends familial boundaries.
Mill picks up the liberal project where Locke left off, selfconsciously working out the interactive relationship between
spheres of activities.
Mill's standard of intervention- -harm to others- -provides
the beginning of a model for government intervention for the
sake of gender equality.
elaboration.
fully

It is this standard that requires

Can this liberal standard be extended so as to

recognize how women

suffer as

women?

Can such an

extension maintain the liberal distinction between private and
public?

These questions guide my next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
RAWLS AND GENDER JUSTICE
As Mill
natural

rejects Locke's

rights,

John

Rawls

foundation for
rejects

adequate basis of liberal freedom.
individual
private

liberty

and

and,

public

utilitarianism

as

an

Yet all three promise

consequently,

activities.

liberalism in

distinguish between

Rawls

reinvigorated

the

continuing debate over liberal ideas and practices with his
widely acclaimed--and just as widely criticized--reworking of
liberal

political

thought,

A Theory of

Justice.

Rawls'

philosophy thus offers feminists an opportunity to test their
criticism of liberalism against a twentieth century formulation of the tradition.
Many

feminists

indication of
address

interpret

liberalism's

women's

Rawls'

thought

as

another

inability to articulate and to

differences,

differences

in

reproductive,

familial and economic roles which root women's oppression
(see,

for example,

1989;

Young 1990).

Benhabib 1987; Hirschmann 1992;
For

these

feminists,

Rawls'

Pateman
abstract

method effectively erases women's differences, silences their
voices and ignores their lives.

In their view, Rawls' overt

attempts to include women in his principles of justice merely
serves

to

obscure

still

further
122

the

limits of

liberal

123
principles for women's emancipation.

Nancy Hirschmann (1992,

76) claims that:
The structural sexism of contemporary obligation
theory is ... masked by ostensible improvements in
contingent sexism, but, in a continuum of historical devolution, it is systematically implicated and
intertwined in the concepts these theories inherit
from the Enlightenment.
This chapter argues that Rawls' feminist critics misconstrue

the

intent

and

principles of justice.

emancipatory

potential

behind

his

Rawls' method integrates both univer-

sal and particular concerns, both "male" and "female" voices
(Okin

1989b).

Indeed,

Rawls'

theory

fails

only when he

overlooks the revolutionary nature of his own liberal principles

(see Kymlicka 1989, 95).

Rawls offers a strategy with

which we can discern both what we have in common, as members
of liberal societies, and how we differ.

Rather than erase or

ignore those differences, Rawls' political philosophy incorporates human individual differences into its very foundation
(see Kukathas and Pettit 1990, 135-136).

The central question

concerns the fair terms of cooperation between individuals
with different experiences and different goods;

these fair

terms of cooperation mediate between persons understood as
"self-authenticating sources of valid claims"

(PL, 33).

This chapter critically extends the sympathetic reading
of

Rawls'

First,

philosophy offered by

reading

Rawls'

work

in

Susan Okin
light

of

in

two ways.

previous

liberal

thinkers reveals how the contemporary liberal project began
and progressed with

the work

of Locke

and

Mill.

By
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elaborating
thought,

the

emancipatory

implications

in

Rawls'

own

the feminist potential implicit in earlier liberal

accounts is exposed.
Second,

and more

importantly,

whereas Okin locates a

fundamental ambiguity in Rawls' work apparent in his reluctance to apply the principles of justice to the family (Okin
1991, 181), I argue that this reluctance on Rawls' part is as
much a

product of

his

choice of

focus

as

a

sentimental,

patriarchal desire to protect the family from the demands of
justice. 1

This becomes apparent when one examines Rawls'

distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory.

By focusing

directly on the relationship between family life and politics
in Rawls' thought, by explicitly identifying both the private
and public dimensions of the family, I demonstrate that what
Okin

labels

an

reveals Rawls'

"internal

paradox"

(1989a,

249)

actually

deep concern for both the integrity of the

family unit and the emancipation of women through an extension
of the principles of justice.

Rawls' ambivalence about the

relationship between justice and the family does not reflect
a patriarchal blind spot to coercive family structures, but a
deep understanding of the role of family life in expressing
diversity, individual goods and liberty.
1

Rawls remarks in Poli ti cal Liberalism:
"Other major
matters are omitted, for example, the justice of and in the
family, though I do assume that in some form the family is
just.
The underlying assumption is that a conception of
justice worked up by focusing on a few long-standing classical
problems should be correct, or at least provide guidelines for
addressing further questions" (PL, xxix) .
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In sum,

like Okin,

I

discover in Rawls'

principles a

profound emancipatory potential for the alleviation of gender
inequities.

Unlike Okin, I find his private-public distinc-

tion both emancipatory and logically consistent.
case,

To make this

I first elaborate the continuing feminist critique of

Rawls,

then suggest a possible liberal response apparent in

Rawls' political philosophy.

This allows a specific response

to the feminist critics of Rawls'

identified here.

In all

three steps, I concentrate on Rawls view of the relationship
between private and public:

in the first,

on the feminist

critique as it challenges this distinction in his work; in the
second,

on the consequences of this distinction for gender

equity; in the third, on the potential for Rawls' distinction
between private and public to meet the continuing feminist
challenge to its efficacy.

I argue that this private-public

distinction protects both women and men, while providing a
potent weapon against patriarchy, wherever it surfaces.
The Feminist Critique of Rawls
Rawls himself recognizes two broad lines of criticism
prompted by A Theory of Justice.

These critiques

either

represent Rawls' liberalism as:
intrinsically faulty because it relies on an abstract conception of the person and uses an individualist, nonsocial, idea of human nature; or else
that it employs an unworkable distinction between
public and private that renders it unable to deal
with the problems of gender and the family.
(PL,

xxix)
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Feminists adopt both these lines of argument.
which

I

call

the

revisionist

liberal

The first,

feminist

critique,

charges Rawls with failing to apply his principles of justice
to

the

gender-structured

family,

failing

injustice in reproductive relationships

to

(see,

address

the

for example,

Green 1986; Kearns 1983; English 1977; Okin 1989b).

Ultimate-

ly, however, many of these feminists find Rawls' principles
viable and desirable, given a complete application of their
strictures.

My own interpretation belongs

in

this

camp.

Contrary to this view, however, I argue that Rawls' principles
of justice necessarily impact on the family,

to the extent

that families belong in the basic structure; at the same time,
however,

Rawls

locates

a

fundamentally

private

aspect

of

family life which places families beyond political control.
In the end,

I demonstrate that Rawls does this consistently

and persuasively.

The second strain of feminist criticism,

which I call the communitarian feminist criticism, 2 challenges
the adequacy of the principles of justice themselves, denying
their cogency for articulating feminine experiences.
feminists reject the universalizing,

These

impartial character of

Rawls' principles of justice as inevitably blind to women's
particular circumstances and to the coercive relationships
which

enforce

2

women's

subordination

(see,

for

example,

The characterization of this strain of feminist critique
as "communitarian" is adopted from Chapters 2 and 3, where
similar critiques of Locke and Mill were identified.
See
Chapter 2 for a defense of this label.
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Benhabib 1987; Matsuda 1986; Pateman 1989; Young 1990).

Some

communitarian feminists counterpoise Rawls' ethic of justice
with an ethic of care,
with women's reality
1989) . 3

I

an ethic,

(see,

they assert, more in tune

for example, Held 1993; Ruddick

elaborate each of these two feminist

readings,

liberal and communitarian, in turn.
The

liberal

feminist

critique applauds

Rawls

for his

effort to create the necessary material and economic bases of
liberty; it denies, however, the feminist potential of such a
liberalism until the distinction between private and public is
reworked, or even jettisoned. 4

Only a liberalism which "cuts

3

The feminist critique lacks a sustained attack of Rawls
from the left. This can be attributed to two factors. First,
feminists often adopt and deepen the prevailing interpretations of particular thinkers and the general marxist criticism
of Rawls is itself less prevalent in the literature responding
to Rawls, for two prominent, early marxist critiques, see
Macpherson (1973); Nielsen (1978); cited in Kymlicka (1990a,
160).
Second, to a large extent, Rawls coopts a socialist
critique of his work by both identifying and addressing
economic patterns of coercion.
Rawls notes that in "a
democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though
not presumably equally held ... and distributive shares satisfy
the principles of justice, many socialist criticisms are met"
(TJ, 280).
It should be noted that in some respects Young
(1990, 32) criticizes Rawls from the left when she accuses him
of focusing on distributive justice and forgetting structural
processes which reenforce and recreate domination.
Young
asserts that "a distributive understanding misses the way in
which the powerful enact and reproduce their power." I have
treated Young in this chapter as an expression of communitarian feminist criticism, because she traces this failure to
appreciate the contexts of power to Rawls' abstract method
which, in her view, renders power relationships unintelligible.
4

Green (1986, 36) presents an example of the more
extreme, later case. "Liberalism, shorn of the public/private
distinction which has heretofore hindered the application of
liberal principles to the question of justice within the
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through the public/private dichotomy remains a secure foundation for feminist

thought and action," and in fact,

there

exists "much in Rawls' work to encourage the suspicion that
the public/private distinction is intrinsic to liberalism"
(Green 1986, 27).

At the very least, Rawls' theory "is flawed

by the ramifications of

the public-private split"

(Kearns

1983, 41) which relegates family life, and gender relations to
the sacrosanct arena of private activity, beyond the reaches
of justice.
The private nature of the family is evident in the way
Rawls identifies the participants in the original position, 5
those agreeing to the principles of justice to guide society,
as "heads of families."

As such, they represent the interests

of families, rather than individuals; they look forward to the
themselves.

This

characteristic of parties to the agreement, however,

"makes

interests

of

their progeny as

well

as

the family opaque to claims of justice" (English 1977, 95; see

family,
remains a sturdy foundation for thorough-going
feminist action."
It is hard to imagine what a liberalism
"shorn" of its private-public distinction would look like. I
have argued throughout this dissertation that this distinction
defines liberalism, that it characterizes liberalism at its
essence. To the extent that some feminists seek to jettison
the private-public distinction, rather than rework it, they
have moved away from anything which would reasonably be
considered liberal.
5

The original position is a device of representation
Rawls employs to expose the fair terms of cooperation. I will
examine this concept, in detail, later in this chapter.
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also,

Okin 1987,

48-50), 6 alerting some feminists to a far

deeper problem in Rawls' work.

In their view, Rawls' silence

regarding gender structured families implies a reluctance, or
even an inability, to speak to women's claims for emancipation,

to effectively combat that aspect of

families which

constitute a barrier to equal opportunity for women.
Despite his assertion that persons behind the veil of
ignorance will be ignorant of their sex, 7 Rawls never incorporates the ramifications of this inclusion into his theory.
overlooks

the

radical

transformation of

He

gender-structured

society and family this would require (Kearns 1983).

After

all, if parties to the contract are truly ignorant of their
sex,

they could never risk allowing

patriarchal society.

the maintenance of

a

Although Rawls recognizes the family as

a significant barrier to equal opportunity (TJ, 301), he never
comprehends the significance of that obstacle to liberty for
6

It should be noted that Rawls appropriates this critique
in Political Liberalism. In this later work, Rawls stipulates
that the "parties can be required to agree to a savings
principle subject to the further condition that they must want
all previous generations to have followed it" (PL, 274) and
drops the head of families constraint.
This way, parties
necessarily consider the interests of subsequent generations
without being characterized as heads of families.
7

Actually, in A Theory of Justice Rawls never mentions
sex specifically in terms of his "thick" veil of ignorance.
"Among the essential features of this situation is that no one
knows his place in society, his class or social status, nor
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like" (TJ, 12). Rawls corrects this oversight and his sexist
language in later work. Rawls rules out as "not relevant from
a moral standpoint. .. a knowledge of our sex and class" (Rawls
1975, 537; see Okin 1987, 46).
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women.

Rawls asks, "Is the family to be abolished then?" (TJ,

511).

He replies that "there is much less urgency to take

this course" (TJ, 511), for "when the principles of fraternity
and redress are allowed their appropriate weight, the natural
distribution

of

assets

and

the

contingencies

circumstances can more easily be accepted"
suggests

that,

families

as

for

Rawls,

"natural"

and

women

can

search for

of

social

(TJ, 512).

accept

This

patriarchal

redress

outside

the

simply

assumes

the

family itself.
Indeed,

according

to Okin,

Rawls

family to be just (Okin 1989b, 235-237).

In Part III of b:_

Theory of Justice Rawls traces moral development, acquired by
children in families.

He ties this moral development to its

culmination in the acquisition,
justice.
stages

of

by adults,

of a

sense of

In just societies, children proceed through three
moral

development:

morality

association, of principles (TJ, 462-479).
essential role in the first two.

of

authority,

of

The family plays an

In the first,

the family

encourages the internalization of "a collection of precepts"
(TJ, 466)

regarding rewards and punishments; these precepts

result from familial authority based in love and affection.
This demands that the parents "exemplify the morality which
they enjoin" (TJ, 466).

Indeed, the parents themselves must

"be worthy objects of (the child's) admiration" (TJ, 465) .

In

the second stage, the family conveys the necessity to see life
from a variety of points of view,

inculcating the need "to
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honor one's obligations and duties" (TJ, 471).

Affection and

attachments prevalent in the family ingrain in the maturing
children the desire to reciprocate benefits.
third stage of development,

Finally, in the

the adult generalizes from the

moral precepts acquired in the family, coming to "appreciate
the ideal of just human cooperation" (TJ, 474).

The adult now

acts from principles of justice as well as affection.
Given this explicit and detailed picture of the role of
the family in the production of a society populated by persons
with an adequate sense of justice, Rawls' silence concerning
justice within the family appears inconsistent.
families model just relations for children,

After all, if

the question of

just relations within the family becomes significant.
argues

that Rawls' s

reluctance to explore

Okin

justice between

family members manifests an ambivalence internal to his work
regarding the private or public nature of the family. 8
hand,

Rawls

designates

structure of society,

the

family

as

part

of

the

On one
basic

a basic structure susceptible to the

principles of justice; on the other, he fails to apply justice
to the family.
just

societies

families.
tively

8

He details the essential role of families in
while

disregarding

the

impact

of

unjust

In Okin's (1987, 47) assessment, Rawls is "effec-

trapped by

this

assumption ... that

life within

the

Kymlicka (1990a, 190) also asserts that Rawls "flipf lops on whether the family is or isn't one of the basic
institutions of society to be governed by principles of
justice."
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family and relations between the sexes are not properly to be
regarded as part of the subject matter of social justice."
This unwarranted--patriarchal--assumption by Rawls yields an
"internal paradox"

(Okin 1989a,

feminist potential of Rawls'

249),

sharply limiting the

thought until this "ambiguity"

(Okin 1991, 181) is resolved. 9
The communitarian feminist critique of Rawls indicts him
not only for his distinction between private and public but
also

for

espousing

distinction.

the

very

principles

which

yield

that

Feminists adopting this perspective share an

opposition to what they perceive to be a narrow conception of
human nature and experience,

a conception inadequate for a

full articulation of women's differences.

Specifically, there

are three cornrnuni tarian feminist challenges to Rawls' liberalism:

a critique of his abstract method; a critique of his

stress on justice as opposed to empathy; and a critique of his
notion of obligation as opposed to non-voluntarily constructed
duties. 10
Many

feminists

exemplified

by

his

reject
veil

of

Rawls'

abstract

ignorance

which

method,
requires

best
the

elimination of all individual, particular concerns motivating
parties
Rawls'
9

to

the original

approach

agreement.

considers

persons

For
shorn

these
of

feminists,

all

actual,

For a similar argument see Green (1986).

10

Grimshaw (1986, 203) delineates each of these three
characteristics of what she calls a "female ethic."
Baird
(1994) also points to this three-prong characterization.
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historical and social circumstances.
possibility,

and usefulness,

They question the very

of this sort of abstraction--

Carole Pateman calls parties in the original position "disembodied entities of reason" (1989, 46) --and conclude that under
the contract situation "sexually differentiated individuals
have disappeared" (1988, 42) . 11

Seyla Benhabib describes the

relationship between abstract persons in the original position
and actual, particular individuals in society as one between
a

"generalized other" and a

Rawls'

"generalized other,"

The former,

"concrete other."
mistakenly depicts

"disembedded and disembodied beings"

(Benhabib

persons
1987,

as

81).

Abstracting from particular individuals with unique histories
and positions, abstracting in essence from all that makes us
human,

disallows

an understanding

of

difference.

"Under

conditions of the 'veil of ignorance' the other as different
from the self,
they

become

disappears ....

irrelevant"

Differences are not denied;

(Benhabib

1987,

89).

Benhabib

recommends an alternative view of others--that of the concrete
other.

As concrete others, persons perceive one another as

unique individuals and try to understand their differences.
Rawls'

distinction between private and public reflects his
Rawls'

impoverished conception of the self.
such,

ignores

desires

11

sexual

differences,

and perspectives.

politics,

differences

These needs

"become

in

as

needs,

'private',

Matsuda (1986, 616) and Minow (1990, 154) arrive at the
same conclusion.
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nonformalizable, nonanalyzable and amorphous aspects of our
conceptions of the good life"

(Benhabib 1987,

94).

Rawls'

private-public distinction relegates consideration of concrete
others to the private realm.

Women, as women, disappear from

politics.
Iris Young presents a similar critique of Rawls.

She

notes that Rawls employs a "social ontology that gives primacy
to substance over relations" and "fails to appreciate that
individual

identities and capacities are in many respects

themselves the products of social processes and relations"
(1990,

27).

That is, Rawls' veil abstracts from all human

relationships, all the distinctive characteristics which make
us human.

Rather than capture a plurality of selves,

the

veil's monological character excludes discussion among moral
subjects; behind the veil, any individual looks like, could
be, any other individual.

The veil eliminates any possibility

of exploring differences, or analyzing relationships.

Through

this veil Rawls attempts to achieve impartiality, but actually
merely masks--often coercive--relationships.
necessarily elusive- -and dangerous.

Impartiality is

"Reducing differences to

unity means bringing them under a universal category, which
requires expelling those aspects of the different things that
do not fit the category"

12

(Young 1990, 102) . 12

MacKinnon (1989, 162, 292) makes an even stronger case.
"Formally, the state is male in that objectivity is its norm.
Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of itself."
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She believes this drive toward impartiality results in
two related problems.

First,

it allows Rawls to mistakenly

focus on distributive justice.

Because Rawls' method rules

out any discussion of context, he understands social justice
as

tantamount

to

a

simple

distribution

of

"benefits

burdens among society's members" (Young 1990, 16).
the

transformation

familial--necessary
Second,
stress

Rawls'
on

of
to

and

He elides

institutions- -economic

effectively

private-public

impartiality,

distribution.

societal

and

the

oppression. 13

combat

distinction
reduction

and

reiterates
of

this

justice

to

"Like impartial moral reason, this public realm

attains its generality only by exclusion of particularity,
desire, feeling and those aspects of life associated with the
body"

(Young 1990, 107) .
Whereas Benhabib and Young oppose Rawls' universalizing

intent, other communitarian feminists--maternal feminists 14 -contrast Rawls' paradigm of justice with an ethic of care,
evident they argue in women's moral voices.

Rawls' "contrac-

tual rationality" (Held 1987, 112) diminishes morality to mere

13

Young (1990, 27) notes that Rawls' inclusion of selfrespect as a primary good appears to transcend mere distribution, but ultimately fails. "While Rawls does not speak of
self-respect as something itself distributed, he does suggest
that distributive arrangements provide the background conditions for self respect."
14

Dietz (1987) identifies "maternalist feminism" as one
feminist challenge to the liberal notion of citizenship.
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bargaining- -men

jostling for

limited goods . 15

Contractual

justice models a relationship between mutually disinterested
parties seeking to further their own ends through agreement.
In contrast, women's lives, as mothers, reveals a distinctive
ethic, a paradigm which integrates women's empathic insights
as caregivers and nurturers.

These feminists do not claim

that all women are so giving; but, rather, that the possibilities built into the mother-child relationship shed light on a
different standard of action, an alternative model of ethical
judgment.

This model demands that the actor evaluate the

needs of the other person, as well as--or before--a consideration of how to maximize his or her own
Virginia Held,

for example,

benefits.

recognizes

that different

standards of behavior operate in different types of relationships.

She contends, however, that:

relations between
atic ... may be an
reconstructing a
will be adequate
(1987 115)

mothers and children as paradigmimportant stage to go through in
view of human relationships that
from a feminist point of view.

t

Rawls' principles elevate contractual justice, defining it as
the paramount public voice, and relegating the ethic of care,
women's voices, to the private realm.

Held concludes:

To continue to build morality on rational principles opposed to emotions and to include women among
the rational will leave no one to reflect the
promptings of the heart.
To simply bring women
15

Hirschmann (1992, 259) remarks:
"Indeed, in the
original position justice arises only because people act
defensively against the possibility that they will be worse
off when the veil is lifted."
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into the public and male domain of the polis will
leave no one to speak for the household.
(Held
1993, 48) 16
Finally, some feminist communitarians find Rawls' theory
of

obligation problematic.

Contract

theory which

founds

obligation upon consent fails to comprehend non-voluntarily
acquired obligations.

In particular, the veil of ignorance,

which removes individuals from their context, cannot account
for non-voluntary duties.
ence

demonstrates

through agreement;

that

In contrast, the maternal experinot

all

some duties

obligations
are

are

acquired

simply given.

Rawls'

emphasis on consent neglects the non-voluntary component of
all obligations, ranging from the political to the maternal.
To be sure, Rawls reintegrates non-voluntary obligations with
his

notion of natural duty- - the duty to comply with just

institutions.

In this case,

one's obligations derive from

what one would agree to, what anyone would agree to,
Rawls' original position.

given

Ultimately, however, this hypothet-

ical construction creates obligation and coercion, without and
regardless of actual consent.
of voluntarism"

creates a

largely hypothetical"

16

This "problematic construction

situation where

(Hirschmann 1992,

93).

"voluntarism is
As a result,

Ruddick ( 19 89, 180) also explores what she calls a
"maternal thinking" which "articulates an opposed and superior
conception of conflict resolution rooted in a maternal view of
relationships .... In this alternate conception, the ideal of
equality is a mystifying phantom.
Mothers are not equal to
their children .... Differences in strength cannot be wished
away .... Power relations are shifting and complex."
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Rawls disguises coercion behind a facade of hypothetical and
empty consent.
Rawls ... flounders in the attempt to reconcile the
conflicting needs for individual choice and community and ends up binding people against their will
through the elaborate construction of a falsely
voluntaristic structure.
(Hirschmann 1992, 94)
Rawls' voluntarism masks coercion, and in doing so, hides nonvoluntarily acquired duties, most profoundly experienced by
women in the family, in a liberal private sphere. 17
In sum, Rawls' private-public distinction troubles both
his liberal feminist and communitarian feminist critics.

They

perceive

this

a

reluctance

on

Rawls'

part,

manifest

in

distinction, to address and rectify injustice in the family.
Rawls' feminist critics point to a number of indications that
the

family

is

superficial
profound

fact

perceived

for

Rawls - - from

family constraint)
distinction

between

justice/care and obligation/duty).

these interpretations,
distinction

private

(the heads of

(his

particular,

in

is

both

the

to

more

the more
universal/

Contrary to

I believe that Rawls' private-public
essential

to

his

theory

of

justice,

necessary as a preserve of individual integrity in and out of

17

Hirschmann (1992, 116) describes a "systematic sexism
in modern obligation theory ... which once again turns on the
central assumptions of the public-private split.
For the
denial of the relevance to political obligation of the
activities of the private sphere, such as child care, affective relations and productions and reproduction in all its
variety, at least implicitly indicates a masculinist ontological and epistemological framework."
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the family, and potent as a weapon against patriarchy, against
patterns of domination in the family.
Rawls' Liberal Response
Feminist

critics

of

Rawls

argue

that his

promise of

freedom and equality is empty unless he responds to substantive inequality within the family.

They extend their earlier

critiques of Locke's and Mill's liberalism, contending that
liberalism's masculine bias, expressed in its private-public
distinction, masks private, familial coercion with a facade of
formal equality.

In fact, Rawls shares the feminist concern

for the substantive bases--material and social--of liberty.
He

agrees

that

"Locke's

doctrine

improperly

subjects

the

social relationships of moral persons to historical and social
contingencies that are extended to, and eventually undermine,
their freedom and equality"

(PL,

287) . 18

Like Locke,

Rawls

hopes to protect individual liberty by defining the legitimate
scope of political intervention, by disclosing the fair terms
of cooperation. 19

More profoundly than Locke, however, Rawls

18

Rawls continues, "The constraints that Locke imposes on
the as-if historical process are not strong enough to characterize a conception of background justice acceptable to free
and equal moral persons" (PL, 287).
19

Rawls asks, "When may citizens by their vote properly
exercise their coercive political power over one another when
fundamental questions are at stake?
Or in light of what
principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our doing
so is to be justifiable to others as free and equal?" (PL,
217) .
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understands that individual liberty also demands an attention
to social and economic conditions.
Rawls' political philosophy uncovers the repercussions of
understanding persons as "self-authenticating sources of valid
claims.

1120

tradition,
Rawls:

This phrase captures the essence of the liberal
the

theme which echoes

persons as

from Locke and Mill

to
For

distinct beings- -free and equal.

liberals from Locke to Rawls, the distinction between private
and public blends a belief in the integrity of the individual
with the need for,

and joy in,

community.

In particular,

Rawls' distinction between private and public elucidates the
fair terms of cooperation among persons and associations with
diverse characters and ends.
The central concern for feminists involves the location
of the family in Rawls' political thought.

They ask:

is the

family private for Rawls, an expression of rationally pursued
individual goods and, as such, beyond public intervention?
is

it public,

justice?

thereby subject to reasonable principles of

At times Rawls treats the family as public, identi-

fying it within the basic structure (see TJ, 7; PL, 258).
others,

he characterizes

according to affectionate,
(see PL, 137).
20

Or

the family as private,

At

operating

rather than coercive principles

Some feminists point to this two-dimensional

Mosher (1991, 289-290) identifies "two fundamental
intuitions" in Rawls' work: "persons are separate" and "luck
cannot be a morally defensible basis for distributive outcomes."
These intuitions flow from the notion of "selfauthenticating" persons.
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nature of the family as an apparent "ambiguity"
181)

or

thought.

"internal

paradox"

(Okin

1989a,

(Okin 1991,

108)

in

Rawls'

Okin (1989b, 231) perceives a "tension within the

theory."

In contrast,

I

argue

that

this

two-dimensional

treatment reflects the dual nature of families

themselves.

Family life correctly understood belongs both in the public
basic structure (a realm subject to the principles of justice)
and to the non-public sphere of associations. 21

On one hand,

families operate as one of the most persistent barriers to
fair equality of opportunity

(TJ,

74,

301,

511).

On the

other, free individuals express and form themselves within the
confines of the family unit (TJ, 462-469).
private and public.

Rawls'

Families are both

liberal paradigm reflects this

complexity inherent in family life, and offers a strategy for
addressing both the private and public aspects of family life,
for combating patriarchy while preserving the familial choice
and expression.
Rawls'

distinction

between

the

reasonable

and

the

rational, the right and the good, clarifies his understanding
of public and private.

21

The reasonable connotes those ends

At one point, Rawls recognizes the family as distinct
from both the political and associational. "The political is
distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways
that the political is not; it is also distinct from the
personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in
ways the political is not" (PL, 137).
For my purposes,
families intersect with both the private and public realm,
acting both as part of the basic structure and the broader
associations. This does not deny that family life maintains
a peculiar, affectionate character.
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societies pursue as necessary to common life (e.g., cooperation) .

The rational designates those goods individuals and

associations seek as a result of independent choice and free
will. 22

As persons with both reasonable and rational powers,

with both a sense of justice and an awareness of distinct and
sometimes conflicting personal and associational ends,

each

individual acts as both a citizen and a man or woman (PL, 1920,

29-35).

As citizens,

individuals exercise a

sense of

justice which is articulated and clarified by the device of
representation known as the original position.

As free and

equal persons, each follows independent personal and associational goals.
rational,

In this way,

the reasonable constrains

citizenship cons trains personhood.

meaning

of

Rawls'

good. 23

As such,

claim

for

the

right

is

This

is

the

prior

to

the

individuals pursue their life within fair

terms of cooperation,
which allows

that

the

realizing their ends within a

equal

self-development

in others. 24

space
"In

22

Rawls (PL, 49-50) specifically recognizes the difference.
"The reasonable is an element of the idea of society
as a system of fair cooperation and that its fair terms be
reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of reciprocity ....
The rational is, however, a distinct idea from
the reasonable and applies to a single, unified agent (either
an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment
and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its
own."
23

Mendus (1989, 119) notes that public and private in
Rawls corresponds with the right and the good.
24

Rawls explains, "the right and the good are compli mentary: no conception of justice can draw entirely upon one
or the other, but must combine both in a definite way" (PL,
173) .
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justice as

fairness

the priority of

right means

that

the

principles of political justice impose limits on permissible
ways of life"

(PL,

174) .

Justice as fairness draws those

limits in such a way as to allow the greatest possible freedom
for self-development and diversity.

Rawls

(PL,

174)

con-

eludes, "A political conception of justice must contain within
itself sufficient space ... for such ways of life."
Rawls' basic structure, the non-voluntary social ins ti tutions

which

shape

life

possibilities, 25

falls

within

the

domain of the reasonable and public; fair terms of cooperation
demand that these coercive social institutions abide by the
principles of justice.

"The basic structure is the primary

subject of justice because its effects are so profound and
present from the start" (TJ, 7).

Clearly, by this definition,

the family belongs in the basic structure.
recognizes this,

in his most recent book,

Rawls

(PL,

258)

noting that the

major social institutions of the basic structure
assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the
division of advantages that arise through social
cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the
legally recognized forms of property, and the
organization of the economy, and the nature of the
family, all belong in the basic structure. 26
25

See TJ, 8 for Rawls' comparison between the basic
structure and other "voluntary cooperative arrangements."
26

It should be noted that at other points Rawls fails to
include the family in the basic structure--unless he does so
with the nebulous term "social ins ti tut ions."
Earlier in
Political Liberalism Rawls writes, "By the basic structure I
mean a society's main political, social, and economic institutions" (PL, 11). Okin (1989, 49) reads passages similar to
this to indicate an ambiguity in Rawls' thought. I argue that
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This reinforces Rawls' placement of the family in the basic
structure in A Theory of Justice (TJ, 7).
While

the

basic

structure

expresses

our

reasonable,

public selves, particular associations manifest our private,
or

more

correctly,

selves. 27

non-public

In

non-public

spheres, persons realize disparate rational goods.

Persons

express themselves in a variety of associational contexts,
often

shifting

membership

and

alliances,

appropriate to their unique ends.
identities

within

various

values

Persons work out their

associations,

themselves and confirming their value,
roles and goals. 28

choosing

learning

about

trying on different

Associations encourage self-development

and affirm self-respect, providing an environment where the
individual's

contributions

are

recognized

(see, in particular TJ, 441; PL, 41-43).
( 1993, 77)

argues,

and

appreciated

As Roberto Alejandro

"associations socialize individuals into

the in-out relationship between the family and basic structure
is actually a product of a complexity internal to the family
itself.
27

See PL, 220-221 for Rawls'
reason and power.
28

description of non-public

Rawls explains:
"In a democratic society non-public
power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over
members, is freely accepted....
Whatever comprehensive
religious, philosophical, or moral views we hold are also
freely accepted, politically speaking, for given liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought, we impose any such doctrine
on ourselves.
By this I do not mean, apart from all prior
loyalties and commitments, attachments and affections. I mean
that, as free and equal citizens, whether we affirm these
views is regarded as within our political competence specified
by basic constitutional rights and liberties" (PL, 221-111).
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the

principles

of

trust

and

friendship,

strengthen

the

individual's self-esteem, and provide a •secure basis' for the
worth of members . "

Associations vividly teach individuals

about reciprocity and mutuality, the foundation of a sense of
justice.
within

In this regard,
the

family,

families are also associations; 29

members

learn

about

"moral

standards

appropriate to the individual's role," experience the exercise
of

"certain

ability

"to

perspectives"

rights
view

and

duties"

things

from

(TJ,
a

467)

greater

and

acquire

an

multiplicity

of

(TJ, 469).

Rawls' paradigm integrates both the private and public,
reasonable and rational, coercive and affectionate aspects of
family life, with the reasonable constraining the rational;
the public framing the private.

As such, the public, reason-

able aspects of the family provides space within which the
private aspects flourish; the public dimension of the family
limits and protects the private dimension. 30

More specifi-

cally, when the family enters the circumstances of justice
(see Tomasi 1991, 523; Kyrnlicka 1989, 113), the principles of
justice hold; when affection and commonality exist,
steps back.

When one partner abuses another

(e.g.,

justice
rape),

29

Kearns ( 19 83, 4 O) asserts that "the family is explicitly
considered to be a small association."
See, in particular,
TJ, 467.
3011

Political values normally outweigh whatever other
values oppose them, at least under the reasonable conditions
that make a constitutional democracy possible" (PL, 155). See
also, TJ, 425.
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justice must prevail.

After all, love transcends justice, but

justice founds love.

(See TJ, 464, 129.)

Families operate according to values which differ from
political values. 31

Rawls,

(PL, 10) then,

does not deny there being other values that apply,
say, to the personal, the familial, and the associational, nor does it say that political values are
separate from, or discontinuous with, other values.
But, when the values of the family break down, when affection
and common interests no longer move its members, the circumstances of justice exist and the principles of justice take
hold.

Two features characterize the circumstances of justice

for Rawls:
ing,

ends

mutual disinterest and distinct, often conflict(Tomasi 1991, 523) . 32

Thus, when the family acts

out of love, affection or mutual interest, the circumstances
of

justice are

affection,

when

not

present.

domination

But when coercion
exploits

compassion,

replaces
justice

supplies redress.

31

Rawls elaborates on the distinct purposes of different
social institutions, "But it is the distinct purposes and
roles of the parts of the social structure, and how they fit
together, that explains there being different principles for
distinct kinds of subjects.
Indeed, it seems natural to
suppose that the distinctive character and autonomy of the
various elements of society requires that, within some sphere,
they act from their own principles designed to fit their
peculiar nature" (PL, 262) .
32

Rawls explains, "the circumstances of justice obtain
whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under
conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances
existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice"
(TJ, 128).
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Like Mill's standard of harm,
justice

allows

aspects of a
private.
spheres

a

society

to

Rawls'

circumstances of

systematically

decide

which

social institution are public and which are

In this way, both thinkers recognize a multitude of
of

activities,

first

identified

possess both private and public dimensions.

by

Locke,

which

Rawls enriches

Mill's standard by incorporating a standard which explicitly
recognizes coercive or oppressive circumstances which might
not, in some interpretations, clearly fall into the category
of harm.
Actually,

Rawls'

against patriarchy.

principles supply a
He

two-prong attack

seeks both to provide background

conditions conducive to justice in the family and to empower
the oppressed to combat their subordination and create just
social institutions.

To begin,

his principles of

justice

create background conditions which expand choices and opportuni ties outside the family. 33

These principles,

illuminated

through the agreement reached in the original position, embody
the fair terms of cooperation and apply to the basic structure
of society.
A.
Each person has an equal claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same
scheme for all, and in the scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be
guaranteed their fair value.
B.
Social and economic equalities are to satisfy
two conditions: first, they are to be attached to
33

0kin (1989a, 93, 175-176) makes exactly this point.
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positions and offices open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they
are to be the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
(PL, 5-6)
Rawls'

distinction between

liberty

and

the worth of

liberty clarifies this relationship between the two principles.

The first guarantees formal equality

(liberty);

the

second provides substantive equality, the resources necessary
to exercise those liberties (worth of liberty) .
While the difference principle

(the second principle)

addresses social and economic inequities, natural inequalities
remain.

Trying to equalize natural assets would demand far

too harsh a breach of personal integrity and destroy human
diversity.

Rawls does not seek to level human excellence, but

to actualize conditions in which all have the opportunity for
such excellence. 34
The aim, however, is not to eliminate contingencies
from social life, for some contingencies are inevitable.
Thus even if an equal distribution of
natural assets seemed more in keeping with the
equality of free persons, the question of redistributing those assets (were this conceivable) does
not arise, since it is incompatible with the integrity of the person.
(PL, 283)
In

this

way,

Rawls maintains

variety among persons

while

ameliorating the social repercussions of those differences.
He celebrates the differences among persons while disallowing
the oppressive social and economic structures which might
34

This echoes Mill's intent.
As Mill sought to protect
human excellence from cultural mediocrity by sheltering each
person from oppressive social tyranny, Rawls strives to
advance the full flowering of individuality by eliminating
oppressive economic tyranny.
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exploit those differences.

Women don't have to become like

men, adopt traditionally male characters (the greatest fear of
some

feminists) , 35

to

claim

equal

recognition

or

equal

access.
Rawls' principles of justice furnish space and resources
for many life choices.

Differences as well as similarities

bring people together.

Because "the self is realized in the

activities of many selves" (TJ, 565), Rawls promotes diversity
among persons.

Indeed it is the differences between men and

women, between any individuals, which brings them together:
The range of realized abilities of a single individual of the species is not in general materially
less than the potentialities of others similar to
it.
The striking exception is the difference of
sex.
This is perhaps why sexual affinity is the
most obvious example of the need of individuals
both human and animal for each other.
(TJ, 525)
It is the differences between men and women which the difference principle both protects and mitigates.

By alleviating

the social and economic repercussions of gender, the difference

principle

character.

allows

free,

chosen

expressions

of

sexual

Social and economic oppression no longer enforces

sex roles.
Rawls

(TJ,

511) argues that "the acknowledgment of the

difference principle redefines the grounds for social inequalities,"
escape.
35

empowering
Rawls'

the

oppressed,

expanding

options

for

principle of fair equality of opportunity

Those I have called maternal feminists particularly
oppose the traditionally-defined male character as a standard
of behavior. See, among others, Held (1993); Ruddick (1989).
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demands that substantive access to a variety of social and
economic positions no longer be tied to one's circumstances in
the family as either a husband or wife,

father or mother.

This requires a dramatic change in employment practices, from
adequate

(government

subsidized?)

parental leave policies
extent

daycare

to

flextime

(see Okin 1989a, 175-176).

and

To the

that prejudice and oppression inhibit women's

life

chances, societal inequities must be structured so as to favor
women.

To the extent that some persons are disadvantaged, the

difference principle dictates that any inequalities in society
or the economy favor those least advantaged persons.

To the

extent that women bear a heavier burden at home, the society
and

the

economy

distribute

benefits

as

to

favor

them. 36

Rawls' concern for the worth of liberty insures that entrance
into a marriage results from true autonomous choice, and also
permits a negotiation of the sexual division of labor on equal
terms.
Rawls'

liberal principles also furnish the tools for a

transformation within the family.
strains the rational,

the reasonable con-

justice supplies a

1988, 647) when affection fails.

36

As

fallback

(Waldron

As such, marital partners

Noting the family as a barrier to equal opportunity,
Rawls asks, "Is the family to be abolished then?
Taken by
itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this direction. But within the context of
the theory of justice as a whole, there is much less urgency
to take this course.
The acknowledgment of the difference
principle redefines the grounds for social inequalities .... "
(TJ 511) .
I
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understand

their

choices,

their

rights

and

obligations.

Although one partner may voluntarily withhold a just claim,
each partner recognizes the options available to the other. 37
In such an environment,

genuine marriages of affection and

reciprocity flourish, marriages built on coercion and domination collapse (Tomasi 1991, 525-528).
one partner to withhold a claim,

Affection may induce

to take on a

task which

justly might be one's spouses, but unreciprocated affection
soon dies.

Both partners,

as

equal

contracting members,

recognize the essential give and take to the marriage,

now

that choice truly exists.
Genuine choice also allows a variety of marital arrangements to surface.

Although in A Theory of Justice Rawls more

narrowly refers to the monogamous family as part of the basic
structure

(TJ,

later works

7),

(PL,

he corrected this limited definition in

258).

True choice provides space within

which individuals assume a variety of

familial and sexual

roles.

sexually prescribed

This choice undermines both a

division of labor in the home and any heterosexist definition
of family life.
Two
family,

37

contractual
the

marital

relationships
and parental.

actually
In both

animate

the

cases,

the

Tomasi
(1991) points out the distinction between
possessing a right and exercising a right.
Each individual
may possess many rights which they fail to exercise, which
they withhold, for a variety of reasons. A person's right to
vote, participate in government, divorce, etc. does not imply
that one must exercise all those rights.
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contractual aspect of the relationship lays the groundwork for
genuine affection between marriage partners or parents and
children.

In the marriage relationship, here understood as

interactions

between

adult

members

(usually

two)

in

the

family,

each partner recognizes the other as a possessor of

rights.

This recognition of the other's rights underlies the

self-respect upon which genuine love builds. 38

As persons

cannot be bound to tyrannical governments, marriage partners
cannot be tied to patriarchal marriages.
By the principle of fairness it is not possible to
be bound to unjust institutions or at least to
institutions which exceed the limits of tolerable
injustice.
(TJ, 112)
Choice preserves the integrity of the marriage contract.
In this contract, we assume certain obligations while accepting certain benefits (TJ, 113).

Love and affection build on

the base provided by the marriage contract and the justice
that contract implies.

The problem becomes one of distin-

guishing domination from love, coercion from affection.
offers

a

test

for distinguishing

affection from exploitation:
1993, 240-244).

Rawls

justice from oppression,

the veil of ignorance (Hampton

The veil asks each partner to consider if the

terms of the relationship would be acceptable if he or she
were acting as a representative for the other person.

Would

the terms of the relationship be acceptable to a representative free of coercive influences, and lacking foresight into
38

Kyrnlicka (1989, 123-125) notes the compatibility between
love and rights.
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which position he/she inhabits?
fair from either position?

That is, is the relationship

From this perspective, even the

exploited will recognize exploitation.

Affection would pass

this test, oppression would not. 39
Obviously,

real

choice

demands

the

option

of

exit.

Either partner can appeal to the principles of justice when
coercion replaces affection.
dictates of

the contract,

This right to exit follows the
the principles of

justice.

divorce law follows the three principles of justice,

So
first

establishing equal liberty, second, providing fair equality of
opportunity, third, enhancing the possibilities of the least
advantaged.
example,

This

means

that

current

divorce

laws,

for

which allow women to disproportionately bear the

burden of exit, in which a woman's standard of living drops by
73% while the man's rises by 42%,
principles of justice. 40

would not satisfy these

Divorce law needs to be formulated

so as to protect and enhance the prospects, the possibilities
of self-development, of the most disadvantaged.

39

Hampton (1993, 240, 244) describes, "in a successful
contractarian theory the contract is a (mere) device that, if
used in the right circumstances, will call to mind and
organize these concepts in a way that will enable us to apply
them to diagnose successfully the presence of injustice in a
relationship."
According to Hampton, it asks, "Could all of
us reasonably accept this if it were proposed as the subject
of unforced, informed agreement?"
40

0kin cites these statistics (1989b, 161). She does not
directly apply them to Rawls' principles of justice, but does
firmly believe that those principles would condemn any such
situation (see, in particular, 1989, 174).
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Contract theory also illuminates the parental relationship, again providing a foundation for true parental nurturance and affection.

In this respect, it asks the parent to

determine whether the standards of parental rule would be
acceptable from the child's perspective.

would a representa-

tive, lacking knowledge of one's position as parent or child,
find

the

terms

of

this

relationship

acceptable?

Rawls

concludes,
We must choose for others as we have reason to
believe they would choose for themselves if they
were at the age of reason and deciding rationally .... From the perspective of the original position, he must assume that this is what they will
come to recognize as for their good.
(TJ, 209; see
also, TJ, 248-249, 509)
This test distinguishes abuse from discipline,

exploitation

from affection.
This

test also allows

the latitude necessary for the

family to fulfill its unique function as the first school of
moral development,

of justice.

Within the family children

should learn reciprocity (Alford 1991, 151), empathy, obligation and love.
nates

In the end, children learn that right subordi-

authority

(see

TJ,

467),

that

justice

limits

even

parents--a valuable lesson to learn if persons are to recognize and condemn oppression wherever it surfaces.

Eventually

the reciprocity experienced in the family extends to include
individuals outside the family,
society as a whole.

in broader associations and

Persons apprehend perspectives beyond

their own, an ability fundamental to a sense of justice.
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In the economy, like the family, Rawls provides the tools
of transformation, while maintaining a sensitivity to culture
and tradition.

His first concern remains with autonomy, as

demonstrated by his primary ranking of the liberty principle; 41 once this concern is met considerations of efficiency,
incentives, and historical circumstances arise.
The question of private property in the means of
production or their social ownership and similar
questions are not settled at the level of the first
principles of justice, but depend upon the traditions and social institutions of a country and its
particular problems and historical circumstances.
(PL, 338)
In other words, as long as the economic structure satisfies
the principles of justice, peculiar circumstances determine
the complexion of the economy.

In all cases, however,

the

liberty principle compels the economy to create "a sufficient
material basis for a sense of personal independence and selfrespect" (PL, 298).

If this basis cannot be generated within

a capitalist society, if the power relationships integral to
private ownership of the means of production are too strong,
than the liberty principle disallows this economic arrangement.
Rawls believes that these conditions can be met within a
modified capitalist

economy.

The primary good of

self -

respect, however, plays a central role in adjudicating between
different economic regimes.

41

Primary goods are those resources

See Gutmann (1989, 339) for a discussion of
principles of justice as relates to economic liberties.

the
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all individuals would desire to possess whatever their ends.
As

such,

they serve as

a

measure of

the efficacy of

the

principles of justice.
We stipulate that the parties evaluate the available principles by estimating how well they secure
the primary goods essential to realize the higherorder interests of the person for whom each acts as
a trustee.
(PL, 75)
Primary goods,

essential to self-development

(Beatty 1983,

488), are distributed in terms of the principles of justice.
Furthermore, the resources necessary to self-respect are also
distributed

equitably,

unless

interests of the worst off.

an

inequality

advances

the

In this light, Rawls' difference

principle distributes productive assets as well as acquisitive
assets, at least to the extent that the former contributes (or
diminishes) self-respect. 42

All of this demonstrates Rawls'

overriding attention to the formation of an economic sphere in
which women and men participate free from coercion.
In sum,

Rawls persistently confronts

equal liberty, wherever they surface.

the barriers

to

His treatment of the

family demonstrates both his overriding concern for justice
and his regard for the freedom and integrity inherent to the
family
42

unit.

When

Rawls

asks,

"Is the

family to be

See Kymlicka (1989, 111) for an argument that Rawls'
principles also address productive assets, despite Rawls own
proclivity to speak more narrowly in terms of income redistribution.
See, also, Schwarzenbach (1987, 143) for a
thoughtful discussion of the relationship between primary
goods and self development, self respect and allocative
assets.
Schwarzenbach identifies an "acquisitive" and
"purposeful" conception of the self which lays behind Rawls
economic conclusions.
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abolished?" (TJ, 511), he recognizes the family as an oppressive social institution.

His answer illustrates an under-

standing of another value to family life which transcends
patriarchy,

an

understanding

of

the

family's

role

reservoir for affection, intimacy and personal freedom.

as

a

His

answer provides the tools for a transformation of family life,
for an attack on patriarchy, without obliterating the family
altogether, without crushing the private dimension of family
relationships.

His

answer discerns

reasonable and rational entity.

the

family as both a

As such, the family must be

both subject to the demands of justice and be allowed to move
beyond those demands to genuine affection.

As we have seen,

Rawls' delineation of the circumstances of justice, and his
use of

the original position

(as applied to

the family),

achieves exactly this end.
Liberal Feminists and Communitarian Feminists:

A Reply

Feminist criticism of Rawls primarily arises from the
view that his private-public distinction prohibits an effective attack on patriarchy.
perceived

reluctance

directly to

to

the family,

Liberal feminists challenge Rawls'
apply

the

principles

attributing this

patriarchal bias on Rawls' part.

to a

of

justice

remnant of

They contend that to the

extent that Rawls implicitly accepts a disturbing assumption
that the family is inherently private,
patriarchy at its origin.

he fails

to engage

158

In contrast,

I have argued that Rawls understands the

family as both private and public, rational and reasonable.
He illustrates

the

family as operating both in the basic

structure and as an association.

Integrating both facets of

modern family life, his liberal paradigm provides an avenue
which challenges

familial

opportunity for genuine,

patriarchy,

while protecting an

self-originating, community.

When

the circumstances of justice prevail, the family is understood
as public and the principles of

justice apply.

When the

circumstances of association prevail, when a true mutuality of
ends and desires exist, justice remains in the background.
Rawls' failure to specifically and explicitly expose the
repercussions of

the principles of

justice for

the family

results not from a patriarchal bias, but rather from a choice
of focus.

Rawls hopes to elucidate a small number of concepts

which, by extension, can be specifically applied to an ever
greater range of social institutions and practices.

Rawls

assumes the family is just only in order to expose the broader
societal principles of justice; once these are discerned, one
can convert
family.

them for use

in more complex cases - -like

the

Rawls assumes the family is just only in order to

hold it constant,

for the moment,

general questions of justice.

in order to explore more

In his view,

A constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a
series of subjects, starting say with principles of
political justice for the basic structure of a
closed and a self-contained democratic society.
That done ... the constructivist procedure is modified to fit the subject in question. In due course
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all the main principles are on hand, including
those needed for the various political duties and
obligations
of
individuals
and
associations.
(Rawls 1993, 39)
With this method, Rawls apprehends both the special nature of
the family unit and the relevance of justice to that same
family unit (see Rawls 1993, 40).
As

early as A Theory of Justice Rawls

limited scope of his project,

discloses

the

confessing that he makes no

attempt to address virtues, other than justice, in a systematic way

(TJ,

17).

In this

regard,

the

family presents

a

particularly complicated picture, blending important private
virtues with the virtue of justice.

As such, Rawls puts the

question of

aside

justice

in

the

family

for

the moment,

concentrating on constructing a paradigm which at a

later

stage may be appropriately extended to the family. 43

Rawls

reiterates his intent in Political Liberalism:

"I believe

also, though I do not try to show in these lectures, that the
alleged difficulties in discussing problems of gender and the
family can be overcome"

(PL, xxix) .

In Rawls' words, he concentrates on ideal theory in which
"everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in
upholding just institutions"

(TJ,

assumes the family acts justly.

8);

for our purposes, he

By doing so, he:

presents a conception of a just society that we are
to achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to
43

Rawls explains, "Of course, in a broader inquiry the
institution of the family might be questioned and other
arrangements might indeed prove to be preferable" (TJ, 413).
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be judged in light of this conception and held to
be unjust to the extent that they depart from it
without sufficient reason.
(TJ, 246; see also TJ,
391; PL, 285)
~
~
So, non-ideal theory builds upon ideal theory, pointing to the
discrepancies revealed by ideal theory, suggesting remedies,
applying the principles of justice to specific cases.

Rawls

tells the reader that his first concern involves ideal theory,
non-ideal theory will flow from this.
Unlike

the

liberal

feminist

reading

of

Rawls,

the

communitarian feminists find Rawls' principles to be inextricably implicated in patriarchy.

These feminists challenge

three fundamental components of Rawls' theory:

his perceived

distinctions between universals and particulars, justice and
care, and obligation and duty.

Far from ignoring particulars,

however, Rawls' political philosophy presents an opportunity
for a full consideration of others, their unique circumstances
and

relationships.

Both Rawls'

A Theory of

Justice

and

Political Liberalism begin as a defense of unique and separate
persons.

In the former, he takes utilitarianism to task for

inadequately

protecting

"utilitarianism

does

not

between persons" (TJ, 27) .

individual
take

ends,

seriously

concluding
the

that

distinction

Poli ti cal Liberalism pursues this

agenda; here Rawls accounts for the intractability of pluralism, which necessarily results from conceiving of persons as
distinct, free and equal--as liberal.
Our individual and associative points of view,
intellectual affinities, and affective attachments,
are too diverse, especially in a free society, to
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enable those doctrines to serve as the basis of
lasting and reasoned political agreement. (PL, 58)
Political Liberalism accounts for what Rawls calls burdens of
judgment.

That is, given the reality of the human experience,

competing claims, distinct persons, difficult choices, lasting
unanimity remains an elusive--and dangerous--goal. 44

Persons

inevitably differ in beliefs, perspectives and desires.

Rawls

recognizes "the burdens of justice as limiting what can be
justified to others" (PL, 81); the burdens of judgment require
pluralism.
Diversity

necessitates

a

political

framework

which

apprehends the fair terms of cooperation among persons with
varying life plans. 45
celebrates them,

Rather than erase differences,

Rawls

providing space for a variety of persons,

conceptions of the good and of the good life.

Rawls does this

by discerning the common ground upon which we all stand, by
delineating the breadth of that common ground and the variety
it accommodates.
which

models

the

This is the aim of his original position
liberal

conception

of

separate

persons

working out a fair and reasonable agreement for life together.
In order for the agreement to be fair it must not be biased by
44

PL, 56-57, details an incomplete list of the sources of
the burdens of judgement.
These range from the conflicting
nature of evidence to differing personal and institutional
perspectives.
45

"Justice as fairness works from the fundamental ideas
of society as a fair system of cooperation together with the
conception of the person as free and equal" (PL, 167).
See
also Kukathas and Pettit (1990, 135-139) for their discussion
of diversity and stability in Rawls' thought.
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the arbitrary natural and social position of the parties to
the agreement.

No one can be allowed to favor one's own

interests in this agreement.

"Each is forced to choose for

everyone" (TJ, 140) ; each is forced to consider the benefit of
every,

and any,

other party to the agreement. 46

ignoring particulars,

Rawls'

Far from

veil of ignorance presents an

opportunity for a full consideration of others, their unique
circumstances and relationships.

Rather than abstract from

differences, it encourages parties to consider differences by
releasing

them

circumstances

from

enslavement

(see Okin 1989a).

to

personal

desires

and

Allowing insight into the

multiple dimensions of various familial and economic relationships, Rawls provides the tools for a revolution of those same
relationships.
Social unity connotes the balancing of various elements,
not the reduction of different parts to one abstract whole.
As

such,

the

original

position

incorporates

a

notion

of

persons as rational and reasonable, as possessing two moral
powers:

a rational capacity to pursue instrumental,

often

competing individual and associational ends, and a reasonable
capacity to frame social structures so as to constitute fair
cooperation.

The original position mirrors these rational and

reasonable moral powers:
46

the rational aspects of the person

0kin (1989b, 231-244) forcefully and effectively makes
this point.
As Okin notes, Rawls' use of rational choice
theory undermines this aspect of the veil of ignorance. Rawls
pulls back from rational choice theory language in Political
Liberalism.
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are reflected in the purposes of the agreement itself.

That

is, the parties in the original position further the particular interests of the person they represent.

The reasonable

aspects are reflected in the constraints essential to the
original

position,

in

the

restrictions

on

knowledge

of

personal, natural and social positions which induce parties to
consider fair terms of agreement and compels them to consider
justice

(see PL, 305).

Thus, the original position serves as

a device of representation, not as a depiction of abstract or
atomistic

persons. 47

It

allows

"reflective

detachment"

(Macedo 1990, 245) which blends individual ends with social
responsibilities.
Considered convictions underlie the original position
which both expresses our liberal intuitions of freedom and
equality,

and serves as a measure of the coherence of our

conclusions. 48
implications

We use the original position to expose the
of

our

liberal

intuitions

and,

just as

47

"As a device of representation the idea of the original
position serves as a means of public reflection and selfclarif ication.
It helps us work out what we now think, once
we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what
justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme of
cooperation between free and equal citizens" (PL, 26).
See
also PL, 27-28.
Here Rawls contends that although it may
appearas though "the essential nature of persons is independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including
their final ends and attachments" actually this is an "illusion," a function of the original position acting as a device
of representation.
48

In my reading "considered convictions," in A Theory of
Justice correspond with "liberal intuitions" in Poli ti cal
Liberalism.
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importantly,

to test those convictions and the viability of

the original position and its constraints.

Rawls explains:

By going back and forth, sometimes altering the
conditions of the contractual circumstances, at
others withdrawing our judgments and conforming
them to principle, I assume that eventually we
shall find a description of the initial situation
that both expresses reasonable conditions and
yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.
This state of
affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium.
(TJ,
20)

This method demonstrates the sensitivity to context of his
theory of justice.

Rawls does not, nor did he ever, claim to

elucidate universal principles to be imposed, haphazardly, on
unique political circumstances; as he stresses in Political
Liberalism,

"We

start ... by

looking

to

the

public

culture

itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas
and principles."

He concludes by "saying that a political

conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our
considered convictions" (PL, 8).
Whereas

some

feminists

misread

in Rawls'

thought

opposition between the universal and the particular,

an

other

feminists incorrectly locate a dichotomy between justice and
care.
tion

This perceived opposition actually denotes an integraof

both

demonstrates,
Rawls'
genuine,

perspectives.

As

my

analysis

of

marriage

rather than denying the possibility of care,

presentation

of

justice

non-exploitative care.

lays

the

foundation

for

Rather than reducing all

relationships to their contractual components, Rawls articulates the terms of a fair relationship, the foundation of true
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affection.

In this light,

opposes care. 49
that

justice complements rather than

Rawls states this vividly when he concludes

"the sense of justice is continuous with the love of

mankind"

(TJ, 476).

Finally,

the alleged opposition between obligation and

duty in Rawls also results from a misperception.

Feminist

critics have mistakenly located a dichotomy between voluntary
and

non-voluntary

relationships

obligation and duty.

in

Rawls'

treatment

of

Rawls' aim, however, is to draw out the

voluntary components of potentially coercive social structures.

For example, it is because "political power is always

coercive power backed by the government's use of sanctions"
(PL, 136)
necessary

that constructs such as the original position are
to

relationship,

elucidate
the

fair

the
terms

voluntary
of

dimension

cooperation.

of

that

Similarly,

because family duties are given, the same device of representation defines fair terms of cooperation in that relationship,
thereby enhancing the voluntary component,
familial sphere.

choice,

in the

Duties do not oppose obligations; they blend

together to form a complex matrix of human relationships, to
some of which justice is pertinent (see TJ, 115-116).
In sum,

the communitarian feminist

incorrectly interprets Rawls'

intent and conclusions.

criticizing Rawls on these bases,

49

out.

critique of Rawls
In

they overlook the avenue

Hampton (1993) and Kymlicka (1990a, 275) both point this
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available

in

regardless

of

oppressor.

Rawls'
its

thought

acceptance

for
by

identifying
both

the

domination

oppressed

and

Feminists have long argued that patriarchy is

pervasive across, and within, cultures.

Patriarchy consti-

tutes one of the best examples of a form of oppression for
which, at times, both the oppressor and oppressed have offered
support.

Witness some women's historical support of foot

binding or,

for that matter, high heels.

In such an atmo-

sphere of oppression less articulate or unspoken perspectives
are

of ten

lost.

Rawls'

method

provides

a

strategy

for

articulating a perspective which an actual participant in the
oppression fails to comprehend.

Sometimes justice must reach

beyond the perspective of the "concrete other" (Benhabib 1987)
to voice an impartial condemnation of an accepted oppression.
Rawls'
50

original position does

exactly this. 50

He reaches

Some scholars of Rawls' work argue that his later
writings represent a retreat from this liberating vision (see,
for example, Kloska 1993). In contrast, Kukathas and Pettit
(1990) identify the shift in Rawls' writings as one of
emphasis, from desirability to feasibility. In this interpretation, A Theory of Justice portrays the desirability of the
terms of cooperation; Political Liberalism demonstrates the
feasibility of terms of cooperation.
Rawls, in his most
recent article "The Law of Peoples" (1993, 38) grapples with
the extension of the principles of justice to foreign policy.
Here he "indicates the role of human rights as part of a
reasonable law of peoples."
Rawls argues this because "In
the absence of this extension to the law of peoples, a liberal
conception of political justice would appear to be historicist
and apply only to societies whose political institutions and
culture are liberal.
In making this case for justice as
fairness, and for similar, more general liberal conceptions,
it is essential to show that this is not so" (my emphasis).
Whatever one's interpretation, however, Rawls never denies the
possibility of a growing appeal and acceptance of what he
calls "liberal intuitions." (For a persuasive argument along
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beyond often oppressive community values to create a picture
of just relationships, to delineate the fair terms of cooperation.
In conclusion,
potential

for

Rawls'

critically

liberal
exposing

principles
and

oppression, regardless of the context.

contain

denouncing

the

women's

Rawls' principles of

justice protect individuals, their right for self -development,
while enhancing the possibility of just, chosen communities
and relationships.

Rawls'

understanding of persons
cultural

circumstances

authenticating"

principles of

as

with

dimension of

justice blend an

constituted by historical and
a

perception
personhood.

into

the

"self -

As

such,

Rawls

supports liberal individual liberty with the substantive means
to exercise that liberty.

He provides the tools, the primary

goods, necessary for the realization of women's liberty.

these lines, see Schwarzenbach 1991, 549.)

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:

LIBERALISM AND FEMINISM:

ARE THE TWO MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE?
Four related claims emerge from these chapters.

First,

anti-liberal feminists have generally misread liberal theory.
By focusing on a
these

feminists

particular theorist's contingent claims,
overlook

animating liberal theory.
failed

to grasp

women's

the

empowerment.

the

deeper,

Second,

enormous

valuable

as a

principles

result,

potential of

Liberalism presents

they have

liberalism for
an

ideal which

applies to women as well as men; despite feminist assertions
to the contrary, liberalism supports and strengthens women's
quest for equality.

Third, liberalism can fully accommodate

feminism, indeed providing full theoretical support for many
of the alternatives feminists provide.
that

feminists

project.

abandon liberalism,

Finally, to the extent
they imperil

their own

The essential feature of liberalism is the identifi-

cation of private spheres of activities within which individuality is developed and expressed.
only

movement

in

political

Liberalism represents the

philosophy

which

founds

and

sustains a systematic defense of the individual based in a
distinction

between

private

and
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public

activities.

In
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rejecting liberalism, some feminism lose the protection it
offers the individual.
Feminist,

have

generally,

misread

intent of particular liberal thinkers.

the

potential

and

Locke, for example,

differentiates between private and public in an attempt to
protect the individual from the arbitrary use of state power.
He limits the scope of political power, while basing legitimate political authority on consent.

Distinguishing paternal

power from political power to ensure the adult status of
liberal citizens,

Locke disarms tyrannies which would rob

persons of the freedom of action compatible with the capacity
for reason.

Feminists who narrowly interpret Locke's distinc-

tion to privilege self-interested reason over compassion, man
over woman, politics over family, overlook and distort both
the

intent

and

potential

built

into

this

early

liberal

expression.
In distinguishing political relationships from parental,
marital, economic, and religious relationships, Locke expresses a liberal understanding of individuals acting in a variety
of spheres.

Liberalism, as it began with Locke and continued

with Mill and Rawls, has always been about creating a community of communities, uniting complex persons and diverse people
in a cooperative, stable society.

Locke explores the relation

between political liberty and familial, economic and religious
ends, differentiating between each in order to secure each.
Still, he never portrays these spheres as entirely separate,

170
dichotomous, or reified.

Rather he provides a framework which

assimilates

character

the

unique

of

each

sphere

with

a

rudimentary understanding of the interdependence and interaction between spheres.

More specifically, Locke locates the

differing purposes of families and politics, while implicitly
recognizing

the role government plays

liberty and property,

even within families.

explicitly incorporates
liberal

citizens,

in

in protecting life,

the role of
supplying

the

Moreover,

families

he

in nurturing

requisite

background

conditions of a liberal political system.
Mill pursues the liberal project of expanding individual
choice by protecting the individual from another threat--the
majority.

He identifies a tyranny as great, or greater, than

political tyranny and distinguishes between private and public
in an attempt to protect the individual from the stunting,
pervasive whims of a social tyranny.

To this end, he elabo-

rates a standard of harm which distinguishes areas of individual

concern

from

legitimate

community

interests,

while

offering a standard of privacy to which both men and women can
appeal.

Feminists who construe this private-public distinc-

tion to celebrate abstract reason over emotion misunderstand
Mill's

project.

Alternatively,

feminists

who

deny

the

efficacy of Mill's liberal principles in the battle against
coercive familial and economic control mistake the extent to
which this
surfaces.

standard protects women from harm,

wherever it
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Mill's use of the concept of harm to distinguish private
from public concerns manifests a keener sense of the private
bases of public power than apparent in Locke's thought.

In

Mill's view private is not distinguished from public simply in
terms of spheres and their purposes,
impact

on

the

individual.

political intervention.

Harm

but also in terms of

to

another

legitimates

By recognizing and addressing harm

regardless of the sphere within which it occurs, Mill grapples
with the unique harm done to women in families.
Particularly troubling to feminist critics of liberalism
is its perceived inability for dealing with the complexity of
family life.
between

Feminists fear that

private

families,

and

public

the liberal distinction

inappropriately

romanticizes

sheltering supposedly free expressions of marital

and parental love from damaging state intervention.
feminists

charge

that

this

portray reality accurately.
individual

integrity

and

image of

family

Many

life fails

to

Families also enslave, destroying
hope.

Parents

abuse

children;

spouses abuse spouses.
Mill explicitly and potently meets this feminist challenge to liberalism.

He recognizes the historical reality in

which families capture and enslave women,

in which husbands

rape and maim, and in which women lack redress.

But he does

this while insisting on the possibility that the family may
live up to the liberal promise of individual integrity; he
does

this while providing for familial

sanctuary from the
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dictates of political and social coercion.

In essence, Mill's

private-public distinction alleviates the potential harm done
to women in families, while allowing room for individually
chosen

marital

and

parental

arrangements.

Mill's

harm

standard legitimates intervention in the family to bar one
member from harming another.

He views any other reason for

intervention, such as moral repugnance or righteous distaste,
as illegitimate, an inappropriate use of political power.
Rawls understands that individual choice demands not only
freedom of action but also the material and cultural resources
imperative to exercise that freedom.

He employs an original

position characterized by a veil of ignorance which reveals
the fair terms of cooperation among individuals.

Rawls'

method seeks to remove personal bias in political reasoning;
justice surfaces when each individual accounts for the needs
of every other individual, when each individual possesses fair
access to the primary goods necessary to maximize authentic
individual choice.

Feminists misinterpret the consequences of

Rawls' method when they conclude that it yields an inhuman
distinction between an impartial and particular perspective,
between universal and particular concerns.

Rather, Rawls'

method allows an understanding of the particular concerns of
another by removing the personal prejudices and motives of
each.
By redefining private and public to explicitly include a
concern

for

the

distribution

of

resources

necessary

to
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exercise

true

choice,

Rawls

advances

the

liberal

agenda.

Whereas Mill leaves open an avenue to such a policy,
manifest

by

seriously

positive notion of

pursuing

liberty,

the

Rawls

implications

made

of

his

specifically charts

the

egalitarian consequence of grounding a political philosophy on
liberty.
liberty

Unlike Locke and Mill, Rawls consciously buttresses
with

the

worth

substantive equality.

of

liberty,

formal

equality with

Like Locke and Mill, Rawls begins with

liberty as a first principle, but unlike them, he extends the
liberal understanding of that first principle by explicitly
supporting it with a second which demands fair equality of
opportunity and fair access to primary goods.
Thus, Rawls broadens Mill's harm principle, recognizing
that protection from harm alone will not suffice.
genuine liberty demands fair play.

Rather,

His original position, and

the principles derived from it, express the standards of fair
play,

of

liberty.

just societal conditions conducive to individual
The difference principle furnishes

background conditions of

the first principle,

the necessary
of

liberty.

Specifically, Rawls' liberal principles provide for affirmative action aimed at alleviating the burdens of the least
advantaged groups--including those burdened as members of an
oppressed class based on sex.
Rawls' treatment of the family testifies to the potential
of the liberal private-public distinction in confronting a
variety of threats to individual liberty.

In recognizing the
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family both as an essential institution of the basic structure
and as a private association, he incorporates the two dimensional nature of family life into the liberal paradigm:

the

liberal appreciation of the family as a chosen affectionate
arrangement and the feminist perception of the family as a
male dominated tyranny.

Rawls comprehends the family as a

significant barrier to opportunity, and offers a model aimed
at removing that barrier, without undermining its integrity.
As an institution of the basic structure, the principles of
justice pertain to the family.
justice exist,
family

members,

When the circumstances of

that is, when conflicting interests motivate
the

principles

of

justice

dictate

equal

liberty followed by a distribution of resources which favors
the least advantaged.

This scheme strengthens the bargaining

position, the possibility for genuine liberty of any oppressed
member in the family.

When affection replaces conflict, when

a commonality of interest eliminates discord, justice provides
the backdrop within which sincere affection and authentic
individual

choice

prevails.

Thus,

Rawls'

private-public

distinction grapples with patriarchal families while preserving the liberal appreciation for the sanctity of family life.
Apparent in the evolution of ideas among the liberal
thinkers

studied here

is

an

increasing

understanding

and

integration of the material and relational bases of individual
autonomy and choice.
address

Liberalism expands to incorporate and

each new public and private

threat

to

individual
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liberty.

Each of these three philosophers struggles to strike

a balance between liberty and equality, between choice (that
is, individual initiative which generates variety and inequality) and the equality necessary to actualize that choice.

As

each liberal thinker uncovers the implications and repercussions of a liberal political philosophy centered on individual
choice, each furthers the liberal project by assimilating the
dynamics of liberty at work in real social, political situations.

In other words,

the evolution among these liberal

thinkers exposes a heightening sensitivity to the link between
formal and substantive equality, between liberty and the worth
of liberty.
In sum, liberalism, and its private-public distinction,
begins in a concern for individual choice,
ever-growing awareness of
choices.

evolving to an

the substantive bases of

those

Women's empowerment requires just such an under-

standing of choice, of women's need for freedom from arbitrary
patriarchal encroachments on their choice and of women's need
for appropriate bases from which to exercise genuine choice.
As such, despite many feminist assertions to the contrary,
liberalism remains a potent weapon against oppression wherever
it surfaces.
in

the

spheres.

Patriarchy begins in women's diminished choices

family

which

reverberate

throughout

other

social

Liberalism combats patriarchy at its roots and in

its effects by expanding individual choice in a variety of
human relationships, including those relationships expressed
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in the familial and economic spheres.

Liberalism can recog-

nize the pervasive character of patriarchy, its impact on all
spheres of activity, while protecting the unique character and
purpose of different spheres.

Patriarchy taints economic,

religious, political and familial relationships;
can

fight

the

patriarchy

in

these

liberalism

relationships

without

destroying them.
The demand by some feminists for an alternative political
paradigm rests on a mistaken reading of liberalism.

Rightly

understood liberalism can accommodate many feminist versions
of the appropriate private-public distinction.
this reading,

Indeed,

in

liberalism incorporates O'Brien's distinction

between "intimate" and "public" space.

This interpretation of

liberalism also negates Pateman's rejection of its privatepublic distinction as overly and artificially separated and
opposed,

while

integrating her call

for

a

paradigm which

distinguishes personal from political life.
Similarly,

feminists who reject liberalism's abstract,

impartial character fail to apprehend the potential of the
liberal distinction between private and public.

Contrary to

this

theoretical

feminist

support

for

reading,
a

liberalism offers

"communicative

ethic"

full

which

integrates

a

situated analysis into political discussion; only an overly
narrow reading of liberalism can justify the claim that this
alternative lies beyond the reach of liberal politics.
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Communicative
liberals

supposedly

ethics

displaces

impose

between

the

opposition

reason

and

which

feelings.

Desires, particulars and emotions now gain entrance into the
process

of

public

justification;

this

situated

analysis

exposes the necessity of a redistributive as well as distributi ve politics.
allows

Correctly understood,

however,

the situated analysis these feminists

liberalism

desire.

The

impartial character of liberal politics some feminists reject
actually

encourages

each

person

to

fully

appreciate

comprehend the particular perspective of another.
step out of oneself to truly know another,

and

One must

especially when

oppression and prejudice color, and narrow, our sympathy.

In

forcing persons to discount personal bias, Rawls encourages a
"situated

analysis"

of

the

other

person's

circumstances.

Liberalism facilitates, rather than negates, a communicative
ethics and sheds light on the power relationships operating in
society which

require

above mere distribution.
oppression,

structural

transformations

over and

Once one fully understands another's

one not only apprehends the personal impact of

that oppression but also the structural dynamics behind it,
the power relations which undermine self-respect and the real
possibility of individual success.
The liberal private-public distinction looks very similar
to the
appeal.

"differentiated continuum"

to which many feminists

Liberalism draws out the choices available in the

multitude of

relationships

persons

live,

while

fully
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understanding the non-voluntary component of each of those
relationships.

Liberalism blends

an

appreciation of

the

possibility of choice with a growing cognizance of the threats
to

that choice.

As

such,

character of human life.
to circumstance,
one's birth.

liberalism apprehends

the dual

On one hand, each person is victim

to the physical and social particulars of

On the other,

each is agent to the future,

creatively choosing among alternatives, framing unique life
plans from predetermined environments.

In recognizing the

peculiar

sphere,

constitution

of

each

special

liberalism

maximizes choice in each while allowing insight into the nonvoluntary components of diverse relationships.

It assimilates

the non-voluntarily acquired aspect of parenting, or mothering, with arrangements to accentuate the voluntary aspect of
such relationships.
become mothers,

Liberalism expands choice; women need not

or wives,

because feasible options

exist.

Moreover, if one chooses to mother, liberalism undercuts the
oppressive outcome of that choice.
Not

only

can

liberalism

accommodate

many

feminist

alternatives, it also guards against those alternatives which
threaten

individual

liberty,

which

violations of one sphere by another.

require

inappropriate

Elshtain's "compassion-

ate politics" for example, does reach beyond the limits of
liberalism.
fairness

Liberals cherish their adult status,

in politics

compassion.

While

rather

than dangerous,

appropriate

to

the

seeking

paternalistic

personal

familial
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sphere, compassion translates poorly to the political sphere
where persons do not, cannot, know the particular desires and
ends of every other person.

In such circumstances, compassion

endangers individuality, imposing tyrannically designated ends
on adults

reasonable enough to choose their own ends

in

situations of fair cooperation.
In general, anti-liberal feminists endanger their own
agenda by dismissing the liberal paradigm.

Rejecting liberal -

ism entails a denial of the one essential feature of liberalism,

a distinction between private and public spheres of

activities.

Private life, a realm where the individual may

retreat from the social and political pressures of modern
life, constitutes a fundamental component of liberalism and of
the feminist aim of women's emancipation.

Both sexes require

an arena within which they are left alone, within which the
individual, and her/his choices, reign.
and protects such an arena.

Liberalism constructs

Feminism requires a liberal

understanding of privacy if it hopes to protect individual
choice.
Feminism can use this paradigm in order to expand women's
choices,

women's empowerment,

while retaining the liberal

protection of genuine choice from authoritarian encroachment.
The liberal thinkers studied here reconciled the reality that
individuals live in, and often cherish social groups, with an
acknowledgment of the coercive character of those groups.
They achieved this by recognizing both the private and public

180
dimensions of various human relationships.

Locke began this

liberal paradigm of private and public spheres by separating
the political from other private spheres.

Mill extended it by

identifying legitimate and illegitimate reasons for political
intervention in private lives.

Rawls deepened the liberal

understanding of private and public life by differentiating
between the right and the good, between the reasonable and the
rational.
liberty

These
requires

philosophers
fair

and

have

shown

that

explicit

terms

of

individual

cooperation,

blended with the greatest possible latitude in choice.
The paradigm which liberalism offers to feminism is not
one which creates a private-public distinction,
private-public distinctions.

but rather

Inherent to liberalism, to each

of the liberal philosophies studied here, is an identification
of multiple spheres of life, each with its own character and
dynamic.
and

Indeed liberalism adopts this view as early as Locke

carries

communities.

it

through

Rawls'

notion

of

a

cornrnuni ty

of

Liberalism protects an individual acting in a

multitude of relationships, and respects the unique character
of those various relationships, without falling prey to the
relativism characteristic of the most recent expression of a
"spheres of
Locke's
contract

justice"

natural

law,

theory save

approach espoused by Michael Walzer.
Mill's
them from

utilitarianism,
the

and

Rawls'

relativism implied by

basing political ideals in "shared understandings."

In each

case explored here, liberal individuals act within a variety
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of human relationships without ever being totally defined by
any one, or group of those relationships.

Through an exercise

of genuine choice, individuals transcend the totality of their
relationships.
Women's equality demands both the liberal recognition of
a variety of spheres operating according to private and public
dimensions and the liberal insight into individuality which
transcends community.

Women's history exposes the oppressive

potential of community life,
understandings.

the danger inherent to shared

Liberalism locates an individual who is not

merely defined by that communal oppression, but who may also
reach beyond those oppressive circumstances to express his or
her own individuality.

Liberalism maximizes the possibility

for

for

authentic choice,

individuals

forming

themselves,

within the context of rich and diverse, sometimes oppressive,
relationships.
Many questions remain unanswered, however.

The public

policy implications of these private-public distinctions need
to be elaborated, struggled over, revised,
struggled over again.

implemented, and

Liberalism offers a paradigm within

which these policy discussions can take place.
complexity
answers,

of

human

standards

life

such as

and

relationships

harm and

Although the
deny

fairness

us

easy

off er us

a

rational, liberal base from which to begin these discussions.
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